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Introduction
What are the conditions for a well-functioning currency union? Since the 1960s’, there
has been a long stream of literature dedicated to this question. Through studying the
historical fixed exchange rate regime of the Gold Standard (chapter 2) and the modern day
euro area (chapters 3 and 4), this thesis aims to add to the understanding of the economics
of currency unions.
Chapter 2 “When Do Fixed Exchange Rate Work? Evidence from the Gold Standard”
examines external adjustments within a currency union. In particular, my co-author Felix
Ward and I look at the historical circumstances of a fixed exchange rate regime that
worked smoothly – the 1880-1913 Gold Standard. External adjustment under the Gold
Standard was associated with few if any, output costs. How did countries on the Gold
Standard equilibrate so smoothly despite inflexible exchange rates that were pegged to
gold? To answer this question, we build and estimate an open economy model of the
Gold Standard. This allows us to quantitatively assess the relative importance of three
prominent channels of external adjustment: flexible prices, international migration, and
monetary policy. Our first finding is that the output resilience of Gold Standard members
was primarily a consequence of flexible prices. When hit by a shock, quickly adjusting
prices induced import- and export responses that stabilized output. Neither restrictions
on migration, nor the elimination of countercyclical monetary policy would have given
rise to substantially higher output-volatility. Our second finding is that price flexibility
was predicated on a historical contingency: namely large primary sectors, whose flexibly
priced products dominated the export booms that stabilized output during major external
adjustments.
Chapter 3 “Sovereign Default Risk and the Role of International Transfers” asks
what is the impact of interregional risk sharing arrangements when countries are afflicted
– 1 –
with sovereign default risk. This is of particular interest in the setup of currency unions,
where countries give up the exchange rate as a tool for business cycle stabilization. I
introduce a sovereign default model in which regional sovereign default risk affects private
sector financing costs and the linkage between public and private sector financing costs can
exacerbate economic downturns. In this context, the benefit of international risk sharing
comes in two dimensions. First, it helps to smooth consumption – the traditional channel
of insurance. More importantly, by ameliorating large recessions, international risk sharing
reduces the asymmetric impact of productivity shocks and raises average output level.
Quantitative analysis shows that most of the welfare benefits that are obtainable from
the optimal risk sharing arrangement can be reaped by a standby facility that is easy to
implement. This finding is of policy relevance because whenever interregional risk sharing
schemes are discussed between sovereign nation states, the willingness to part with fiscal
autonomy is often severely limited.
In Chapter 4 “Sovereign Risk Spillover and Monetary Policy in a Currency Union”, I
investigate the pass-through of sovereign default risk to the private sector financing condition
from a different angle. In particular, I use a two-region currency union model to examine
how the spillover affects shock propagation and optimal monetary policy. On the one hand,
an increase in a region’s sovereign risk premium raises the regional private sector credit
spread, depresses inflation and tax revenue and further worsens the fiscal position. On the
other hand, it also triggers changes in the policy interest rate. The net impact depends
on the maturity of the government debt. When calibrated to the euro area and taken into
account the average long maturity of government debt, the impact of the sovereign risk
spillover on shock propagation is negligible. This is also reflected in optimal monetary
policy. For the euro area, optimal monetary policy is well approximated by a simple target
criterion that describes the optimal relation between output and inflation as derived from a
basic New Keynesian model without sovereign risk and credit spreads. This continues to be
the case even when there are cross-regional differences in their exposure to sovereign default
risks. If government debts are short-term, however, the spillover considerably affects shock
transmission and optimal monetary policy requires a stronger immediate shock-response.
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2
When Do Fixed Exchange Rate Work? Evidence
from the Gold Standard
Joint with Felix Ward
2.1 Introduction
The pre-1914 Gold Standard was a global fixed exchange rate regime of colossal extent:
By 1913 economies responsible for 67% of world GDP and 70% of world trade had relin-
quished flexible exchange rates as a means to unwind external imbalances. Yet external
adjustments were associated with few, if any, output costs (see Meissner and Taylor, 2006;
Adalet and Eichengreen, 2007). How did the Gold Standard (GS) equilibrate so smoothly
despite inflexible exchange rates? There exist various competing, though not mutually
exclusive explanations. First, prices were relatively flexible, allowing for a faster absorption
of shocks (Backus and Kehoe, 1992; Basu and Taylor, 1999; Chernyshoff et al., 2009).
Second, cyclical international migration helped to turn around the current account and
took the pressure off of wages in depressed regions (e.g. Hatton, 1995; Khoudour-Caste´ras,
2005). Finally, central banks could smooth out temporary disturbances by running down
their reserves (see Bazot et al., 2014; Eichengreen and Flandreau, 2016) or by making use
of the considerable monetary policy independence that the Gold Standard, as a target zone
regime, afforded in the short run (Krugman, 1991; Svensson, 1994; Bordo and MacDonald,
2005). The purpose of this paper is to provide a quantitative assessment of the relative
importance of each of these channels. Can we determine which one reduced output volatility
the most? Were they equally important – or were they most effective in combination?
In order to quantitatively assess the relative importance of flexible prices, international
migration and monetary policy we built the first open-economy model of the Gold Standard
that features international migration, various degrees of price flexibility and an elaborate
monetary structure. We estimated the model with Bayesian methods and then studied
the estimated model’s behavior through counterfactual simulations: How would output
– 3 –
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volatility have looked had prices been less flexible? What if there had been no release through
migration? How important was countercyclical monetary policy? The first main finding of
this paper is that price flexibility was paramount for the benign adjustment experience under
the Gold Standard. Neither restrictions on migration, nor the elimination of countercyclical
monetary policy would have given rise to substantially higher output-volatility.
The second main finding of this paper is that price flexibility and benign external
adjustment was predicated on production and trade concentrating in the primary sector:
Agricultural products generally exhibit significantly more flexible prices than industrial
or service goods. Prior to 1913 agricultural products still made up the majority of all
merchandise exports, even among early industrializers. This fortunate coincidence of the
nominally most flexible sector also being the most important tradable sector is the main
explanation for the ease of external adjustment under the pre-1913 Gold Standard. On
the basis of newly collected disaggregate export, price and production data we show that
Gold Standard economies experienced a pronounced shift in sectoral structure in the face
of a current account reversal. That is a shift, away from the production of non-tradables
(primarily services) towards the production of tradable agricultural goods. This sectoral
shift was brought about by quickly falling agricultural prices that directly translated into a
boom in agricultural exports.
A study of external adjustment under the Gold Standard is particularly interesting
in light of the often painful adjustment experiences in fixed exchange rate regimes today.
Figure 2.1, for example, contrasts external adjustment under the Gold Standard with
that in the euro area:1 Under the Gold Standard as well as in the euro area the current
account-to-GDP (CA/GDP) ratio on average decreased by about 5 percentage points in
the 10 years prior to reversing sharply. However, while reversals were associated with
major recessions in the euro area, under the Gold Standard output continued to grow on
trend. The Gold Standard thus also provides an auspicious historical contrast to more
recent external adjustments where exchange rates are fixed. Additionally, the pre-1913
Gold Standard lasted longer than most international fixed exchange rate regimes and thus
provides a unique opportunity to analyze external adjustment under fixed exchange rates
for an unaltered set of countries over more than three decades.
The paper is structured as follows: The following section introduces the data. After that,
1CA/GDP troughs are defined according to a turning-point algorithm (see Bry and Boschan, 1971). CA/GDP-
troughs are defined as the lowest CA/GDP-value in a ±10-year window. For the EZ a ±8-year window was
chosen and border conditions were weakened because of the shorter sample length.
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Figure 2.1: Average GDP- and CA/GDP-behavior around major CA/GDP-reversals
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Notes: The averages are based on a sample of 14 GS countries and 12 EZ countries respectively.
Major adjustment periods are defined as the periods lasting from one CA/GDP trough to the next.
CA/GDP troughs are defined according to a turning-point algorithm a` la Bry and Boschan (1971):
CA/GDP-troughs are defined as the lowest CA/Y-value in a ±10-year window. For the EZ a ±8-
year window was chosen and border conditions were weakened because of the shorter sample length.
GS: 9 CA/GDP troughs. EZ: 7 CA/GDP troughs.
Section 2.3 gives an empirical outline of the behavior of prices, migration and monetary
policy during major external adjustment episodes under the Gold Standard. Here we show
that: (i) a strong price-decline in regions facing a current account-reversal quickly increased
their price-competitiveness, (ii) migration flows redistributed labor supply from deficit
regions to surplus regions, and (iii) central banks made use of the short-run independence
they enjoyed under the Gold Standard. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 presents the Gold Standard-
model and its estimation. The relative importance of prices, migration and monetary policy
are then analyzed on the basis of counterfactual model simulations in Section 2.6. Section
5
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2.7 substantiates our findings from the model simulations with evidence from disaggregate
price- and export data that suggests large primary sector shares and the dominance of
primary products in international trade played a crucial role for external adjustment under
the Gold Standard. Section 2.8 then concludes our analysis.
2.2 Data
The empirical foundation of our analysis is a new annual dataset for 14 countries that were
members of the Gold Standard throughout the 1880-1913 period, namely Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S (http://dx.doi.org/10.17632/wch3rbkxp7.2). By
focusing on a sample of 14 Gold Standard members whose commitment to gold was never
seriously questioned in the period under consideration we exclude the topic of peg-credibility
from our analysis. This allows us to squarely focus on the issue of external adjustment
under inflexible exchange rates.
In many cases we were able to draw extensively from previous historical data collections
by economic historians. In other cases new data had to be compiled from the historical
publications of contemporary statistical offices, central banks and trade agencies. Particular
effort went into the construction of a novel set of effective exchange rates, gold cover ratios
and sectoral export- and price level data. The construction of these series is described in
more detail in the following section.
All in all, our dataset covers the following annual time series: nominal GDP, real
per capita GDP, consumer prices, the current account, imports and exports, the nominal
exchange rate, immigration and emigration, population, discount rates, note circulation,
nominal and real effective exchange rates, gold cover ratios, sectoral production shares,
sectoral exports, sectoral price level data, terms of trade, and export prices. A detailed
listing of all the sources is provided in Appendix 2.A.1. Further data descriptions, as well
as reliability and validation checks for the sectoral data and migration series can be found
in Appendices 2.A.4, 2.A.2 and 2.A.3.
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2.2.1 Effective exchange rates
The real effective exchange rate of country i is calculated as the trade-weighted geometric
average of bilateral real exchange rates (RERi,j,t) with respect to countries j ∈ 1, ..., J
REERi,t =
J∏
j=1
j 6=i
RER
wi,j,t
i,j,t ,
where wi,j,t is the bilateral trade weight. The real exchange rate is the product of the
nominal exchange rate2 and the ratio of consumer prices, RERi,j,t = NERi,j,t
CPIi,t
CPIj,t
.3 Our
baseline REER estimate uses the bilateral trade flow data provided by Lo´pez-Co´rdova
and Meissner (2008) and Mitchell (2013) as trade weights.4 Trade weights wi,j,t equal the
ratio of total bilateral trade to GDP, (importsi,j,t + exportsi,j,t)/GDPi,t. In accordance
with modern-day REER estimates, as provided for example by the ECB, we updated the
bilateral trade-weights every three years. Note that we exclusively consider GS-member
economies for the REER calculation. We do this in order to focus on competitiveness within
the GS.5 Along the same lines we constructed nominal effective exchange rates (NEER)
and foreign effective consumer price indices as trade-weighted geometric averages. The final
REER series are displayed in Figure 2.9 in Appendix 2.A.6.
2.2.2 Gold cover ratios
Another crucial variable for our attempt to characterize external adjustment under the
GS are gold cover ratios. In its simplest form a legally defined gold cover ratio required the
central bank to back a certain fraction of its note issue with gold. In more general terms,
2Here the nominal exchange rate is written in quantity notation, i.e. foreign currency per domestic currency.
3This method of data aggregation into a foreign composite flows from a setup in which preferences are
characterized by a unit-elasticity of substitution between foreign goods varieties. Another advantage of
using the weighted geometric average is that the REER that is calculated on the basis of exchange rates
quoted in price-notation is exactly the inverese of the REER calculated on the basis of exchange rates
quoted in quantity notation.
4We linearly intrapolate the trade-weights and use the first and last observation of each country-pair to fill
in missing values at the beginning and end of the sample.
5This differentiates our REER series from those introduced by Cata˜o and Solomou (2005), whose REER
series are affected by fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate with respect to non-Gold Standard members.
For our 14 country sample of long-term Gold Standard adherents an average of 75% of imports came from
other countries in the sample and an average of 84% of exports went to other countries in the sample.
Although there is some variation across countries and time in these within-GS trade shares, even the
minimum intra-GS import share of 53% and the minimum intra-GS export share of 66% are sizeable.
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cover ratios required central banks to back their liquid liabilities with liquid assets. The
exact legal definition of cover ratios however differed across countries and time.6 In order
to capture this definitional ambiguity we decided to construct two different measures of
the gold cover ratio – one narrow and one broad. The narrow cover ratio is the ratio of
metal reserves (gold and silver) to notes in circulation. The broad cover ratio adds foreign
exchange reserves to the numerator and central bank deposits to the denominator. This
allowed us to select the cover ratio that comes closest to the legally defined one for each
country. For example since 1877 the numerator of the cover ratio targeted by the National
Bank of Belgium included foreign exchange reserves. Thus in our model estimation for
Belgium we used the broad cover ratio series. The narrow and broad cover ratio series are
displayed in Figures 2.10 and 2.11 in Appendix 2.A.7.
2.2.3 Sectoral shares, prices and exports
In order to see which sector drove external adjustment during the GS we collected
disaggregated price- and export data, as well as primary sector shares. The export data are
disaggregated into agricultural-, raw material- and industrial exports. The sectoral price
data features the same three categories as well as service prices. While some sources provide
data at this level of aggregation, in many cases we had to aggregate up from more readily
available product-level data. The sectoral data are described in more detail in Appendices
2.A.4 and 2.A.3. The sectoral value-added share data come from Buera and Kaboski (2012).
2.3 Stylized facts
In order to get a first impression of how prices, migration and monetary policy behaved
during major external adjustments under the Gold Standard (GS) this section introduces
a set of stylized facts. To this end we identify troughs in the current account to GDP
ratio (CA/GDP) through a Bry and Boschan (1971)-style algorithm: CA/GDP-troughs
are defined as the lowest CA/GDP-value in a ±10-year window. For the period between
1880-1913 we thus identify 9 CA/GDP troughs (see Figure 2.14 in Appendix 2.A.8).7
6Bloomfield (1959) provides a summary of the main types of legal cover ratios.
7As a robustness check we have also considered an alternative set of CA/GDP-troughs. In particular we
extended the selection to include any visually salient trough in the CA/GDP-ratio that was followed by a
prolonged period of increasing CA/GDP-ratios. Results are generally robust to this alternative selection
(see Appendix 2.C.1).
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We then look at how the average behavior of prices, migration and monetary policy (xi,t)
after such major CA/GDP-reversals differs from their average behavior after non-reversal
years. More formally we look at the sequence of differences
Dh(xi,t+h, Ai,t) = Ei,t(xi,t+hAi,t = 1)− Ei,t(xi,t+hAi,t = 0), h = 1, ...,H (2.1)
where Ai,t equals 1 if the economy i enters a major adjustment phase at time t, and
0 otherwise. h indicates the temporal distance from the start of the adjustment phase.
Thus Dh(xi,t+h, Ai,t), h = 1, ...,H stands for the different behavior of xi after major
CA/GDP-reversals relative to non-reversals.
Practically, we estimate the sequence of differences Dh(xi,t+h, Ai,t) through the following
sequence of fixed effects models:
xi,t+h − xi,t
xi,t
= αi,h + βhAi,t + ui,t+h, h = 1, ...,H (2.2)
where αi are country-fixed effects and ui,t is an error term. The {βh}h=1,...,H in expression
(2.2) allow us to sketch out the average behavior of macroeconomic aggregates over the
H years following a major CA/GDP-trough. This will provide us with a set of stylized
facts on how GS-member economies typically behaved during major adjustment phases in
contrast to their behavior during “normal” times.8
The first row of Figure 2.2 shows that the typical adjustment during the GS featured a
sharp increase in exports that led to a quick turn-around in the current account. Lower
import levels also temporarily contribute to the reversal. In general, however, external ad-
justments under the GS were export-driven. How did prices, migration and monetary policy
behave during these episodes? The second row in Figure 2.2 shows that domestic prices fell
strongly and swiftly during adjustment phases. The brunt of the adjustment is furthermore
born by domestic prices, with foreign prices remaining stable. As a consequence, the fall in
domestic prices translates almost one-to-one to a gain in relative price competitiveness of
around 6%.
8This approach is more familiar as the local projection framework for estimating impulse response functions
(Jorda, 2005) . Here however the {βh}h=1,...,H are used for the depiction of historical averages and should
not be interpreted as impulse response functions.
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Figure 2.2: Prices, migration and monetary policy after major reversals in the
CA/GDP-ratio
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How about migration? The third row of Figure 2.2 shows that about 5 years into
the adjustment, the average GS economy’s population was about 0.5% smaller due to the
reduction in immigration and an increase in emigration.9 This indicates that in the typical
external adjustment under the GS migration played only a minor, albeit systematic role.
However, for some economies migration flows could be more sizeable. Consider the case of
Sweden in the 1880s, which for the best part of the decade lost close to 1% of its population
per year. Assuming that at the end of such a decade the population level is only 5% lower
than what it would have been without migration, a back-of-the-envelope calculation places
the direct CA/GDP effect, stemming from emigrants lowering origin-country imports, in the
+1 to +2 ppt range.10 This constitutes a considerable contribution to external adjustment.
The same 5% population decline furthermore increases origin-country wages, and thus
stabilizes incomes. For a Cobb-Douglas production function, that is parametrized to a
labor share of income of around 66%, a 5% decrease in the labor supply thus implies a
non-negligible wage increase in the range of 1-2%.11 Thus for Sweden, migration might
have been more central to external adjustment than for other countries at the time.
Note, however, that the effect of migration on output is not unambiguously stabilizing.
Destabilizing effects arise in the short-run when recessionary origin economies lose internal
demand to already expanding host economies (see Farhi and Werning, 2014). When this
channel is taken into account migration is less likely to have a stabilizing influence, because
it now exerts opposing forces that can cancel each other out.12
Turning to the monetary side of external adjustment under the Gold Standard, the last
row in Figure 2.2 displays the behavior of the central bank discount rate, gold cover ratio
and the nominal effective exchange rate. In general, monetary policy turned accommoda-
tive during major external adjustments. Central bankers used their freedom to conduct
independent discount rate policy within the target zone and, on average, lowered discount
rates by 100 basis points. Some central banks made more extensive use of their freedom
9Note that due to sample difference arising from the fact that there are several countries for which only
immigration or emigration exists, but not both, the Immigration/Population and the Emigration/Population
graphs do not necessarily add up to the Net Immigration/Population graph.
10This assumes that Swedish households consume around 75% Swedish-produced goods and 25% foreign-
produced goods, which corresponds to Sweden’s actual average import to GDP ratio for the period 1880
to 1913. Also note that the assumed 5% population decline can be considered conservative.
11Note that such wage effects will slightly dampen the direct CA/GDP effect of migration.
12In the model, migration’s net effect on output stability will thus hinge upon the interaction of various
parameters, such as home bias in consumption, the curvature of the production function with respect to
labor input as well as all of the rigidities that influence the two regions’ response to short-run changes in
aggregate demand.
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than others. To get an idea of how much discount rate independence a ±1% target zone
regime allowed for, consider that a 1% depreciation of the exchange rate - that is expected
to disappear within one quarter - allows a central bank to temporarily set its policy rate 4
ppts below world levels.13 This can explain how in some years the discount rates set by
several Scandinavian central banks deviated by up to 3 percentage points from those set
by the Bank of England.14 In the short-run the GS left central bankers with considerable
flexibility for setting their discount rates with a “concern for home trade” (Sayers (1976) vol
I, p.44, Bordo and MacDonald (2005)). Beyond the limited monetary policy independence
they enjoyed within the target zone, central bankers were furthermore willing to round
the corners of the policy trilemma through active intervention in foreign exchange markets
or through the passive accommodation of gold outflows. Figure 2.2 shows that during
major external adjustments such policies resulted in a 5 ppt drop in gold cover ratios. The
National Bank of Belgium and the Banque de France were particularly willing to let their
gold cover ratios fluctuate in order to insulate the domestic economy from movements
in world interest rates (Eichengreen and Flandreau, 2016; Bazot et al., 2014). Thus, the
pre-1913 GS was in possession of several safety valves on the monetary side that could ease
external adjustment.15
To sum up, a typical external adjustment under the GS was accompanied by a strong
and swift gain in price-competitiveness. Migration- and monetary policy also reacted. For
individual countries activity along the latter two channels could become pronounced enough
to exert a non-negligible stabilizing force on per capita incomes– e.g. Sweden in the case
of migration, and Belgium in the case of monetary policy. Against the backdrop of these
empirical regularities we now introduce a structural model in order to quantitatively assess
the relative importance of price flexibility, migration and monetary policy in explaining the
stability of incomes during external adjustments under the GS.
13This example is taken from Bordo and MacDonald (2005). Note that, to the extent that the central bank’s
countercyclical policy rule is known and expected by agents, this influences ex ante inflation expectations
and thus real rates even before the central bank has taken any action. Thus observed differences in nominal
rates are imperfect indicators of the effectiveness of monetary policy independence during the GS.
14Due to the absence of large inflation differentials this translated into almost identical real rate differentials.
15The outlined relationship of prices, migration, and monetary policy with movements in the CA/GDP ratio
is a robust characteristic of the GS data. It also shows up in within year correlations (see Table 2.13 in
Appendix 2.C.2), as well as an alternative definition of CA/GDP troughs (see Figure 2.15 in Appendix
2.C.1).
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2.4 A model of the Gold Standard
To quantitatively analyze the relative importance of prices, migration and monetary
policy for the ease of external adjustment under the Gold Standard we need to be able to
disentangle their individual impact. To this end, we introduce a two-region open economy
model that features international migration flows, various degrees of price flexibility and a
GS-specific monetary structure.16
In the following section, we will first shortly outline the model and thereby focus mainly
on decision problems in one of the two regions – the H -region. The economy in the F -region
is symmetric and we provide a more detailed description of the complete equation system
that characterizes its state of equilibrium in Appendix 2.B.1.
2.4.1 Households
There is a continuum of households i ∈ [0, 1], with households [0, nt) living in H and
[nt, 1] in F. Household i’s period utility follows the Greenwood et al. (1988) (GHH) form.
The household maximizes its life time utility17
V it = Et
∞∑
k≥0
βk
1
1− σc
(
cit+k −
1
1 + σl
lit+k
1+σl
)1−σc
,
where β is the discount factor, lt is hours worked and ct is consumption, which is made
up of H - and F -produced goods: ct =
[
(1− α) 1 c
−1

H,t + α
1
 c
−1

F,t
] 
−1
. The elasticity of
substitution between these goods is  and the openness parameter α reflects a home-bias
in taste as well as trade frictions. The H and F goods themselves are CES bundles of
differentiated goods that are produced by the n home- and 1 − n foreign firms: cH,t =((
1
n
) 1
µ
∫ n
0 cH,t(j)
µ−1
µ d j
) µ
µ−1
and cF,t =
((
1
1−n
) 1
µ ∫ 1
n cF,t(j)
µ−1
µ d j
) µ
µ−1
, where j is the firm
index and µ is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in the same region. The
16The 2-region model abstracts from those countries that were not part of the Gold Standard. As a
robustness check we therefore also estimated a version of the model in which we treat one of the regions
as a hybrid that includes all other gold, as well as non-gold countries. The presented results are robust to
this alteration (see Appendix 2.C.3.6).
17Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003), Mendoza (1991) and Mendoza and Yue (2012) point out that open
economy models with GHH utility functions are better at replicating business cycle statistics than models
with utility functions where labor supply is subject to wealth effects.
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price indices for the H - and F -produced goods bundles are PH,t =
[
1
n
∫ n
0 PH,t(j)
1−µ d j
] 1
1−µ
and PF,t =
[
1
1−n
∫ 1
n PF,t(j)
1−µ d j
] 1
1−µ
. The H consumer price index is then given by
Pt =
[
(1 − α)P 1−H,t + αP 1−F,t
] 1
1−
. We assume that the law of one price applies at the
individual goods level so that PF,t(j) et = P
∗
F,t(j), where F -variables are marked by an
asterisk and et denotes the nominal exchange rate (domestic per foreign currency).
18 Note,
however, that due to the existence of home bias in consumption LOP does not imply
purchasing power parity (PPP).19
The households’ budget constraint is
BiH,t−1R
e
t−1 +B
i
F,t−1R
e∗
t−1/et + TRt + Ptwt l
i
t + Γt + I
τ
t
= BiH,t +B
i
F,t/et + Pt c
i
t + Pt
K
2
(
BiF,t
Ptet
− o¯
)2
where F -variables are marked by an asterisk. Ptwt is the nominal wage households receive
for supplying their labor to local firms on competitive labor markets. Γt are local firms’
nominal lump-sum dividends that are payed out to local households. BiH,t and B
i
F,t are
household i’s holdings of two internationally traded one-period risk-free bonds, denominated
in H - and F currency respectively. Ret is the effective return, which is determined by the
risk-free rate Rt and a risk premium shock 
b
t as R
e
t = Rt/ exp(
b
t). The adjustment of
foreign real asset holdings is subject to a quadratic adjustment cost, which is the last term
of the budget constraint equation.20 When households in F adjust their portfolio holding
of H bonds, the associated cost is transferred to H households in a lump-sum fashion:
TRt =
n∗t
nt
P ∗t
et
K∗
2
(
BiH,tet
P ∗t
− o¯∗
)2
. Portfolio adjustment costs and risk premium shocks allow
for deviations from strict uncovered interest parity (UIP). Because of migrations, the model
has four different household types - denoted by τ : H - and F -households that either stay or
18While the law of one price (LOP) assumption is an exaggeration (see Persson, 2004), price differentials
were generally declining over the 19th century, so that by the end of the century they had become a
fraction of what they used to be at its beginning (see Klovland, 2005; Jacks, 2005).
19See Diebold et al. (1991) and Taylor (2002) for analyses of purchasing power parity (PPP) in the 19th
and 20th centuries. While PPP held in the long-run, there could be considerable deviations from PPP
over short and medium horizons.
20We assume the same functional form as Benigno (2009). The adjustment cost also pins down the steady
state gross foreign asset position. The model’s steady state for net foreign assets is determined even
without the adjustment costs due to migration (see Appendix 2.B.2).
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migrate τ ∈ {H→ H, H→ F, F→ H, F→ F}, where → shows the direction of migration.
The type-specific and possibly negative payment Iτt ensures that nominal asset holdings
after migration are equalized across households within the region.
2.4.1.1 Endogenous migration
In our model households are free to migrate back and forth between the H and F
regions.21 At the beginning of each period, exogenous shocks realize and households choose
whether to migrate (δit = 1) or to stay (δ
i
t = 0). The decision to migrate is based on
comparing the lifetime utilities of continuing to live in H (V it ) to that of moving to F.
The utility of moving to F includes the utility of living there (V it
∗
) minus the costs of
moving. There exist two short-term costs of moving: One is a time-invariant, region specific
migration cost κd, which reflects the various hindrances migrants have to overcome (e.g.
travel costs). The other is a stochastic utility shock υit that captures the cross-population
idiosyncrasy and cross-time variation in a household’s preference for leaving its current
location.22 The household i’s migration decision is
δit = arg max
δit∈{0,1}
{V it , V it ∗ − υit − κd}.
We assume that the i.i.d. utility shock υit follows a logistic distribution with a mean of zero
and scale parameter ψ. An individual household’s migration probability is
dit = Prob
(
V it
∗ − κd > V it
)
.
After migrations have taken place, the type-specific transfers Iτt ensure that nominal asset
holdings at the beginning of the period are the same across households within a region. They
thus can be treated as identical and we drop the household index i.23 As a consequence
21Kennan and Walker (2011) also develop an econometric and dynamic model of migration that features
optimal location decisions over many alternative locations. They model individual decisions to migrate as
a job search problem and focus on the partial equilibrium response of labor supply to wage differentials.
22This ensures that not all households migrate at the same time.
23Type changing, or in our case migration, causes difficulties in tracking a household’s asset position. Cu´rdia
and Woodford (2010) construct an insurance scheme for households that change types with an exogenous
probability. The insurance equalizes the marginal utility of income for households of the same type. In
our model, such an insurance scheme is, however, infeasible, due to the endogeneity of the migration
decision. Here, we resort to the pooling assumption in order to keep the model tractable. A similar pooling
assumption has been used in Corsetti et al. (2013, 2014).
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the population fraction that emigrates, d˜t, equals the emigration probability, dt.
24 The
aggregate population in H, therefore, evolves according to25
nt = (1− d˜t)nt−1 + d˜∗t n∗t−1. (2.3)
2.4.2 Firms
The model’s production side consists of a continuum of monopolistic competitive firms
j ∈ [0, 1] that maximize expected discounted profits. The n home firms and 1− n foreign
firms produce with labor from H and F households respectively. The production technology
is yt(j) = exp(At)Lt(j)
γ , where yt(j) is output, Lt(j) is labor and At is the exogenous region-
specific productivity level. γ parameterizes the curvature of the production function with
respect to labor and thus determines the de- and reflationary effects of migration on wages
in receiving and sending regions. As in Calvo (1983), firms face a nominal rigidity, where
in each period only a random fraction (1− θ) of firms can reset their prices.26 θ, together
with γ and µ determine the slope of the Phillips curve according to κ˜ = (1−βθ)(1−θ)θ(1−µ+µ/γ) .
27
2.4.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium the following market clearing conditions for financial-, goods- and labor
markets hold:
0 = ntBH,t + n
∗
tB
∗
H,t
0 = ntBF,t + n
∗
tB
∗
F,t
yt(j) = nt cH,t(j) + n
∗
t c
∗
H,t(j), j ∈ [0, n)
y∗t (j) = nt cF,t(j) + n
∗
t c
∗
F,t(j), j ∈ [n, 1]
24While migration often lags behind business cycle conditions, Jerome (1926, p.241) states that the “most
common lag in migration fluctuations is from one to five months”. Migration thus does not feature any
intrinsic persistence in our annual model.
25Note that population levels in the model are stationary, although deviations from the steady state can be
very persistent.
26In accordance with the GS results reported by Benati (2008) our model does not feature price (backward-)
indexation.
27See Beckworth (2007) for evidence that nominal rigidities in late 19th century-economies were important
enough to affect real economic activity.
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nt lt =
n∫
0
Lt(j) dj, j ∈ [0, n)
n∗t l
∗
t =
1∫
n
L∗t (j) dj, j ∈ [n, 1]
2.4.4 Monetary policy and gold flows
Different strands of the literature have characterized monetary policy under the classical
GS as either a money-quantity rule or a discount rate rule. According to the money-quantity
view central banks were supposed to expand and contract the money supply in proportion
to gold in- and outflows, such as to keep the ratio of gold-to-money - the gold cover ratio
- stable. Another part of the literature, however, focuses on the importance of central
bank discount rates in stabilizing the exchange rate. Here we model monetary policy as
a discount rate rule that targets the gold cover ratio γt. This formulation integrates the
money quantity view and the discount rate view in that discount rate policy Rt contributes
to a stable money-to-gold ratio in the long-run. At the same time in the short-run, within
the target zone, the central bank is free to let the gold cover ratio fluctuate in order to
stabilize the domestic output gap.
In contrast to strict money-quantity rules, this depiction of monetary policy under
the GS is in line with the observed fluctuation in gold cover ratios (see Appendix 2.A.7).
Finally, we also allow central banks to directly target the nominal exchange rate et in order
to accommodate the heterogeneity of discount rate policies that could be observed under
the GS.28 The discount rate rule is
Rt
R¯
=
(
Rt−1
R¯
)ρ( yt
y¯
)(1−ρ)Φy (γt
γ¯
)(1−ρ)Φγ (et
e¯
)−(1−ρ)Φe
exp(rt ),
where we allow for persistence in the discount rate, and Φy, Φγ and Φe denote the sensitivity
of the discount rate reaction with respect to the output gap, the gold cover ratio and the
exchange rate.29
28For instance, Morys (2013) presents evidence that the core economies’ discount rate policies were directly
targeted at keeping the nominal exchange rate within the gold points, while in the periphery central banks
put more weight on their gold cover ratios.
29Here the output gap is defined as the deviation of real output yt from its steady state y¯. We prefer defining
the output gap in terms of deviations of real aggregate output from its steady state over definitions
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Adherence to this discount rate rule implies deviations from a strict money-quantity
rule. Money Mt varies with money demand according to a money demand function as in
much of the earlier GS literature.30 Money demand is assumed to be a fraction of the
nominal value of total production nPH,t yt and depends on the discount rate Rt:
PH,t n yt = exp(χt)Mt k(Rt), k(Rt) > 0, υ
r :=
∂k
∂Rt
≥ 0,
where χt is an exogenous money demand shock. Central bank gold stocks evolve according
to
Gt = Gt−1 + F (et) exp(mt ), (2.4)
F (e¯) = 0, e :=
∂F
∂et
≥ 0
where gold moves between H and F according to deviations of the nominal exchange rate
from the ratio of the two currencies’ underlying gold parities – i.e. their mint ratio (Officer,
1985; Giovannini, 1993; Canjels et al., 2004; Coleman, 2007). When H and F central banks
commit to convert local currency into gold at a fixed parity, deviations of the nominal
exchange rate from the mint parity makes shipping gold between regions profitable. mt
indicates an exogenous gold shock.31 Given money Mt and gold Gt the gold cover ratio γt
is determined by the relation
Mt =
1
γt
PgGt,
where Pg is the legal gold parity.
based on deviation from the efficient level of output or per capita output levels, because we consider the
former to cohere more with contemporary central banks’ targets and information sets. While the use of
retrospectively constructed GDP series harbors an element of anachronicity we consider them to be a
reasonable proxy for the more general business climate that central banks were reactive to.
30Here, we consider Mt to be narrowly defined as central bank notes in circulation. The holding of notes
does not appear in the budget constraint. This is the case because we implicitly assume a cash-in-advanced
constraint for central bank notes where asset markets are opened before goods trading. Households will
convert all notes into bond holdings at the end of the period, because note-holding means the foregoing of
interest revenues.
31We also considered a version of the model in which gold flows are influenced by net immigration and
the trade balance. However, our estimations showed neither of them to be an important determinant of
gold flows. Gold coins carried by migrants constituted only a minute fraction of total gold flows, and in
contrast to the 18th century price-specie flow model (Hume, 1752) by the late 19th century trade deficits
and surpluses were no longer primarily settled through gold flows.
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Finally, note that in this setup the long-run credibility and sustainability of the peg is
never doubted. This allows us to focus on external adjustment when exchange rates are
inflexible.
2.5 Bayesian estimation
We loglinearize the model around its non-stochastic steady state (see Appendix 2.B.3)
and estimate it with Bayesian techniques for the U.K., Sweden and Belgium.32 For each
estimation, we chose the country in focus – the U.K., Sweden or Belgium – to be the H
region, while all other GS members were aggregated into the F region.
We selected Sweden and Belgium with an eye on obtaining upper bound estimates for the
effectiveness of the migration- and monetary policy-channels respectively. In the late 19th
century, Sweden was one of the countries with the highest emigration rate, losing between
0.3% and 1.1% of its population per year through emigration. Previous research has already
pointed out that Swedish net immigration followed a pronounced countercyclical pattern
that might have aided external adjustment (see Khoudour-Caste´ras, 2005): Whenever the
domestic economy went badly a sizeable fraction of the Swedish population headed for the
New World, particularly the U.S.33 For these reasons we expect Sweden to give us an upper
bound estimate of how effective cyclical migration could be in easing external adjustment
under the GS.
We select Belgium, because the National Bank of Belgium was renown for its willingness
to let its gold cover ratio fluctuate in order to insulate the domestic economy from movements
in world interest rates (Ugolini, 2012; Eichengreen and Flandreau, 2016). In fact, by the
late 19th century Belgium was considered the prime example in this regard, due to the scale
and scope of its foreign exchange market interventions (see Conant, 1910). The success
of its policies in achieving a non-negligible degree of monetary autonomy within the GS
did not escape international notice and even led to calls for emulation (see Palgrave, 1903;
Schiltz, 2006). We thus expect that Belgium provides us with an upper bound estimate for
the effectiveness of the monetary policy channel under the GS.34
32The large number of parameters and the relative shortness of macroeconomic time series usually renders
maximum likelihood estimation of medium-scale DSGE models infeasible.
33At that time, only Norway had a comparably high emigration rate with a similarly countercyclical pattern.
Counterfactual simulation results for Norway are reported in Appendix 2.C.3.6. The results are in line
with the conclusions drawn on the basis of the other three countries’ estimation results.
34The Banque de France is another central bank that pioneered an activist approach to reserve and portfolio
management. Counterfactual simulation results for France are reported in Appendix 2.C.3.6. These results
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Finally, we also estimate the model for the U.K. The U.K. was one of the earliest
countries to abandon silver and switch to a purely gold-based monetary system already
in the 18th century. As the first industrializer and subsequently the world’s pre-eminent
free-trader it motivated many trading partners to follow suit. The U.K. was in many ways
the centerpiece of the Gold Standard (GS) – home to the world’s largest financial center
and hosting the most influential central bank of its time.
2.5.1 Observables
We estimate each model on the basis of 11 observables: domestic and foreign time series
of per capita GDP; central bank discount rates and CPI-inflation; domestic time series for
the ratio of net immigration to population35; the trade balance to GDP ratio; changes in the
central bank notes in circulation; the gold cover ratio and the nominal effective exchange
rate (NEER). The foreign time series are constructed as trade-weighted geometric averages,
analogously to the previously discussed REER series (see Section 2.3). The ratio of net
immigration to population and the trade balance to GDP ratio are directly detrended by a
one-sided HP-filter (λ = 100). All other variables are first logged before being detrended by
the same one-sided HP-filter.
2.5.2 Calibration
Some parameters are calibrated, either because they are difficult to estimate (e.g.
markups) or because their identification from observables is straightforward (e.g. discount
factors) (see Table 2.1). We follow standard calibration strategies for the time discount
factor β, the within-country intra-temporal elasticity of substitution µ, the curvature of
the production function γ, the trade-openness parameters α and α∗, and the steady state
gross foreign asset position o¯. The time discount factor β is set to 0.9615, in order to match
a sample average discount rate of 4%. The elasticity of substitution between the goods
within a country µ is set to 11, implying a steady state price markup of 10%.36 Given µ,
lead to conclusions very similar to those we draw from the Belgian case.
35Most migration flows within our sample originate and end in one of the sample countries. Little of the
large-scale migration to South America originated from within our sample. Instead it originated from
non-persistent Gold Standard member countries, such as Italy, Spain and Portugal, that are also outside
of our sample.
36This value is consistent with Jacks et al. (2010), who use an elasticity of substitution parameter of 11. A
value of 11 implies a markup of 10% which nicely corresponds to the late 19th century markup estimate of
9.8% by Irwin (2003).
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Table 2.1: Calibrated parameters
Description Value/Target
β Discount factor 0.962
µ
µ−1 Markup 1.1
γ∗ Production function F 0.792
α Openness parameter H SST H import-to-GDP ratio
α∗ Openness parameter F SST H export-to-GDP ratio
United Kingdom
γ Production function H 0.726
n SST population H 0.160
d¯ SST emigration H 0.0064
o¯ Foreign portfolio H SST H GFA-to-GDP ratio = 1.33
Sweden
γ Production function H 0.792
n SST population H 0.020
d¯ SST emigration H 0.0059
o¯∗ Foreign portfolio F SST F GFA-to-GDP ratio = 0.001
Belgium
γ Production function H 0.792
n SST population H 0.027
d¯ SST emigration H 0.0036
o¯∗ Foreign portfolio F SST F GFA-to-GDP ratio = 0.001
Notes: GFA gross foreign assets. SST steady state.
we calibrate γ to target a steady state labor income to GDP ratio of 0.66 for the U.K. and
0.72 for all other countries (Sweden, Belgium and the F -regions).37 The first value reflects
the average labor share in the U.K. from 1880-1913 and the later is an approximation
based on the average labor share in France and Germany during the same time period.38
The trade openness parameters α and α∗ are calibrated to target the historical average
import to GDP -ratios (U.K.: 30%, Sweden: 25%, Belgium: 47%) and export to GDP
ratios (U.K.: 29%, Sweden: 24%, Belgium: 37%) of the H region. The U.K.’s gross foreign
asset holdings o¯ are set to target a steady state gross foreign asset to GDP ratio of 1.33,
which is consistent with the gross foreign asset estimates provided by Piketty and Zucman
37The model’s steady state labor income share is γ(µ− 1)/µ
38According to the datasets provided by Hills et al. (2015) and Piketty and Zucman (2014).
21
2.5. Bayesian estimation
(2014) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2004).39 Calibrating steady state gross foreign asset (GFA)
positions for Sweden and Belgium is less straightforward due to the lack of historical data.
We assume that in the steady state the F -region holds few Swedish or Belgian assets relative
to its GDP, GFA/GDP = 0.001. Together with the steady state net foreign asset position,
this pins down the steady state gross foreign asset holdings of Sweden and Belgium.40
The introduction of migration to the model necessitates the calibration of steady
state values for population levels n and emigration rates d¯. Fortunately this is relatively
straightforward: The steady state population level of H is chosen to correspond to the
average domestic population to sample population ratio. The steady state emigration
probability in H (d¯) is set to the average emigration to population ratio of the H country
(U.K., Sweden or Belgium). This implies the corresponding steady state value for F
according to the equality d¯ n = d¯∗ n∗.
2.5.3 Prior distribution
The prior distribution is selected according to the endogenous prior method introduced
by Christiano et al. (2011), who use observables’ moments to adjust an initial prior choice.
The endogenous prior approach is particularly attractive for our analysis because prior
information on the model parameters for the GS era is relatively scarce. In particular, we
use the second moments of the observables to form the endogenous prior. This helps to
improve the model’s fit of the observables’ variances.41
The prior distributions for the estimated parameters are summarized in Table 2.2. We
assume that the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution σc and the inverse Frisch
elasticity σl are identical across regions. Their prior distribution follows the literature
standard (e.g. de Walque and Wouters, 2008; Smets and Wouters, 2007). For the trade
elasticities  and ∗ we choose a comparatively wide prior, reflecting the wide range of
modern-day estimates for these parameters. The migration parameters ψ and ψ∗ determine
how sensitive migration is to differences in the utility level between regions: a small ψ
implies a stronger migration reaction for any given utility difference, whereas a large ψ
implies that migration is largely a random phenomenon.42 In accordance with the previously
39Since they also depend on estimated parameters, o¯ (o¯∗), α and α∗ are re-calibrated during estimation for
each draw from the prior distribution.
40The model’s steady state for net foreign assets is determined due to migration (see Appendix 2.B.2).
41As in Christiano et al. (2011), we use the actual sample as our pre-sample.
42Note that while ψ characterizes migration’s sensitivity to cyclical fluctuations, the fixed migration cost κd
determines the level of migration d¯.
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cited evidence for the responsiveness of migrants to economic conditions we choose a normal
distribution with a relatively small mean of 2. According to current best-practice estimates
for the U.S. (Kennan and Walker, 2011) a persistent 1% increase in one state’s wages implies
a 0.5% larger state-population after 5 years. In our model’s framework, a value of 2 for ψ
implies a similar reactivity of migration.
Nominal rigidity is characterized by the Calvo parameter θ, which together with γ, β and
µ determines the slope of the Phillips curve, κ˜, according to κ˜ = (1− βθ)(1− θ)/[1/θ(1−
µ + µ/γ)]. Instead of estimating the Calvo parameters we choose to directly estimate
the the Phillips curve slopes. Many modern day quarterly Calvo parameter estimates
lie in the range of [0.5, 0.8], which corresponds to an average price duration of 2 to 5
quarters, or a quarterly Phillips curve slope between 0.01 and 0.13. Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2004) and Eggertsson (2008) convert the quarterly Phillips curve slope to an annual
slope by multiplying the former by four. Thus today’s Calvo parameter estimates in the
[0.5, 0.8]-range imply an annualized Phillips curve slope between 0.04 and 0.52. Where
can we expect the corresponding GS parameter to lie? Aggregate price indices exhibited
substantially more flexibility (Gordon, 1990; Basu and Taylor, 1999; Obstfeld, 1993) and
output responsiveness than today (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1996; Bordo et al., 2008;
Chernyshoff et al., 2009).43 We thus expect to find steeper Phillips curves for the GS era.
To be on the safe side however, we chose a conservative beta-prior for κ˜ and κ˜∗, which gives
almost equal prior weight to all but the most extreme values of the 0-1 range.
On the monetary side, following Benati (2008) and Fagan et al. (2013) we assume a prior
mean of 0.1 for the interest-rate elasticity of money demand vr (also see Bae and de Jong,
2007, for similar 1900-1945 estimates for the U.S.). Concerning the sensitivity of gold flows
to the exchange rate e we remain agnostic except for the sign, by selecting a wide [0, 15]
uniform prior distribution. In our prior choice for the portfolio adjustment cost parameter
K we select an inverse gamma prior with a mean of 0.04 (see Benigno, 2009), implying
an average deviation of H - from F interest rates of 1 ppt. This roughly corresponds to
contemporary textbook estimates of an annualized 75 basis point wedge between London
and New York interest rates (e.g. Haupt, 1894; Margraff, 1908; Escher, 1917).
For the discount rate rule, we use pre-sample data to inform our prior choice. We set
43Note however that the micro evidence based on product-group level prices indicates that prices have not
become less flexible over time (Kackmeister, 2007; Knotek, 2008). This points towards a compositional
effect: it is well known that pre-1913 price indices contain more flex-price items such as agricultural
produce and raw materials than today’s indices. However, for our macro model calibration the aggregate
price level evidence has more relevance.
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the prior means of the discount rate coefficients close to the pooled regression coefficient
estimates that we obtained for a sample of GS members for the years 1870-1879. We then
chose wide prior standard deviations to reflect our uncertainty about these parameters.
Consistent with historical accounts the regression results also show that the U.K. changed
its discount rate much more frequently than the Swedish and Belgian central banks.44
Accordingly, we estimate the discount rate rule for the U.K. without a persistence term.
Furthermore, although foreign countries might have wanted to keep their nominal exchange
rates stable vis-a`-vis the U.K. (see Morys, 2011) there is little reason why they should
directly target the nominal exchange rate vis-a-vis Sweden or Belgium. Hence, only for the
U.K. model do we include a reaction term for nominal exchange rate deviations into the F
discount rate function.
Exogenous shocks generally follow AR(1) processes.45 Only the discount rate shock is
not allowed to exhibit any persistence beyond that which is intrinsic to the discount rate
rule. All persistence parameters are given a wide beta prior with a mean of 0.3.46 We allow
for the region-specific technology shocks to be correlated. We chose a flat beta prior for the
correlation σaa∗ . The persistence and standard deviation of the gold shocks are assumed to
be the same across regions.
Finally, we allow for measurement error in all trade-weighted observables (all F -
aggregates and the NEER). We also allow for measurement error in the net immigration and
trade balance to GDP ratio. Following Christiano et al. (2011) we calibrate the measurement
errors’ variance to 10% of the variance in the observables. As shown in Appendix 2.C.3.1,
the data without measurement error very closely follow the original data.
44The Bank of England decided upon its discount rate on a weekly basis (see Eichengreen et al., 1985).
45Note that in the case of money demand shocks, it is the changes ∆xt ≡ ηxt that follow an AR(1) process.
46The 0.3 mean for our annual model corresponds to the conventional prior mean from the [0.5, 0.85] range
that is usually applied in quarterly models: 0.3 ≈ 0.754.
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Table 2.2: Prior distribution
Description Distribution Mean S.D. Description Distribution Mean S.D.
Utility parameters Shock parameters
σc Inverse EIS Normal 1.50 0.35 ρa Persistence, technology (H) Beta 0.30 0.15
σl Inverse Frisch elasticity Normal 2.00 0.75 ρ
a∗ Persistence, technology (F) Beta 0.30 0.15
 Trade elasticity (H) Normal 1.50 1.50 ρg Persistence, markup (H) Beta 0.30 0.15
∗ Trade elasticity (F) Normal 1.50 1.50 ρg∗ Persistence, markup (F) Beta 0.30 0.15
ρx Persistence, money demand (H) Beta 0.30 0.15
Migration parameters ρx∗ Persistence, money demand (F) Beta 0.30 0.15
ψ Migration sensitivity (H) Normal 2.00 1.00 ρb Persistence, risk premium (H) Beta 0.30 0.15
ψ∗ Migration sensitivity (F) Normal 2.00 1.00 ρb∗ Persistence, risk premium (F) Beta 0.30 0.15
ρm Persistence, gold (H & F) Beta 0.30 0.15
Price parameters ηa S.D., technology (H) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
κ˜ Phillips curve slope (H) Beta 0.50 0.28 ηa∗ S.D., technology (F) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
κ˜∗ Phillips curve slope (F) Beta 0.50 0.28 ηg S.D., markup (H) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
ηg∗ S.D., markup (F) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
Gold flow parameters ηx S.D., money demand (H) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
e Gold flow due to exchange rate Uniform [ 0, 15 ] ηx∗ S.D., money demand (F) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
G¯
G¯∗ Relative gold stock Inv. gamma
n
1−n 1.00 η
b S.D., risk premium (H) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
ηb∗ S.D., risk premium (F) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
Discount rate parameters ηr S.D., monetary policy (H) Inv. gamma 0.10 2.00
ρ Discount rate persistence (H) Beta 0.30 0.15 ηr∗ S.D., monetary policy (F) Inv. gamma 0.10 2.00
Φy Output coefficent (H) Beta 1.00 0.56 ηm S.D., gold (H & F) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
Φe Exchange rate coefficent (H) Beta 1.00 0.56 σaa∗ Correlation, technology Beta 0.50 0.28
Φg Cover ratio coefficient (H) Beta 1.00 0.56
ρ∗ Discount rate persistence (F) Beta 0.30 0.15
Φy∗ Output coefficent (F) Beta 1.00 0.56
Φe∗ Exchange rate coefficent (F) Beta 1.00 0.56
Φg∗ Cover ratio coefficient (F) Beta 1.00 0.56
Other parameters
K Portfolio adjustment costs Inv. gamma 0.04 2.00
υr Interest rate elasticity of Inv. gamma 0.10 0.03
money demand
Notes: EIS – elasticity of intertemporal substitution. S.D. – standard deviation. The prior distributions for ψ,ψ∗, σl,  and ∗
are truncated at zero. In case of the U.K., ρ is not estimated but set to zero. In the case of Sweden and Belgium, Φe∗ is not
estimated but set to zero.
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2.5.4 Posterior distribution
Table 2.3 summarizes the estimation results. Firstly, the posterior distributions for
the Phillips curve parameters indicate that the price level was much more flexible in the
time before 1914 than it is today. Annual Phillips curve (PC) slope estimates for the
U.K., Sweden and Belgium are 0.34, 0.53 and 0.90 respectively, implying average price
durations in the 1.5 to 2 quarter range. For comparison, estimates for the U.S. and the
euro area today generally hint towards a much flatter Phillips curve. The Calvo parameter
estimates obtained by de Walque and Wouters (2008) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007)
for instance, imply annualized Phillips curve slopes in the [0.01-0.15]-range.
Secondly, consider the parameters ψ and ψ∗ that pin down the sensitivity of migration
to the business cycle. As expected, the comparatively small estimate for Sweden reflects
that Swedish migrants were very responsive to economic fundamentals. Though less than in
Sweden, U.K. migrants still responded strongly to cyclical differences in consumption and
labor income. Given the U.K.’s ψ-estimate, a persistent 1% decrease in consumption in the
U.K. relative to the F -region would result in a 4% decrease in the U.K.’s population after 5
years. By contrast, the comparatively high ψ-estimate for Belgium implies that Belgian
migration flows were considerably less sensitive.47
Finally, the monetary side is characterized by the following parameter estimates: The
discount rate policy in all three countries stabilized gold cover ratios (φg > 0) and the
nominal exchange rate (φe > 0), whereas our evidence for output stabilization (φy > 0) is
restricted to the British and Swedish central banks. In both cases, the policy reaction to
output is much less than what a modern-day Taylor rule would suggest (ΦyTaylor = 0.5).
These results reflect that the primary monetary policy targets at the time were stable
gold cover ratios and nominal exchange rates. The autocorrelation of Swedish and Belgian
discount rates is 0.42 and 0.44 respectively, implying that some interest rate smoothing
took place. Furthermore Belgian discount rates reacted less to deviations of the exchange
rate from its mint parity ((1 − ρ) · Φe = 0.34) and fluctuations in the gold cover ratio
((1 − ρ) · Φg = 0.07). In this sense the National Bank of Belgium made more use of the
monetary policy independence that the Gold Standard allowed. Note, however, that it does
not appear to have targeted the domestic output gap.
47Between 1880 and 1913 Belgium itself was a destination for many political refugees, which did not migrate
primarily for economic reasons. Furthermore, unlike many other European countries Belgium did not
encourage the emigration of its citizens to relieve domestic crises. Finally, overall net immigration relative
to the general population level in Belgium was small in the period covered by our sample, 1880-1913.
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2.5.5 Model evaluation
To see whether the estimated models give a good description of the data, we conducted
marginal likelihood comparisons between different model versions and extensive moment
comparisons of real and simulated data. Note that our baseline model specification does
not feature external consumption habits, which is a common feature of DSGEs estimated
with modern data. A marginal likelihood comparison of the models with and without habit
formation, however, shows that the latter is favored by our 1880-1913 data. Similarly we
have also estimated a version of the model with a more elaborate law of motion for central
bank gold stocks (see (2.4)). Strictly speaking gold stocks do not only depend on exchange
rate deviations, but also on net immigration (migrants carrying gold coins) and the trade
balance (trade deficits being settled through gold transfers). The estimated parameters
however, confirm back-of-the-envelope calculations as well as historical narratives in that
by the late 19th century these two gold flow determinants were of negligible importance.
We thus opted for the more parsimonious version of the model.
Next, we compared the (auto-)correlations of the simulated data to that of the observed
data. We did this for the six variables that we are most interested in – a total of 216
moments.48 To obtain the simulated data we run the model with all parameters set to
their posterior mean.49 Figures 2.21 in Appendix 2.C.3.2 show the correlations, including
the 90% coverage percentiles for the stochastic simulations. The model fairly accurately
represents the data’s correlation structure.
48Per capita GDP, inflation, the discount rate, the nominal exchange rate, changes in the net immigra-
tion/population ratio and changes in the trade-balance/GDP ratio.
49We conducted 2000 simulations. Each simulation has 34 periods, corresponding to the length of our
sample. To limit the results’ dependence on initial conditions, we ran simulations for 134 periods and
discarded the first 100 observations.
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Table 2.3: Posterior distribution
U.K. Sweden Belgium
Description Mean 90% HPDI Mean 90% HPDI Mean 90% HPDI
Utility parameters
σc Inverse EIS 1.57 1.11 2.03 2.50 2.07 2.93 2.10 1.77 2.41
σl Inverse Frisch elasticity 2.65 1.67 3.60 2.85 1.94 3.79 3.36 2.57 4.13
 Trade elasticity (H) 2.81 0.71 4.72 1.44 0.09 2.60 0.64 0.03 1.17
∗ Trade elasticity (F) 3.20 1.57 4.80 1.26 0.26 2.27 0.47 0.00 0.84
Migration parameters
φ Migration sensitivity (H) 0.27 0.06 0.47 0.07 0.05 0.08 3.77 2.76 4.81
φ∗ Migration sensitivity (F) 1.98 0.33 3.39 2.03 0.44 3.52 3.44 2.42 4.40
Price parameters
κ˜ Phillips curve slope (H) 0.34 0.16 0.54 0.53 0.33 0.75 0.90 0.79 1.00
κ˜∗ Phillips curve slope (F) 0.35 0.14 0.58 0.64 0.39 0.93 0.36 0.18 0.54
Gold flow parameters
e Gold flow due to nom. exchange rate 2.33 3.29 1.35 1.85 2.90 0.78 0.54 0.75 0.31
G¯
G¯∗ Relative gold stock 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03
Discount rate parameters
ρ Discount rate persistence (H) – – – 0.42 0.18 0.65 0.44 0.28 0.59
Φy Output coefficent (H) 0.14 0.09 0.19 0.18 0.01 0.34 0.02 0.00 0.04
Φe Exchange rate coefficent (H) 0.72 0.13 1.27 1.68 1.29 2.00 0.61 0.14 1.07
Φg Cover ratio coefficient (H) 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.22 0.12 0.08 0.15
ρ∗ Discount rate persistence (F) 0.25 0.06 0.42 0.42 0.17 0.66 0.13 0.02 0.24
Φy∗ Output coefficent (F) 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.33 0.06 0.00 0.13
Φe∗ Exchange rate coefficent (F) 1.63 1.23 2.00 – – – – – –
Φg∗ Cover ratio coefficient (F) 0.39 0.21 0.54 0.49 0.17 0.83 0.18 0.10 0.27
Other parameters
K Foreign portfolio adjustment costs 0.24 0.01 0.45 0.09 0.02 0.17 0.53 0.34 0.72
υr Interest rate elasticity of money demand 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.14
2
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Table 2.3: Posterior distribution (continued)
U.K. Sweden Belgium
Description Mean 90% HPDI Mean 90% HPDI Mean 90% HPDI
Shock parameters
ρa Persistence, technology (H) 0.18 0.06 0.29 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.49 0.39 0.59
ρa∗ Persistence, technology (F) 0.93 0.90 0.96 0.86 0.82 0.90 0.46 0.29 0.64
ρg Persistence, markup (H) 0.31 0.10 0.51 0.38 0.24 0.53 0.24 0.08 0.38
ρg∗ Persistence, markup (F) 0.52 0.32 0.73 0.23 0.07 0.38 0.35 0.17 0.52
ρx Persistence, money demand (H) 0.19 0.05 0.33 0.20 0.05 0.34 0.07 0.01 0.13
ρx∗ Persistence, money demand (F) 0.54 0.39 0.69 0.36 0.16 0.56 0.55 0.35 0.74
ρb Persistence, risk premium (H) 0.30 0.07 0.50 0.52 0.29 0.75 0.33 0.12 0.51
ρb∗ Persistence, risk premium (F) 0.24 0.04 0.43 0.34 0.09 0.57 0.30 0.07 0.52
ρm Persistence, gold (H & F) 0.21 0.04 0.38 0.30 0.12 0.49 0.14 0.03 0.26
ηa S.D., technology (H) 1.52 1.26 1.77 2.05 1.77 2.32 1.62 1.43 1.82
ηa∗ S.D., technology (F) 0.34 0.25 0.43 0.32 0.26 0.39 0.49 0.37 0.60
ηg S.D., markup (H) 2.46 1.63 3.25 4.60 3.39 5.80 6.71 5.34 8.03
ηg∗ S.D., markup (F) 1.34 0.77 1.91 2.11 1.32 2.85 1.51 0.75 2.24
ηx S.D., money demand (H) 2.76 2.38 3.15 7.35 6.37 8.36 2.09 1.93 2.24
ηx∗ S.D., money demand (F) 0.75 0.52 0.98 0.93 0.56 1.30 0.33 0.20 0.44
ηb S.D., risk premium (H) 0.26 0.18 0.34 0.25 0.17 0.32 0.24 0.17 0.31
ηb∗ S.D., risk premium (F) 0.20 0.13 0.27 0.21 0.13 0.28 0.19 0.13 0.26
ηr S.D., monetary policy (H) 0.39 0.29 0.49 0.69 0.39 0.97 0.19 0.15 0.23
ηr∗ S.D., monetary policy (F) 0.38 0.27 0.49 0.31 0.22 0.40 0.28 0.22 0.34
ηm S.D., gold (H & F) 0.48 0.34 0.62 0.38 0.16 0.60 0.18 0.12 0.23
σaa∗ Correlation, technology 0.28 0.03 0.49 0.44 0.26 0.61 0.07 0.00 0.15
Note: HPDI – highest posterior density interval. For the U.K. ρ is not estimated but set to zero. For Sweden and Belgium Φe∗ is not
estimated but set to zero.
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2.6 Counterfactual analysis
In this section we conduct the horse-race between the price-, migration- and monetary
policy-channels to explain why external adjustment under the Gold Standard (GS) was
associated with few output costs. In order to quantitatively assess the channels’ relative
importance we present counterfactual output volatilities. The counterfactual volatilities are
obtained from model simulations in which either the price-, the migration- or the monetary
policy parameters are set to a counterfactual value of interest. Table 2.4 displays the results
of this exercise. The first column shows the standard deviations of the observables under the
baseline model. We simulated the model on the basis of the posterior mean of the estimated
structural parameters and shock processes. More particularly, we ran 2000 simulations,
each 34 periods long (corresponding to the length of our sample).50 Columns 2 to 4 display
the counterfactual standard deviations that result from conducting the same simulation
with the respective counterfactual structural parameters.
First, for the price rigidity counterfactual we lower all Phillips curve slope parameters
from our high GS estimates to a value which is representative of today’s economies. In
particular we set the average duration of price contracts to three quarters, implying
annualized Phillips curve slopes of 0.13 for the U.K. and 0.17 for Sweden and Belgium. This
comes close to what most price rigidity estimates for current advanced economies look like
today (see Smets and Wouters, 2007; Schorfheide, 2008). In this scenario the counterfactual
standard deviations for per capita output are substantially higher, increasing between 81.5%
(for the U.K.) and 145.2% (for Belgium). According to these model simulations flexible
prices were a major reason for the resilience of per capita incomes during the GS.
In the second counterfactual, we shut down the migration channel. This had little
effect on output volatility. The exception is Belgium, where the standard deviation of
output increases by a notable 3.8%. The counterfactual “no migration”-simulations for the
U.K. and Belgium even resulted in slightly less volatile per capita incomes. This acts as
a reminder that the stabilizing effects of migration on regional output do not necessarily
outweigh the destabilizing effects that arise from the redistribution of aggregate demand
away from the already recessionary origin-region.
For the monetary policy counterfactual we eliminated the freedom central banks enjoyed
in setting their discount rates by assuming that H has to adjust its interest rate to ensure an
50To limit the result’s dependence on the initial conditions, we ran each simulation for 134 periods and
discarded the first 100 observations.
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absolutely fixed exchange rate, while F – a much larger region than H – sets its discount rate
as estimated.51 Column (4) in Table 2.4 shows that this “no independence” counterfactual
has the most impact for the U.K. Here, the monetary policy independence that the GS
allowed enabled the Bank of England to achieve a 3.2% lower per capita income volatility.
A look at the counterfactual impulse response functions furthermore shows that particularly
in the short-run monetary policy could exert a non-negligible stabilizing influence (see
Figure 2.22 in the Appendix). Such short-run dynamics get played down in Table 2.4, which
focuses on overall output volatility.52 We find, however, no evidence that monetary policy
substantially helped the adjustment experience of either Sweden or Belgium.
Table 2.4: Counterfactual per capita output volatilities
Counterfactuals
Baseline
model
Rigid
prices
No
migration
No inde-
pendence
No
migration,
given rigid
prices
No inde-
pendence,
given rigid
prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3|2) (4|2)
United 1.76 3.20 1.75 1.82 3.19 3.42
Kingdom (81.50%) (-0.89%) (3.19%) (-0.16%) (7.03%)
Sweden 1.88 4.26 1.87 1.90 4.28 4.38
(126.77%) (-0.20%) (0.91%) (0.46%) (2.82%)
Belgium 0.94 2.29 0.97 0.93 2.29 2.29
(145.15%) (3.77%) (-0.19%) (-0.01%) (-0.16%)
Notes: In parenthesis – percentage change in counterfactual S.D. relative to baseline S.D. for (2),
(3) and (4), and relative to rigid price counterfactual in columns (3|2) and (4|2).
In the context of today’s fixed exchange rate regimes an interesting question arises as to
whether international migration can alleviate the external adjustment problem given that
prices are rigid. To see if migration would be substantially more effective in reducing output
and inflation volatility in a rigid price economy, we ran the corresponding counterfactual
GS model simulation. The result displayed in column (3|2) of Table 2.4 does not support
51See Appendix 2.B.3 for details.
52See Angell (1926) for an early publication that points out that the efficacy of discount rate policy for
external adjustment is restricted to the short-run.
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this supposition. Shutting down the migration channel in a rigid price economy does not
substantially impact output volatilities relative to the rigid price-only counterfactual. Rigid
prices somewhat heighten the stabilizing effect that monetary policy has on output (see
column (4|2)), but the total effects still pale in comparison to the direct effects of price
flexibility on output volatility .
In summary, our findings put nominal flexibility at the center of the explanation for
why external adjustments under the GS were rather benign. The role of migration- and
monetary policy in stabilizing per capita output was comparatively small and, in the case
of migration, even ambiguous.
2.7 Sectoral structure, price level flexibility and external adjustment
This section provides an in-depth analysis of price flexibility and external adjustment
under the GS. Newly compiled disaggregate sectoral data allows us to address the following
questions: Why was the aggregate price level so flexible under the GS? Which prices exactly
adjusted by how much during external adjustments? Was it really an increase in the export
of flex-price goods that turned around the current account?
2.7.1 Sectoral structure and price level flexibility
A notable feature of the Gold Standard-economies is their large primary sector shares,
even among early industrializers. Primary sector products in turn generally exhibit much
more flexible prices than industrial goods or services (Bordo, 1980; Han et al., 1990; Jacks
et al., 2011). Thus, the Gold Standard economies’ sectoral structure is a likely reason for
the flexibility of the overall price level.53 Sectoral inflation variances within our 14-country
sample line up accordingly: Table 2.5 shows that the growth rates of prices for agricultural
goods (variance = 0.51) and raw materials (variance = 0.64) exhibit about twice the
volatility of industrial price-growth rates (variance = 0.27) and more than five times the
53The compositional explanation of pre-1914 flexibility was already put forth by economists in the 1930s
(see Humphrey (1937), Mason (1938) and Wood (1938)) as a way of reconciling the wide-spread belief
that the general price level had become more rigid (see Means, 1936) with product-level price studies that
showed that neither the frequency nor the size of price changes had changed since the late 18th century
(Mills, 1927; Humphrey, 1937; Mason, 1938; Bezanson et al., 1936; Tucker, 1938). The modern literature
on price flexibility has extended this aggregation phenomenon into the 21st century (see Kackmeister
(2007) and Knotek (2008) on product-level prices, and Backus and Kehoe (1992) and Basu and Taylor
(1999) on aggregate price indices).
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volatility of service prices (variance = 0.10).54 To get an idea of the relative importance of
primary sectors in the period from 1880 to 1913, consider that in our 14-country sample an
average of 47% of employment is concentrated in primary sectors, and 30% of value added
is generated in them (see Table 2.5). Even the U.K., the most industrialized country of
its time, still employed between 10 and 20% of its labor force in agriculture and mining.
Among internationally traded goods, agricultural products and raw materials made up an
even larger fraction: Within our 14-country sample 67% of all merchandise exports were
primary products.55 Even among early industrializing North Western European countries,
primary product exports equalled the amount of manufacture exports (see Lamartine Yates,
1959, pp. 226-32).
Table 2.5: Sectoral structure, export composition and price volatilities
Mean N.obs
Agriculture, value-added share (%) 30 428
Agriculture, employment share (%) 47 238
Agricultural exports, share of total merchandize exports (%) 36 551
Primary exports, share of total merchandize exports (%) 67 517
Variance N.obs
Agricultural prices, year-on-year change (%) 0.51 601
Raw material prices, year-on-year change (%) 0.64 578
Industrial prices, year-on-year change (%) 0.27 509
Service prices, year-on-year change (%) 0.10 436
Notes: The number of observations differs due to data availability and frequency. Agricultural
employment share figures are commonly decennial data.
54The high flexibility of agricultural prices has been linked to their supply and demand elasticities, with
short-run supply being highly inelastic (Cairnes, 1873). Perishability and storability play a role in this,
with less durable products generally exhibiting more flexible prices (Mills, 1927; Telser, 1975; Reagan
and Weitzman, 1982). Blanchard (1983) and Basu (1995) link the high number of production stages and
roundaboutness of industrial production to the lower flexibility of industrial goods’ prices (see Means,
1935, for a related empirical analysis of prices closer to our sample period). Market structure also becomes
a factor in that most agricultural goods are traded on auction markets, while industrial goods are more
likely to be sold in customer markets where long-term fixed contracts are more common (see Bordo, 1980;
Sachs, 1980; Gordon, 1982).
55This comes very close to figures by Aparicio et al. (2009), according to which 63% of international trade
between 1880 and 1939 consisted of primary products. Furthermore, the fraction of primary products in
total trade remains surprisingly stable at around two thirds in the period from 1870 to 1913 (see Lewis,
1952).
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A look at disaggregated nominal prices and real (CPI-deflated) exports confirms the
crucial role agriculture played for external adjustment under the GS (see Figure 2.3).
Agricultural goods dominated the quick fall in domestic prices, and primary products
generally dominated the export booms during major CA-reversals.56 Four years into the
adjustment agricultural and raw material exports were both up by 30%. At the same
time industrial exports had increased by only 10%.57 Agricultural exports in particular,
dominated the early years of CA-reversals, with exports up by 20% after only two years.58
Figure 2.3: Sectoral prices and sectoral exports after major CA/GDP-reversals relative to
non-reversals
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Notes: CA/GDP-troughs are defined according to a turning-point algorithm a` la Bry and Boschan
(1971): CA/GDP-troughs are defined as the lowest CA/GDP-value in a ±10-year window. The
number of CA/GDP-troughs thus identified is nine. The disaggregate export data are CPI-deflated.
Increasing primary good exports also left their mark on the adjusting economy’s sectoral
structure. Figure 2.4 depicts the sectoral adjustment that accompanied the export-led
external adjustments of the GS economies. The value added (VA) share of the primary
sector (predominantly tradable goods producing) increased by close to 2 ppts; so did the
agricultural sector labor share (LS). At the same time, the VA shares of the tertiary sector
56In contrast to industrial and raw material prices the relative decline in agricultural prices is persistent.
Note however that h = 0 is unlikely to represent a steady state in this case.
57Note that while the sharp increase in agricultural exports is accompanied by an equally sharp fall in
agricultural prices, this is not the case for raw materials. This possibly hints at differential price elasticities
in the international demand for agricultural goods and raw materials.
58This relationship between sectoral prices, sectoral exports and the CA/GDP ratio is not restricted to
phases of major external adjustment. It also is present in within-year correlations (see Table 2.14 in
Appendix 2.C.2).
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(mostly non-tradable goods producing) tended to decrease by around 1 ppt. The VA share
of the secondary sector, which here combines non-tradables (e.g. construction works) as
well as tradables (e.g. raw materials and machines), falls by around 0.5 ppts. In terms of
absolute real output, tertiary sector production fell up to 15% below trend during major
CA-adjustments, while real primary sector production rose up to 10% above its trend level.
Secondary sector production tends to closely follow the tertiary sector’s path.59
Figure 2.4: Sectoral adjustment after major reversals in the CA/GDP-ratio
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Notes: CA/GDP-troughs are defined according to a turning-point algorithm a` la Bry and Boschan
(1971): CA/GDP-troughs are defined as the lowest CA/GDP-value in a ±10-year window. The
number of CA/GDP-troughs thus identified is nine. VA – value added share. LS – labor share.
In sum, the fortunate coincidence of the nominally most flexible sector – agriculture –
also being the most important tradable sector is the main explanation for the ease of external
adjustment under the pre-1913 Gold Standard.60 When hit by a shock that necessitated
the reversal of the current account the agricultural sector produced more of its tradable
output, which was readily absorbed by world markets.61
59This relationship is robust to an alternative definition of major CA/GDP troughs (see Figure 2.18
in Appendix 2.C.1). It also is present outside of major adjustment periods, in the contemporaneous
correlations of changes in the CA/GDP ratio with changes in the sectoral shares (see Table 2.16 in
Appendix 2.C.2).
60Note that large primary sector shares today are far less associated with benign external adjustments
among developing economies (see Labys and Maizels, 1993; Kinda et al., 2016). One explanation may
lie in the importance of primary product exports for fiscal revenue. Prior to 1913 government spending
only made up a small fraction of GDP and revenue losses from lower-priced agricultural products would
primarily be borne by private individuals.
61The sectoral adjustment, away from services and towards tradable primary goods, can be easier to
accomplish against the backdrop of rapid industrialization. Instead of requiring a costly re-allocation
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Figure 2.5: Terms of trade vs. local prices after major reversals in the CA/GDP-ratio
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(1971): CA/GDP-troughs are defined as the lowest CA/GDP-value in a ±10-year window. The
number of CA/GDP-troughs thus identified is nine.
2.7.2 Terms of trade vs. local prices
While the local price level fell markedly, the terms of trade – the ratio of export prices
to import prices as measured at the port – remained stable (Figure 2.5, left graph).62
This generalizes the observations made by Viner (1924) and Angell (1926) for Canada,
and by Wilson (1931) and Pope (1986, 1990) for Australia. They noted that the terms of
trade moved little during external adjustments under the GS. How can this well known
observation be reconciled with a price flexibility based explanation of external adjustment?
To better understand how a stable terms of trade, together with domestic price deflation,
can bring about external adjustment it is worth taking a look at the different price
components that are involved. The terms of trade (ToTt) equals export prices (P˜
?
H,t) minus
import prices (P˜F,t) as measured at the port:
T̂ oT t =
ˆ˜P ?H,t − ˆ˜PF,t,
of labor and capital away from the production of non-tradables towards the production of tradables,
external adjustments under the GS simply required a temporary slow-down in the secular transition from
agriculture (primarily tradable) to industry and services (primarily non-tradable).
62The same relationship between the terms of trade, the CPI, and the CA/GDP ratio extends to non-
adjustment periods (see the within-year correlations in Table 2.15 in Appendix 2.C.2). It also is robust to
using all visually salient CA/GDP troughs, instead of the lowest CA/GDP-value in a ±10-year window
(see Figure 2.17 in Appendix 2.C.1).
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where hatted variables denote logarithms.
The log CPI can be written as a weighted sum of non-tradable prices (PN,t) and tradable
prices (PT,t). The latter can be further decomposed into the price of home tradables, as
measured at home (P˜H,t), and the price of foreign tradables, as measured at the port (P˜F,t):
Pˆt = (1− γˇ)PˆN,t + γˇPˆT,t (2.5)
= (1− γˇ)PˆN,t + γˇ
[
αˇ ˆ˜PH,t + (1− αˇ) ˆ˜PF,t
]
,
where γˇ denotes the weight of non-tradables in the overall consumption basket, and αˇ
denotes the share of home tradables among all tradables. In this way, the ToT and CPI
can be decomposed into four price components: P˜ ?H,t, P˜F,t, PN,t and P˜H,t.
Table 2.6 summarizes the direction of movement of the four price components during
major external adjustments. The table also shows the substitution effect associated with
each of these price movements. These substitution effects have been derived from a
straightforward extension of our GS model by a tradable and non-tradable sector (the full
model description is provided in Appendix 2.B.4).
The export price of H tradable goods (P˜ ?H,t) and the import price of F tradable goods
(P˜F,t) both fall around 4% two years into the adjustment, resulting in a stable ToT (see
Figure 2.5). Despite falling by an equal amount, however, the fall in export prices is likely
to increase exports by more than the equivalent fall in import prices increases imports.
This is because the rest of the world is large compared to the local economy.
Next, the local price of H tradable goods (P˜H,t), as indicated by local agricultural prices,
falls by a large amount – around 8% two years into the adjustment (see Figure 2.3). This is
likely to induce a sizeable fall in imports, as domestic consumers substitute towards the
cheaper domestic tradable good.
Also note that the local price of H non-tradable goods (PN,t), as indicated by local
service prices, falls around 4% (see Figure 2.3). This puts pressure on the CPI, and to the
extent that non-tradable inputs enter tradable goods it is part of the explanation for why
P˜H,t and P˜
?
H,t fall.
One loose end remains. Why does the local price of H tradables (P˜H,t) fall by around
twice as much as the export price of the very same tradables (P˜ ?H,t)? This is consistent
with distributional services driving a wedge between local prices and port prices. Consider
that selling one ton of grain overseas is associated with more distribution costs (e.g.
transportation, warehousing and finding overseas buyers) than selling the same ton of grain
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locally.63 If the price for such distribution services is less flexible than the local price for
grain, then the port price for grain – an aggregate of distribution service prices and local
grain prices – will display fewer fluctuations than the local price for grain.
In sum, falling export prices induce a large increase in exports, while falling import
prices and falling local prices have contravening effects on imports. The net result is a
stable terms of trade, a sizeable decrease in the domestic price level and a sizeable increase
in exports.
Table 2.6: Local prices, terms of trade and the trade balance
Price Price change Substitution effect
P ?H,t (port price of H tradable good) ↓ exports ↑↑
PF,t (port price of F tradable good) ↓ imports ↑
PH,t (local price of H tradable good) ↓↓ imports ↓
Net effects ToT stable, CPI ↓↓ exports ↑↑
2.7.3 Engel decomposition
Engel (1993) finds that most variation in the real exchange rate today is due to variation
in tradable goods prices, as opposed to variation in non-tradable goods prices. How does
this compare to the GS era? Engel (1993) decomposes the logarithm of the real exchange
rate into a tradable price component (qT ), and a non-tradable price component (qN ):
R̂EERt = ĈPIt + N̂EERt − ĈPI
?
t
= N̂EERt + PˆT,t − Pˆ ?T,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡qT
+ (1− γˇ) [(PˆN,t − PˆT,t)− (Pˆ ?N,t − Pˆ ?T,t)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡qN
,
where we have used (2.5) to substitute for the CPI terms. PT,t denotes the price of locally
consumed tradables, and PN,t denotes the price of local non-tradables. The F region’s
equivalents are denoted with an asterisk. NEERt denotes the nominal effective exchange
rate and γˇ denotes the weight of non-tradables in the overall consumption basket. All prices
63Although by the late 19th century important trading centers and coastal cities were internationally
well-integrated there was considerable market segmentation further inland (Uebele, 2011).
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are in logs.64
Table 2.7 shows how the two components qT and qN correlate with the REER. When
port prices are used for PT,t and P
?
T,t (as suggested by Burstein et al., 2005), the non-tradable
price component, qN , is positively correlated with the REER, while the tradable price
component, qT , is not. This is consistent with the earlier finding that external adjustment
under the GS was based on local price deflation.65
When local prices, instead of port prices, are used to calculate qT and qN (see Engel,
1999), the tradable price component qT starts to exhibit a significantly positive correlation
with the REER. However, the correlation coefficient for the non-tradable price component,
qN , remains significantly positive.
Table 2.7: Engel decomposition
Port prices: Local prices:
∆ REER ∆ REER
ρ p N ρ p N
∆qT 0.019 0.68 456 ∆qT 0.170*** 0.00 287
∆qN 0.162*** 0.00 399 ∆qN 0.107* 0.08 277
Notes: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. ρ: Pearson correlation coefficients. p: p-values. N : number of
observations.
In sum, the data indicate that variation in non-tradable prices played an important
role in overall REER variation under the GS. This stands in contrast to the findings for
floating exchange rate economies today, where most variation in the real exchange rate can
be attributed to variation in tradable prices qT , instead of non-tradable prices qN Engel
(1993, 1999).
There exist several plausible explanations for this shift in the composition of real
64We use local service prices as an indicator for local non-tradable prices PˆN,t. The F region’s equivalent,
Pˆ ?N,t, is a trade-weighted average of the service prices of all other countries in the sample. With respect to
the tradable price PˆT,t two indicators have been used in the literature. First, port prices, as suggested by
Burstein et al. (2005). In this case, export prices are used as an indicator for the local tradable price PˆT,t,
while import prices are used for N̂EERt − Pˆ ?T,t. Second, we use local tradable prices (see Engel, 1999). In
this case we use a weighted average of local agricultural prices and local raw material prices (weighted by
value-added sector shares) as our indicator for PˆT,t, whereas the F equivalent, Pˆ
?
T,t, is a trade-weighted
average of the corresponding prices in all other countries.
65This finding is also consistent with the finding by Burstein et al. (2005) that during several large devaluations
in the 1990s and 2000s, variation in qN accounted for most of the variation in real exchange rates, if port
prices are used as the traded goods price.
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exchange rate movements: First, non-tradable price variation might be more important
for economies whose exchange rate is fixed. This conforms with recent findings by Berka
et al. (forthcoming), who show that among euro area members, variation in non-tradable
prices plays a more important role for overall REER variation. Second, the finding that
tradable price variation was less important under the GS than today is also consistent with
the fact that tradable goods under the GS (i.e. primary goods) were more homogeneous
than tradable goods today. This would be consistent with the finding by Engel (1993), that
for very homogeneous tradable goods (e.g. bananas) qT explains less real exchange rate
variation than qN . In this way, the 20th century shift away from primary goods production
may have changed the nature of real exchange rate adjustments. Finally, to the extent that
services are labor intensive and wages were less rigid in the late 19th century than they are
today, the larger role of non-tradable prices in adjusting the real exchange rate under the
GS can be partly attributed to more flexible wages.
2.8 Conclusion
How international adjustment worked so smoothly during the 19th century Gold Stan-
dard, a colossus defying most tenets of optimum currency area, has continually fascinated
scholars of international economics. The contribution of the present paper towards a
better understanding of this benign adjustment experience is twofold. First, we built and
estimated a structural model of the Gold Standard. On the basis of the estimated model
we quantitatively assessed the relative importance of three prominent adjustment channels:
flexible prices, international migration, and monetary policy. Counterfactual simulations
suggest that the ease of external adjustment under the Gold Standard was primarily due to
flexible prices allowing for speedy expenditure switching.
Second, we find that price flexibility, and thus benign external adjustments, were
predicated on a historical contingency: large agricultural sectors and the dominance of
primary products among merchandise exports. As still is the case today, agricultural
products and raw materials exhibited much more flexible prices than industrial or service
goods. At the same time agricultural products made up a large part of all merchandise
exports, even among early industrializers. This fortunate coincidence of the nominally
most flexible sector simultaneously being the most important tradable sector is the main
explanation for the ease of external adjustment under the pre-1913 Gold Standard.
Our findings raise an interesting question with respect to the malfunctioning of the Gold
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Standard after World War 1 and its fall in the 1930s, which is often attributed to the rise
of rigid wages (see Bordo et al., 2000). A sectoral composition-based explanation for why
the 19th century Gold Standard worked well, however, suggests that staying on gold was
becoming increasingly difficult as primary sector shares continued their decline. According
to this line of reasoning the classical Gold Standard had been approaching its date of expiry
independently of the rise of wage rigidity and the unfolding of the tumultuous events after
1913 (see Means, 1936).
Our result also touches upon current problems in the euro area. The pre-1914 Gold
Standard is a prime historical example for a functioning fixed exchange rate regime among
fiscally independent nation states. In this regard the Gold Standard served as a historical
precedent that could be alluded to when the design of the euro area was questioned in
principle. To the extent that our findings attribute its functioning to a fortunate historical
contingency the Gold Standard loses its role as an exemplar in this regard.
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2.A Data appendix
2.A.1 An annual macrodataset on 14 Gold Standard economies, 1870-1913
Australia: Nominal GDP: Mitchell (2013). Real per capita GDP: Barro and Ursu´a
(2010). CPI: Taylor (2002). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld (2004) (adjusted for
monetary gold flows). Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013). nominal USD-exchange rate:
Obstfeld and Taylor (2003). Immigration & emigration: Ferenczi (1929). Population:
Mitchell (2013). Narrow and broad cover ratio: Jones and Obstfeld (2004) (gold) and
Mitchell (2013) (notes and deposits). Notes in circulation: Mitchell (2013). Primary,
secondary and tertiary sector shares (value added): Buera and Kaboski (2012). Agricultural
labor share: Mitchell (2013). Agricultural, raw material and industrial exports: Coghlan
(1901) (1880-1898), Statistical abstract for the several British colonies, possessions, and
protectorates (1899-1900) and Official year book of the Commonwealth of Australia (1901-
1912). Agricultural, raw material, industrial and service prices: Butlin (1962). Terms of
trade: Wilson (1931). Export prices: Wilson (1931).
Belgium: Nominal GDP: Smits et al. (2009). Real per capita GDP: Barro and Ursu´a
(2010). CPI: National Bank of Belgium Services Statistiques Financie`res et E´conomiques
(2012), Table: Indice des prix a` la Consommation en Belgique. Current account: exports
- imports. Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013). Nominal USD-exchange rate: Schneider
et al. (1991) (1870-1880) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) (1881-1913). Immigration &
emigration: Mitchell (2013). Population: Annuaire statistique de la Belgique. Central bank
discount rate: National Bank of Belgium (1870-1879) and Flandreau and Zumer (2004)
(1880-1913). Narrow and broad cover ratio: Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik: Organisation
und Gescha¨ftsverkehr wichtiger europa¨ischer Notenbanken, 1876-1913 (1925). Notes in
circulation: Mitchell (2013). Primary, secondary and tertiary sector shares (value added):
Buera and Kaboski (2012). Agricultural labor share: Mitchell (2013). Agricultural, raw
material and industrial exports: Annuaire statistique de la Belgique. Agricultural, raw
material, industrial and service prices: Smits et al. (2009) and Global prices and incomes
database (raw materials). Terms of trade: Horlings (2002).
Canada: Nominal GDP: Jones and Obstfeld (2004). Real per capita GDP: Barro and
Ursu´a (2010). CPI: Taylor (2002). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld (2004) (adjusted
for monetary gold flows). Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013). Nominal USD-exchange
rate: Schneider et al. (1991) (1870-1899 & 1909-1913) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003)
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(1900-1908). Immigration & emigration: Urquhart and Buckley (1965) & Viner (1924).
Population: The Maddison-Project (2013). Narrow and broad cover ratio: Leacy et al.
(1983). Notes in circulation: Mitchell (2013). Primary, secondary and tertiary sector shares
(value added): Buera and Kaboski (2012). Agricultural labor share: Urquhart and Buckley
(1965) Historical Statistics of Canada (1881) & Mitchell (2013) (1891-1911). Agricultural,
raw material and industrial exports: Statistical yearbook of Canada (1870-1904) and
Canada yearbook (1905-1913). Agricultural, raw material, industrial and service prices:
Urquhart and Buckley (1965) Historical Statistics of Canada. Terms of trade: Urquhart
and Buckley (1965) Historical Statistics of Canada. Export prices: Urquhart and Buckley
(1965) Historical Statistics of Canada.
Denmark : Nominal GDP: Mitchell (2013). Real per capita GDP: Barro and Ursu´a
(2010). CPI: Taylor (2002). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld (2004) (adjusted for
monetary gold flows). Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013). Nominal USD-exchange rate:
Denzel (2010) (1870-1880), Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) (1881-1912) and Officer (2015) (1913).
Emigration: Mitchell (2013). Population: The Maddison-Project (2013). Central bank
discount rate: Johansen (1985) (1870-1874) and Abildgren (2005) (1875-1913) . Narrow
and broad cover ratio: Johansen (1985). Notes in circulation: Johansen (1985). Primary,
secondary and tertiary sector shares (value added): Buera and Kaboski (2012). Agricultural
labor share: Henriksen (2009). Agricultural, raw material and industrial exports: Henriksen
(2009) (1874-1883), Statistical abstract for the principal and other foreign countries. (1884-
1912) and Statistisk a˚rbog (1913). Agricultural, raw material, industrial and service prices:
Hansen (1974). Terms of trade: Johansen (1985). Export prices: Johansen (1985).
Finland : Nominal GDP: Hjerppe (1989). Real per capita GDP: Barro and Ursu´a
(2010). CPI: Taylor (2002). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld (2004) (adjusted for
monetary gold flows). Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013). Nominal USD-exchange rate:
Autio (1992) (1870-1880) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) (1881-1913). Immigration &
emigration: Ferenczi (1929). Population: The Maddison-Project (2013). Central bank
discount rate: Autio (1996). Narrow and broad cover ratio: Ikonen (1998). Notes in
circulation: Mitchell (2013). Primary, secondary and tertiary sector shares (value added):
Hjerppe (1989). Agricultural labor share: Hjerppe (1989). Agricultural, raw material and
industrial exports: Hjerppe (1989) (1875-1880) and Statistical yearbook of Finland (1877 &
1882-1913). Agricultural, raw material, industrial and service prices: Smits et al. (2009).
Terms of trade: Hjerppe (1989). Export prices: Hjerppe (1989).
France: Nominal GDP: Mitchell (2013). Real per capita GDP: Barro and Ursu´a (2010).
43
2.A. Data appendix
CPI: Piketty and Zucman (2014). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld (2004) (adjusted for
monetary gold flows). Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013). Nominal USD-exchange rate:
Denzel (2010) (1870-1880), Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) (1881-1912) and Officer (2015) (1913).
Emigration: Mitchell (2013) (1870-1890) and Ferenczi (1929) (1891-1913). Population:
The Maddison-Project (2013). Central bank discount rate: Jong (1967) (1870-1879) and
Flandreau and Zumer (2004) (1880-1913). Narrow and broad cover ratio: Vergleichende
Notenbankstatistik: Organisation und Gescha¨ftsverkehr wichtiger europa¨ischer Notenbanken,
1876-1913 (1925). Notes in circulation: Mitchell (2013). Primary, secondary and tertiary
sector shares (value added): Buera and Kaboski (2012). Agricultural labor share: Mitchell
(2013), CEPII series longues macroeconomiques. Agricultural, raw material and industrial
exports: Statistical abstract for the principal and other foreign countries. Agricultural, raw
material, industrial and service prices: Brandau (1936) (agricultural & raw material) and
Smits et al. (2009) (industrial and service). Terms of trade: White (1933). Export prices:
White (1933).
Germany : Nominal GDP: Burhop and Wolff (2005). Real per capita GDP: Barro
and Ursu´a (2010). CPI: Taylor (2002). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld (2004)
(adjusted for monetary gold flows). Exports & imports: Sensch (2009) (1872-1879) and
Mitchell (2013) (1880-1913). Nominal USD-exchange rate: Denzel (2010) (1870-1886) and
Statistisches Jahrbuch fu¨r das Deutsche Reich (various issues). Emigration: Mitchell (2013).
Population: Mitchell (2013). Central bank discount rate: Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik:
Organisation und Gescha¨ftsverkehr wichtiger europa¨ischer Notenbanken, 1876-1913 (1925)
(1870-1879) and Flandreau and Zumer (2004) (1880-1913). Narrow and broad cover ratio:
Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik: Organisation und Gescha¨ftsverkehr wichtiger europa¨ischer
Notenbanken, 1876-1913 (1925). Notes in circulation: Mitchell (2013). Primary, secondary
and tertiary sector shares (value added): Buera and Kaboski (2012). Agricultural labor
share: Broadberry (2009) (1871 & 1913) and Mitchell (2013) (1882-1907). Agricultural,
raw material and industrial exports: Sensch (2009). Agricultural, raw material, industrial
and service prices: Hoffmann (1965) and Mu¨ssig (1919) (raw material). Terms of trade:
Desai (2005). Export prices: Desai (2005).
Netherlands: Nominal GDP: Smits et al. (2000). Real per capita GDP: Barro and
Ursu´a (2010). CPI: Taylor (2002). Current account: Smits et al. (2000). Exports &
imports: Mitchell (2013). Nominal USD-exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Immigration & emigration: Mitchell (2013). Population: Bie and Smits (2001). Central bank
discount rate: Jong (1967) (1870-1875), Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik: Organisation
44
2.A. Data appendix
und Gescha¨ftsverkehr wichtiger europa¨ischer Notenbanken, 1876-1913 (1925) (1876-1879)
and Flandreau and Zumer (2004) (1880-1913). Narrow cover ratio: Jong (1967) (1870-
1875) and Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik: Organisation und Gescha¨ftsverkehr wichtiger
europa¨ischer Notenbanken, 1876-1913 (1925) (1876-1913). Broad cover ratio: Jong (1967).
Notes in circulation: Jong (1967). Primary, secondary and tertiary sector shares (value
added): Buera and Kaboski (2012). Agricultural labor share: Van Zanden, J.L., National
Accounts of the Netherlands, 1800-1913. Agricultural, raw material and industrial exports:
Statistical abstract for the principal and other foreign countries. Agricultural, raw material,
industrial and service prices: Van Zanden, J.L., National Accounts of the Netherlands,
1800-1913 and Van Riel (2000). Terms of trade: Bie and Smits (2001). Export prices: Bie
and Smits (2001).
New Zealand : Nominal GDP: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003). Real per capita GDP:
Barro and Ursu´a (2010). CPI: Thorns and Sedgwick (1997). Current account: exports -
imports. Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013). Nominal USD-exchange rate: Officer (2015)
(GBP-USD exchange rate). Immigration & emigration: Ferenczi (1929). Population: The
Maddison-Project (2013). Notes in circulation: Mitchell (2013). Agricultural labor share:
New Zealand Censuses (various issues 1871-1916). Agricultural, raw material and industrial
exports: Statistics of the colony of New Zealand (1875-1907) and The New Zealand official
yearbook (1908-1913). Agricultural, raw material, industrial and service prices: Arnold
(1982) (agricultural) and McIlraith (1911) (raw material). Terms of trade: McIlraith (1911).
Export prices: McIlraith (1911).
Norway : Nominal GDP: Grytten (2004). Real per capita GDP: Barro and Ursu´a (2010).
CPI: Taylor (2002). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld (2004) (adjusted for monetary
gold flows). Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013). Nominal USD-exchange rate: Obstfeld
and Taylor (2003). Emigration: Mitchell (2013). Population: The Maddison-Project (2013).
Central bank discount rate: Norges Bank Historical Monetary Statistics. Narrow and broad
cover ratio: Norges Bank Historical Monetary Statistics. Notes in circulation: Norges Bank
Historical Monetary Statistics. Primary, secondary and tertiary sector shares (value added):
Grytten (2015). Agricultural labor share: Statistisk Aarbok (various issues). Agricultural,
raw material and industrial exports: Statistical abstract for the principal and other foreign
countries. Agricultural, raw material, industrial and service prices: Klovland (2013) and
Grytten (2015). Terms of trade: Klovland (2013). Export prices: Klovland (2013).
Sweden: Nominal GDP: Edvinsson (2004). Real per capita GDP: Barro and Ursu´a
(2010). CPI: Taylor (2002). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld (2004) (adjusted for
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monetary gold flows). Exports & imports: Scho¨n (2015). Nominal USD-exchange rate:
Denzel (2010) (1870-1880) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) (1881-1913). Immigration &
emigration: Mitchell (2013). Population: The Maddison-Project (2013). Central bank
discount rate: Edvinsson et al. (2010). Narrow and broad cover ratio: Swedish Riksbank
Historical Monetary Statistics of Sweden. Notes in circulation: Swedish Riksbank Historical
Monetary Statistics of Sweden. Primary, secondary and tertiary sector shares (value added):
Buera and Kaboski (2012). Agricultural labor share: Scho¨n et al. (2012). Agricultural, raw
material and industrial exports: Scho¨n (2015). Agricultural, raw material, industrial and
service prices: Swedish Historical National Accounts 1560-2010, The 2015 release. Terms of
trade: Scho¨n (2015). Export prices: Scho¨n (2015).
Switzerland : Nominal GDP: Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer (1996). Real per capita GDP:
Barro and Ursu´a (2010). CPI: Taylor (2002). Exports & imports: Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer
(1996) (1870-1884) and Mitchell (2013) (1885-1913). Nominal USD-exchange rate: Denzel
(2010) (1870-1880) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) (1881-1913). Emigration: Mitchell
(2013). Population: Mitchell (2013). Central bank discount rate: Swiss National Bank
(SNB) Historical Time Series: average of discount rates in Geneva, Basel, Zurich and
St Gallen (1870-1893), Flandreau and Zumer (2004) (1894-1906) and SNB central bank
discount rate (1907-1913). Narrow and broad cover ratio: SNB Historical Time Series.
Notes in circulation: SNB Historical Time Series. Primary, secondary and tertiary sector
shares (value added): Buera and Kaboski (2012). Agricultural labor share: Historical
Statistics of Switzerland Online (1870-1880) and Mitchell (2013) (1890-1910). Agricultural,
raw material and industrial exports: Statistical abstract for the principal and other foreign
countries. Agricultural, raw material, industrial and service prices: Historical Statistics of
Switzerland Online. Terms of trade: Historical Statistics of Switzerland Online. Export
prices: Historical Statistics of Switzerland Online.
United Kingdom: Nominal GDP: Hills et al. (2015). Real per capita GDP: Barro
and Ursu´a (2010). CPI: Hills et al. (2015). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld (2004)
(adjusted for monetary gold flows). Exports & imports: Hills et al. (2015). Nominal USD-
exchange rate: Officer (2015). Immigration & emigration: Mitchell (2013). Population:
The Maddison-Project (2013). Central bank discount rate: Hills et al. (2015) (1870-
1875), Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik: Organisation und Gescha¨ftsverkehr wichtiger
europa¨ischer Notenbanken, 1876-1913 (1925) (1876-1879) and Flandreau and Zumer (2004)
(1880-1913). Narrow and broad cover ratio: Bank of England Historical Balance Sheet.
Notes in circulation: Bank of England Historical Balance Sheet. Primary, secondary and
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tertiary sector shares (value added): Buera and Kaboski (2012). Agricultural labor share:
Mitchell (2013). Agricultural, raw material and industrial exports: Statistical abstract for
the United Kingdom. Agricultural, raw material, industrial and service prices: Clark (2004)
(agricultural), Layton and Crowther (1935) (raw material) and Feinstein (1972) (industrial
and service). Terms of trade: Hills et al. (2015). Export prices: Hills et al. (2015).
United States: Nominal GDP: Johnston and Williamson (2011). Real per capita GDP:
Barro and Ursu´a (2010). CPI: Hills et al. (2015). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld
(2004) (adjusted for monetary gold flows). Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013). Immigration
& emigration: Mitchell (2013) (immigration) and Ferenczi (1929) (emigration). Population:
The Maddison-Project (2013). Narrow and broad cover ratio: Jones and Obstfeld (2004)
(gold), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED (silver and foreign exchange), Mitchell
(2013) (notes). Notes in circulation: Mitchell (2013). Primary, secondary and tertiary
sector shares (value added): Buera and Kaboski (2012). Agricultural labor share: Mitchell
(2013). Agricultural, raw material and industrial exports: Statistical abstract for the
principal and other foreign countries (1870-1906) and Department of Commerce and Labor
Department of Commerce and Labor Bureau of Statistics (1907) (1907-1913). Agricultural,
raw material, industrial and service prices: Historical Statistics of the United States 1789-
1945 (agricultural & industrial) and Brandau (1936) (raw material). Terms of trade: Lipsey
(1963). Export prices: Lipsey (1963).
2.A.2 Migration data
One important source for migration numbers are port statistics, which have been
introduced in most early developing countries after the Napoleonic wars.66 These port
statistics provide information about departures and arrivals. Another important source are
communal registers that noted changes in place of residence or naturalizations.
Generally, receiving countries tended to focus on collecting immigration data, while
sending countries focused on collecting emigration data. Thus, for sending countries, there
do not always exist immigration data (e.g. Denmark, Germany or Norway). Similarly, for
receiving countries emigration data tends to be less readily available than immigration data.
For example, our emigration series for Canada only starts in 1900.
Immigration data for receiving countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USA) is
66The following description of the migration data makes ample use of the data descriptions given in Ferenczi
(1929) and Mitchell (2013).
47
2.A. Data appendix
usually considered to be of high quality. They are also more comparable than emigration
statistics from European countries. Partly this is due to some European passport statistics
and communal registers confounding intentions to emigrate with actual emigration. Partly
this is due to port statistics only covering overseas or intercontinental migration. As long as
such cross country heterogeneity in data collection only affects the migration series’ level,
while leaving its cyclical properties intact, all results discussed in the paper are robust, as
we only analyze the series’ cyclical properties.
However, there also exists the concern that the migration data do not cover temporary
emigration and subsequent return migration. If this was the case fluctuations in the labor
migration series would underrepresent the true extent of labor migration. For example,
if good economic prospects lead to an influx of undocumented temporary workers on
top of documented permanent immigrants, the migration time series would systematically
underrepresent the true extent of cyclical labor movements. As a consequence, the sensitivity
of migration flows might be underestimated, and counterfactual per capita volatilities could
give an erroneous impression of the relevance of migration flows for external adjustment.
For this reason Table 2.A.4 lists information about the degree of return migration where
such information is available.
Scandinavian countries tend to see very little return migration from North America
(only 10%). Similarly, there was little return migration of German emigrants to the U.S.
Among British emigrants to the U.S. however somewhat more than one third returned
home. Also about one third of British migrants to Australia returned by the late 1880s.
Fortunately, however, the migration data for the U.K. are based on port statistics that
document arrivals and departures. They thus cover the extent of return migration to the
U.K.
To get an idea about how pre-1914 cyclical fluctuations in overall arrivals were related
to cyclical fluctuations in immigration we looked at the one country in our sample for which
we have immigration as well as arrivals data: Finland. We find that the Pearson correlation
coefficient for immigration and arrivals exceeds 0.8 for first differences and 0.9 for 5-year
differences. This indicates that the cyclical fluctuations in the migration data collected
from different sources was highly correlated.
Note that for the model estimation we exclusively rely on net figures, i.e. net immigration.
In principle, net immigration series possess validity in excess of the underlying gross series
in that net-arrivals equal net immigration, even if the gross figures differ.67
67Only if reporting periods were straddled by important holiday or business-traveling seasons would the
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One way of cross-validating the net immigration series obtained from immigration and
emigration data is to see whether it is consistent with the net immigration (netim) implied
by population data and vital statistics (death rate- and birth rate-data). Given the end of
period population level (pop), birth rates (BR) and death rates (DR), net immigration can
be calculated as:
netimt = popt − popt−1 ∗ (1 +BRt −DRt).
To be sure, the suggested cross-validation exercise jointly tests the quality of immigration
and vital statistics. However, given that for most early developing countries vital statistics
by the late 19th century are of good quality, any resulting discrepancy between the two series
is more likely to be attributable to the migration statistics.68 One period in the following
is the time from one population enumeration to the next. Although annual population
estimates exist for this period, they are of little use for this cross-validation exercise, because
they usually are estimated on the basis of birth rates, death rates and migration data. The
suggested cross-validation attempt would thus become circular.69 Most countries in our
sample conducted decennial censuses in the late 19th and early 20th century, so that in the
following we compare cumulative net immigration rates over ten-year periods.
For all countries for which we have sufficient immigration and emigration data, Figure
2.6 plots the two net immigration/population series – one derived from the migration
statistics (plus symbols), and the other derived from the census population enumerations
and vital statistics (circle symbols).70 In general, the fluctuations of the two series are
similar. Note that the results of all analyses presented in this paper are robust to any level
two differ. There is no indication that this was the case. Even if it was the case, seasonal tourism at the
time was an elite phenomenon whose effect on overall population movement statistics must have been very
small.
68The same argument is provided by primary sources when explaining the discrepancy between population
estimates and population enumerations. See, for example, the population statistics section of the Official
yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia from 1913.
69For the same reason we do not calculate a vital statistics-based net immigration series for France, because
the French immigration series we use was itsself derived from vital statistics, rendering this exercise circular
for the case of France (see White, 1933. The French International Accounts 1880-1913. p.77. Table 11:
Funds brought into France by immigrants, 1880-1913, Immigration).
70For Denmark, Germany and Norway there exist no immigration series, so there exist no net immigration
rates from migration data for comparison. France is excluded because its immigration series is an estimate
based on vital statistics. Emigration data for the U.S. allows only for the calculation of a single net
immigration rate observation. This provides no information with respect to the validity of the cyclical
variations in the net immigration series.
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Figure 2.6: Immigration rates: migration data vs. population and vital data
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Notes: Plus (+) signs – cumulative intercensal netimmigration/population rate, calculated from
immigration and emigration data. Circles – cumulative intercensal netimmigration/population rate,
calculated from the preceeding census’ population data, death rates and birth rates.
differences, as our analysis is based on the series’ cyclical properties only. In general, these
results make us confident that the migration series are informative about the medium-term
swings in international population movements, in which we are interested in.71
2.A.3 Sectoral price data
The sectoral price data come from various sources and most commonly are either
wholesale price indices or implicit sectoral deflators. We never use price data from trade
statistics. In this way we ensure that the sectoral price indices reflect the prices of locally
71Note that for the model estimation we allow for measurement error in the net immigration series.
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produced goods.
In order to assess the validity and reliability of these sectoral price series we built their
weighted average and compared it to GDP deflators. In particular we look at the weighted
arithmetic average, where the weights are the sector shares provided by Buera and Kaboski
(2012). Because the sectoral price data distinguishes between agriculture, raw materials,
industry, and services, whereas the sectoral share data by Buera and Kaboski (2012) only
distinguishes between primary (agriculture), secondary (mining and industry) and tertiary
(services) we aggregate the sectoral price data in the following way:
Pt = primt ∗ P agrit + secondt ∗ (P indut + P rawt )/2 + tertt ∗ P servt .
When there was no service price indicator available ( U.S.), or when service prices are only
available for a short period of time (Canada and U.K.) we drop the third term from this
equation and rebase the primary and secondary sector shares: primt/(primt + secondt)
and secondt/(primt + secondt).
The resulting series for each country are shown as gray dashed lines in Figure 2.7. In
almost all cases the price level estimate derived from the sectoral price data is very similar
to GDP deflator series obtained from different sources. Only in the case of Canada, the
U.K. and the U.S., for which service price indices are either not available, or have been
dropped because they were only available for short time periods, is the match less exact.
New Zealand is missing from this graph owing to a lack of sectoral share data. In general,
the consistency between the sectoral price series and the much more widely used and better
vetted GDP deflator series is reassuring.
2.A.4 Sectoral exports
How much of international trade does our 14 country gold block sample cover? To
answer this question we calculated within Gold Standard trade shares:
impsharei,t =
∑
j∈gold impij,t
impi,t
and expsharei,t =
∑
j∈gold expij,t
expi,t
,
where i is the country index and t the time index.72
72We use bilateral trade flow data provided by Barbieri et al. (2008), Jacks et al. (2011) and Mitchell (2013).
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Figure 2.7: Price level: GDP deflator vs. weighted average of sectoral prices
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Notes: Solid black line – GDP deflator. Dashed gray line – weighted average of sectoral prices (weight =
sectoral shares by Buera and Kaboski (2012)).
The average import and export shares are listed in Table 2.8. 75% of imports come
from other GS members in the sample, while 84% of exports go to other GS members in
the sample. There is some variance over time and across countries, but even the smallest
import share is 49%, while the smallest export share is 57%.
These numbers point towards the gold block being a fairly self-contained trading block.
While some important trading partners were not members of this gold block (e.g. India,
China, Argentina or Brazil), the data clearly indicate that such trade usually did not
amount to more than one quarter of trade for the gold block countries.73
73Note that these within Gold Standard trade shares are about twice as large as those reported in the online
appendix to Cata˜o and Solomou (2005). This is due to Cata˜o and Solomou (2005) including only Germany,
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Table 2.8: Within Gold Standard trade shares
Mean SD Min Max N
Import share 0.75 0.14 0.49 1.00 440
Export share 0.84 0.11 0.57 1.00 440
Notes: Average within gold-block trade shares (14 countries from the baseline sample). Different de-
nominators for the calculation of the trade share: aggregate trade measure (e.g.
∑
j∈gold impij/impi),
sum of bilateral trade measures (e.g.
∑
j∈gold impij/
∑
j impij) and the same measures calculated
on the basis of interpolated trade measures.
France, the U.K. and the U.S. among the gold block countries.
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Table 2.9: Sectoral price data
Country Time Source Notes
Australia 1870-1913 Butlin (1962) agricultural : average of pastoral, agriculture and dairying price
indeces. Pastoral index contains wool and livestock prices.
Agricultural wholesale price index based on nine goods. Dairying
index is a weighted average of wholesale prices for butter, eggs and
honey. raw materials: based on price of gold and coal. Gold’s
relative importance declines substantially after 1911, and the index
tends to give too much weight to it after that year Butlin (see 1962,
p.456). industrial : industrial price index (composed of four
industrial goods’ wholesale price series, and industrial wage-rates).
services: based on prices for private water transport, government
business undertakigs (railway freight rates and wage incomes),
government services, property and finance, professional and domestic
service, distribution.
Belgium 1870-1913 agricultural, industrial &
services: Smits et al.
(2009). raw materials:
Global prices and incomes
database.
agricultural : implicit agricultural, hunting and forestry deflator. raw
materials: average price of lampoil, kerosene and coal in Ghent
1816-1925. industrial : industry deflator. services: index based on
prices for wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants,
transport, storage, communication, financial intermediation, real
estate, renting and business activity, community, social and personal
services.
Canada agricultural :
1870-1913. raw
material &
industrial :
1890-1913.
services:
1900-1913.
Urquhart and Buckley
(1965)
agricultural : wholesale prices of 15 foodstuffs (from Toronto
newspapers). raw materials: wholesale price of raw and partly
manufactured goods. industrial : wholesale price of fully and chiefly
manufactured goods. services: index based on prices for domestic
electric light and hospital charges.
Denmark 1870-1913 Hansen (1974) agricultural : implicit deflator for agricultural production. raw
material : implicit deflator for forestry, peat- and lignite production.
industrial : implicit deflator for craftsmanship, industry, etc.
services: implicit deflator of trade etc.
Finland 1870-1913 Smits et al. (2009) agricultural : implicit deflator for agricultural and fishing production.
raw materials: implicit deflators for forestry production. industrial :
implicit deflator for manufacturing production. services: implicit
deflator for trade, transport, storage and communications, financial
intermediation, real estate, renting and business activities.
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France agricultural &
raw material :
1871-1913.
industrial &
services:
1870-1913.
agricultural & raw
material : Brandau (1936).
industrial & services:
Smits et al. (2009).
agricultural & raw material : wholesale price indices. industrial :
implicit deflator for total industry production. services: implicit
deflator for trade, transport, real estate activities, total government,
other community, social and personal service activities and private
households with employed persons.
Germany 1870-1913 agricultural, industrial &
services: Hoffmann (1965).
raw materials: Mu¨ssig
(1919).
agricultural : retail- and wholesale prices. raw materials: price index
based on prices for coal, coke, spar, ore, iron. industrial : price index
based on industrial inventory, industrial supplies, railway
construction, agricultural machinery and equipment, furniture,
household goods, heating, clothing, textile household goods, leather
goods, health and personal care goods, cleaning goods.services:
price index based on services of doctors and nursing staff, housing,
domestic services, education, recreation, transport and public
consumption.
Netherlands 1870-1913 agricultural, industrial &
services: Van Zanden,
J.L., National Accounts of
the Netherlands,
1800-1913. raw materials:
Van Riel (2000).
agricultural, industrial & services: sectoral deflators. raw materials:
based on prices for copper, tin, lead, coal and peat.
New Zealand agricultural :
1870-1913. raw
materials:
1870-1910.
agricultural : Arnold
(1982). raw materials:
McIlraith (1911).
agricultural : total food consumer prices. raw materials: non-farm
commodity price index.
Norway 1870-1913 agricultural, raw materials
& industrial : Klovland
(2005). services: Grytten
(2015).
agricultural : based on prices for feeding stuffs, vegetables, grain, fish,
dairy product and meat. raw materials: based on prices for metals,
minerals and timer and wood. industrial : based on prices for
manufactures of wood and manufactures of textiles. services: based
on prices for commerce, transport and communication, government
services, community and business services, personal services,
domestic services and misc.
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Sweden 1870-1913 Swedish Historical
National Accounts
1560-2010, The 2015
release.
agricultural : based on prices of products from agriculture, forestry,
hunting and fishing, horticulture sectors. raw materials: based on
prices of products from mining and metals industry. industrial :
based on prices of products from paper and printing industries,
textile and clothing industry, leather, hair and rubber industries,
chemical industries, building and construction. services: based on
prices for foreign shipping, domestic shipping, stevedoring, timber
floating, stage-post services, horse-drawn transports, railways, postal
services, telecommunications, trade and commerce, private services
and dwelling services
Switzerland agricultural,
raw materials
&
industrial :1870-
1913. services:
1890-1913.
Historical Statistics of
Switzerland Online
agricultural : price index for food and beverage: animal, vegetable
and processed products. raw materials: price index for fuels,
chemicals, metals and building materials. industrial : price index for
textiles (cotton, silk, wool, linen), skins and leather. services:
tertiary sector, implicit deflator.
United
Kingdom
agricultural,
raw materials
& industrial :
1870-1913
agricultural : Clark (2004).
raw materials: Layton and
Crowther (1935).
industrial : Maynard
(1962) Tinbergen (1956)
agricultural : farm index; composite of arable products, meat, dairy,
wool, and pasture products; index for the price of the net output of
products of the agricultural sector of the economy; products used as
inputs in the farm sector (e.g. animal fodder) get less weight. raw
materials: raw material price index based on the wholesale price of
44 to 45 commodities. industrial : based on prices for clothing,
durable household goods and other goods. service: based on prices
for transport and communication, and other services.
USA agricultural,
raw materials
& industrial :
1870-1913
agricultural & industrial :
Historical Statistics of the
United States 1789-1945.
raw materials: Brandau
(1936).
agricultural : wholesale farm product price index. raw materials:
wholesale prices for industrial raw materials. industrial : wholesale
prices of textile products, chemicals and drugs, house-furnishing
goods. service: imputed with sectoral share data and GDP deflator.
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Table 2.10: Migration data
Country Time Type Source Notes
Australia 1870-1913 arrivals &
departures
Ferenczi (1929) Return migration to U.K. inconsequential in 1870s ( 10%),
but grows in importance in the late 1880s (to about one
third).
Belgium 1870-1913 arrivals &
departures
Mitchell (2013) Arrivals and departures, from and to foreign countries.
Recorded in local registers of resident population. Data
appear incomplete before the late 1900s.
Canada immigration:
1870-1913
emigration:
1900-1913
immigration &
emigration
Viner (1924) &
Urquhart and
Buckley (1965)
Denmark emigration:
1870-1913
controlled
emigration
Mitchell (2013) intercontinental emigration of citizens
Finland immigration:
1894-1913
emigration:
1870-1913
immigration &
emigration
Ferenczi (1929) Intercontinental emigration of all citizens. Prior to 1881 only
emigrants to U.S. series (spliced).
France immigration:
1880-1913
emigration:
1870-1913
immigration &
emigration
Ferenczi
(1929), White
(1933),
Mitchell (2013)
French emigration statistics tend to show fewer emigrants
than receiving countries’ statistics show French immigrants.
French emigration statistics only cover intercontinental
migration; up to 1891: steerage passengers of French
citizenship at le Havre, Bordeaux, Bayonne, and at various
times other French ports. The immigration numbers are
from White (1933), and they are based on population data
and death/birth rates.
Germany emigration:
1870-1913
emigration Mitchell (2013) Litte return migration from the U.S.. Intercontinental
emigration of German citizens through German or major
foreign ports. Almost identical migration numbers in origin
and destination country.
Netherlands 1870-1913 immigration &
emigration
Mitchell (2013) Intercontinental emigration of Dutch citizens through Dutch
ports.
New Zealand 1870-1913 arrivals &
departures
Ferenczi (1929)
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Norway emigration:
1870-1913
emigration Mitchell (2013) Intercontinental emigration of citizens; up to 1876 only
emigrants to the U.S.. Norway exhibits only very little
discrepancy between U.S. immigration and local emigration
statistics.
Sweden 1870-1913 immigration &
emigration
Mitchell (2013) All residents moving to take up permanent residence.
Switzerland immigration:
1891-1913
emigration:
1870-1913
immigration &
emigration
Mitchell (2013) Emigration statistics include intercontinental migration of
citizens and foreign residents. Immigration statistics only
cover naturalisations of foreigners. Statistics up to 1889 are
known to be incomplete. Emigration statistics considered to
be of high quality, as Swiss emigration numbers coincide
with immigration numbers from destination countries.
United
Kingdom
1870-1913 arrivals &
departures
Mitchell (2013) Up to 1876 intercontinental passengers to and from U.K.
ports (incl. Irish ports). from 1876 onwards intercontinental
passengers to and from U.K. ports (U.K. citizens only).
Somewhat more than one third of British emigrants to the
U.S. returned home.
United States immigration:
1870-1913
emigration:
1870-1913
(gaps)
immigration &
departures
Ferenczi
(1929),
Mitchell (2013)
Up to 1906: aliens with intent to reside. From 1906: aliens
arriving with intent to settle. Arrivals in alaska are only
irregularly included up to 1903. Arrivals in Hawaii and
Puerto Rico are included from 1901 and 1902 on,
respectively. Land frontier arrivals only regularly included
from 1908 on. 1892 to 1903: First or second-class passengers
were excluded. From 1904 on aliens in transit were excluded.
Aliens returning from visits abroad were excluded from 1907
on. Emigration statistics only start in 1908. Before that the
emigration series is based on passenger data. Years ending
30 June.
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Table 2.11: Export categories
Country Disaggregate export component series:
Agricultural Raw material Industrial
Australia 1880-1898 : wool, tallow,
butter, live stock, meat, sugar,
wheat and flour, jams, fruit,
potatoes and other vegetable
products.
1899-1900 : butter, flour,
fodder, fruit (green), grain
(oats and wheat), hay and
chaff, hides, live stock (horses),
cold-preserved meat (beef),
mutton and lamb, rabbits and
hares, meat (preserved in
tins), oil (cocoanut in bulk),
skins (sheep and other), sugar
(cane and other), tallow, wine
(fermented), wool (in the
grease and scoured).
1901-1912 : animal foodstuffs
etc., vegetable foodstufs etc.,
beverages (non-alcoholic),
alcoholic liquors, tobacco, live
animals, animal substances,
vegetable substances.
1880-1898 : coal, silver (lead
and ore), tin, copper, hides
and skins, gold, minerals,
timber, sandal-wood, pearl
shell, pearls, guano.
1899-1900 : bark (for tanning),
coal, coke, copper (ore, ingots,
bars) gold, lead (pig and
matte), pearlshell, silver and
silverware, silver (lead ), skins
(rabbit, hare and other), tin
(ore and ingots), wood and
timber, gold and silver
buillion.
1901-1912 : oils, stones, metals
(ores), wood.
1880-1912 : apparel, paints, metals (part
manufactured and manufactured), leather,
earthenware, paper, jewellery, instruments, drugs
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Belgium 1870-1913 : starch, bovine,
ovine, swines, horses, beers,
canned cheese, other canned
foods, butter, flour,
bran/food/starch/moutures,
grains, milk and cheese,
vegetables (and potatoes),
eggs, bread/sea
biscuit/macaroni etc., fish,
rice, meat, mixed delicacies,
fruits, alcoholic
drinks/liquor/brandies,
animal fats, other animal
products, crops and fodder,
beets, hop, yeast, plants and
flowers, vegetables
(non-specified), wine
1870-1913 : wood
(construction and other),
coffee, rubber (raw and
processed), black coal, coke,
salt (raw), linen and hemp
rags, oils/food and other, lime,
iron and steel filings, sulfur,
other minerals, steel (raw and
ingots), copper and nickel,
iron (raw and old), gold/silver
and platinum, lead, zinc, other
metals, raw skins, stones (raw
and finished), resin and
bitumen, sugar (raw), tobacco,
bark, seeds (oily), seeds
(other), broken glass and
cullet
1870-1913 : arms, candles, ropes, salt refined, drugs,
fertilizer, yarn (cotton, wool, goat hair, linen and
silk), clothing, cars and streetcars, other machines,
textiles (hemp, cotton, etoupes, jute, wool, linen, silk,
other), haberdashery and ironmongery, iron
(processed), furniture, watches, art objects, paper,
prepared skin, processed skin, pottery, chemicals,
various products for industry, typographical products,
soap, sugar (refined), tinctures and colors, tissues
(cotton, wool, linen, jute, hemp, silk, not specified),
tulles (lace trimming and satin lace), glasswares, cars
Canada 1870-1913 : products of
fisheries, animals and produts
of, agricultural product
1870-1913 : prodcts of mines,
products of forest (raw)
1870-1913 : products of the forest (manufactured and
partially manufactured), manufactures
Denmark 1870-1873 : meat and cattle,
pork and pigs, butter, other
animal, cereals, flour, grains
and bread, other vegetable,
food, drink.
1874-1883 : agricultural
exports.
1870-1873 : hides and skins.
1884-1912 : coal, coffee (raw),
coffee (roasted), oil/petroleum
and other, sugar (raw and
refined), tobacco, wood.
1870-1873 : goods of iron and metal industry, texile
and clothing, articles of stone/clay and glass industry,
other industrial goods.
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1884-1912 : horses, cattle,
sheep and goats, swine, beer,
butter (in hermetically sealed
boxes), eggs, fish (except shell
fish, fresh), fish (preserved
and salted), barley, wheat,
wheat flour, lard and fat, meat
(incl. hams and sausages), rice
flour, seeds (oleaginous and
other), spirits/brandy and
other, wool (raw).
1913 : living animals, animal
products, cereals, fodder,
garden products and fruit,
beverages and spirits, diverse
plant materials.
1913 : colonial goods,
skins/fur/feathers/bonse (and
other animal products),
tallow/oil/rubber/resin/tar,
wood, minerals (raw or
drafted), other metals
1884-1912 : hides and skins (prepared and
manufactured), iron and steel manufactures, wool
manufactures.
1913 : textile materials, yarn, textile products,
clothes, manufactures of skins/fur/feathers/bones
etc., products of tallow/oil/rubber/resin/tar, wood
(processed), paper, other plants-based products,
chemicals and fertilizers, mineral products,
ships/cars/machines and instruments.
Finland 1875-1880 : agricultural
exports.
1882-1891 : butter, meat, milk,
cheese, horses, cattle, pigs,
other live animal, corn (grain),
corn (flour and groats), fish,
poultry, fruits, yarn, hay,
vegetables and horticultural
products, canned food, drinks.
1892-1913 : living animals,
other animal products (meat
etc.), fish, starch foods,
horticultural products and
potatos, fruits and berries,
canned shellfish, drinks,
animal products (bones, horns,
hair), plants/seeds/vegetable
materials.
1875-1880 : forestry, wood
industry.
1882-1891 : wood, firewood,
iron and steel, skins, tar pitch,
cumin, willow bark, potash,
colonial goods (spices and
tobacco), other animal
products, oils and fats,
minerals (raw and products
thereof), metal.
1892-1913 : colonial goods,
skin and leather, pelts, wood
(raw and products), resin and
tar, oils and fats, minerals
(raw and processed), metals.
1875-1880 : paper, textile industry, metal and
engineering industries, other manufacturing.
1882-1891 : wood pulp, paper and cardboard, leather,
glassworks, wallpapers, pottery and earthenware,
textiles and tissue, yarn, woodworks, candles, ships,
drugs, clothes/hats/caps, cosmetics, chemicals,
explosives and accelerants, colors and tinctures,
machines, instruments, cars, artistic goods, luxury
goods.
1892-1913 : paper and carton, spinning products
yarn, tissues, clothing/hats/caps, cosmetics, chemical
products, explosives and accelerants, colors and
tinctures, machines, instruments, car, ships, artistic
works, luxury products.
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France 1870-1913 : horses, other
animals, brandy and other
spirits, butter, margarine,
cheese, cotton (raw), eggs,
fruit (fresh and preserved),
grain and flour, oil cake,
sardines (preserved in oil),
potatoes, other sorts of
vegetables (fresh or preserved),
wine, wool (raw).
1870-1913 : hides (raw),
iron/steel and manufactures
of), pig iron, steel
ingots/billets etc., oils
(volatile and essential), rags
(wollen), silk (raw, thronw,
waste and cocoons), sugar
(raw and refined), wood
(common).
1870-1913 :chemical products, colors and dyes
(prepared), copper wire, cotton yarn, cotton
manufactures (piece goods, unbleached, bleached,
dyed, printed, mixed), lace and patent net, hosiery
and knitted wares, trimmings, earthen and china
ware, flax and hemp yarns, glass and glass wares,
haberdashery/small fancy wares and toys, hides
(tanned or curried), rails, other partly wrought iron,
constructional iron and steel (manufactured),
enamelled and tinned wares, all other manufactures,
jewellery, leather wares (boots and shoes, gloves and
other), machines and machinery (and parts thereof),
metal wares and tools (except of iron and steel),
medicines (prepared), millinery, motor cars and
vehicles, paper (and manufactures thereof),
perfumery and toilet soaps, silk (spun), silk and
waste silk (tissues, gauze, lace and ribbons), soap,
wool yarn, wool manufactures, cloths/casimirs and
similar tissues, dress stuffs of pure wool, stuffs of
wool mixed with other materials.
Germany 1872-1913 : food industry
exports
1872-1913 : raw materials and
semifinished products, metals
1872-1913 : finished products
Netherlands 1878-1889 : animals living
(cattle, sheep and pigs),
animals (horses), bran, butter,
cheese, cotton (raw), fish
(fresh, preserved, incl.
salmon), flax (raw), grain and
flour, wheat and wheat flour,
ryea and rye flour, oats and
oats flour, margarine and
artificial butter, margarine
(oleo), rice and rice flour,
spirits (incl. liqueurs), tallow
and lard, vegetables (fresh and
preserved), wool (raw), yeast.
1878-1889 : articles of food
and live animals.
1878-1889 : copper (ore and
unwrought), guano, hair of all
sorts (unmanufactured), hides
and skins (raw), indigo, iron
and steel (pig iron), madder,
oil (seeds), palm oil, salpetre
(unrefined), spelter or zinc
(unwrought), sugar, tin
(unwrought), tobacco (leaf).
1878-1889 : raw materials.
1878-1889 : candles, cotton (yarn and manufactures),
drugs (Peruvian bark and other), dye stuffs, iron bars
(rails etc.), iron wares (incl. nails and wire), steel and
manufactres, machinery of all kinds, wool (yarn and
manufactures).
1878-1889 : manufactured articles
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New Zealand 1870-1874 : wool, meat,
butter, dairy, grain.
1875-1880 : wool, tallow,
hides, sheepskins, rabbitskins,
flour, bran and sharps, wheat,
barley, malt, oats, oatmeal,
potatoes, hops, butter, cheese,
bacon and hams, salt beef and
pork, preserved meats, frozen
meat, whalebone, sealskins,
whale oil (black and sperm
whales),
1881-1913 : the fisheries,
animals and produce,
agricultural products.
1870-1874 : timber, gum, gold
1875-1880 : gold, silver, coal,
kauri gum, timber (sawn and
hewn, logs, spars, laths,
palings, posts and shii).
1881-1913 : the mine, the
forest.
1875-1880 : leather, cordage, phormium (New
Zealand hemp),
1881-1913 : manufactures.
Norway 1878-1900 : horses, beer, fish
(fresh), cod (dried or split),
herrings (salted), other salted
fish, anchovies, lobster, fish
roes, grain (oats),
1901-1913 : bran, butter,
condensed milk, fish (fresh),
cod (dried or split), herrings
(salted), other salted fish,
anchovies, lobster, fish roes
1878-1900 : skins (calf), skins
(seal), sulphur, train oil, wood
(rough or planed, hwen, in
boards, laths, etc., spars,
stakes, pit props, beams and
other hewn wood, split wood
and firewood).
1901-1913 : copper (crude,
refined, old and scrap), fish
guano, hides and skins, ice,
sulphur, train oil, wood
(rough or planed, hewn in
boards, laths, etc., spars,
stakes, pit probs etc., beams
and other hewn wood, staves,
pit props, split wood, firewood
etc., zinc (crude).
1878-1900 : iron manufactures (nails), lucifer
matches, cotton manufactures, packing paper, wood
manufactures, wood pulp (mechanical process), wood
pulp (chemical process).
1901-1913 : calcium carbide, iron nails, lucifer
matches, paper (packing), paper (printing), sailing
and steam vessels, wood pulp (mechanical and
chemical process)
Sweden 1870-1913 : agriculture and
subsidiaries, food industries.
1870-1913 : mining metal,
stone and clay, wood
industries, leather and rubber
1870-1913 : paper industries, textile and clothing,
chemical industries
Switzerland 1885-1913 : articles of food 1885-1913 : raw materials 1885-1913 : manufactured articles
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United
Kingdom
1872-1897 : animals (horses),
beer and ale, biscuit and
bread, butter, cheese, corn
(wheat), wheat flour, corn
(other kinds), fish (herring and
of other sorts), pickles and
vinegar sauces, provisions (not
otherwise described), spirits.
1898-1913 : grain and flour,
meat (incl. animals for food),
other food and drink, tobacco.
1872-1897 : clay
(unmanufactured), coals
(cinders and fuel), grease
(tallow and animal fat), oil
(seed), rags (and other
materials for paper), salt,
seeds of all sorts, skins and
furs (British), sones and slates
(slate by tale), wool (sheep
and lambs, nolls, waste).
1898-1913 : coal, coke and
patent fuel, iron ore, other
metalic ores, wood and timber,
cotton, wool (sheep and lambs;
woll waste, noils) other textile
materials, oil seeds nuts, oils,
fats and gum
1872-1897 : alkali, apparel and slops, arms and
ammunition, bags, bleaching material, books,
candels, caoutchoue manufactures, carriages and
waggons railway, cement, chemical products and dye
stuffs, clocks and watches, coal products, cordage
and twine, cotton yarn and twist , cotton
manufactures, cycles, earthen and china ware,
electric lighting apparatus, furniture, cabinet and
upholstery wares, glass (plate, flint, common bottles,
other sorts), haberdashery and millnery
, hides and undressed skins,
materials for paper making,
miscellaneous raw materials
and articles mainly
unmanufactured.
, hardware and cutlery, hats, implements of tools of
industry, instruments and apparatus, leather, linen
yarn, jute yarn, linen manufactures, jute
manufactures, steam engines, other machines,
medicines, metals, musical instruments, oil and floor
cloth, painters’ colors, paper and pasteboard,
pictures, plate and plated ware, sewing machines, sild,
thrown, twist and yarn, silk manufactures, skins and
furs, soap, stationary other than paper, grindstones,
millstones and other sorts of stones, sugar (refined),
telegraphic wire, umbrella and parasols, wood and
timber manufactures, wool, wollen and worsted yarn
and manufactures, yarn, alpaca and mohair and
other sorts unenumerated, other articles.
1898-1913 : iron and steel and manufactures thereof,
other metals and manufactures thereof, cutlery,
hardware implements and instruments, telegraph
cables and apparaturs, machinery, ships,
manufactures of wood and timber, yarns and textile
fabrics (cotton yarn and manufactures, wollen yarn
and manufactures, other materials), apparel,
chemicals, drugs, dyes and colors, leathers and
manufactures thereof, earhware and glass, papers,
miscellaneous articles wholly or mainly manfactured
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USA 1870-1912 : foodstuffs in
crude condition and food
animals, foodstuffs partly or
wholly prepared.
1870-1912 : crude materials
for use in manufactures.
1870-1912 : manufactures for further use in
manufactures, manufactures ready for consumption.
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2.A.5 Primary sector shares
Figure 2.8: Primary sector shares
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Notes: Plus sign – primary sector employment share (i.e. agriculture and raw materials). Circles –
agricultural sector value added share. Plus signs and circles indicate observations. Grey lines are
linearly inter- and extrapolated values.
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2.A.6 Real effective exchange rates
Figure 2.9: REERs within the Gold Standard
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Notes: Grey – not on Gold Standard.
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2.A.7 Gold cover ratios
Figure 2.10: Gold cover ratios, narrow
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Notes: The figure depicts narrowly defined gold cover ratios: Gold cover ratio = Gold divided by
central bank notes in circulation. In the absence of a central bank (e.g. Australia, Canada and
the U.S.) the gold cover ratio has been calculated as the ratio of gold- and specie reserves in the
institution guarateeing gold convertibility (i.e. the Treasury in the U.S. or the private banks in
Australia and Canada) relative to bank notes in circulation and demand deposits.
68
2.A. Data appendix
Figure 2.11: Gold cover ratios, broad
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Notes: The figure depicts broadly defined gold cover ratios: Gold cover ratio = (Metal reserves
+ foreign exchange reserves)/(central bank notes in circulation + central bank deposits). In the
absence of a central bank (e.g. Australia, Canada and the U.S.) the gold cover ratio has been
calculated as the ratio of gold-, specie and foreign exchange reserves in the institution guarateeing
gold convertibility (i.e. the Treasury in the U.S. or the private banks in Australia and Canada)
relative to bank notes in circulation and demand deposits.
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2.A.8 Adjustment periods
Figure 2.12: CA/GDP within the Gold Standard
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Notes: Grey – not on Gold Standard. Vertical bar – CA/GDP trough. CA/GDP troughs are defined
according to a turning-point algorithm a` la Bry and Boschan (1971): CA/GDP troughs are defined
as the lowest CA/Y-value in a ±10-year window.
70
2.A. Data appendix
Figure 2.13: CA/GDP within the euro area
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Notes: Grey – not in euro area. Vertical bar – CA/GDP trough. CA/GDP troughs are defined
according to a turning-point algorithm a` la Bry and Boschan (1971): CA/GDP troughs are defined
as the lowest CA/Y-value in a ±8-year window. Border conditions were weakened because of the
short sample length.
71
2.B. Model appendix
2.B Model appendix
2.B.1 Nonlinear model
In this section, we present the nonlinear model. In order to save space, we will focus
on the Home region where possible. Foreign equations are analogs to the home ones and
foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk. Small letters denote real variables defined as
x = X/P and x∗ = X∗/P ∗.
We first look at the household decision. The household’s two-stage decision involves (i)
the migration decision, and (ii) the decision on hours worked, consumption and savings.
Households are indexed by i. The migration decision is described by the following equations:
Υit = max{stay, migrate}
{V it , V it ∗ + υit − κd}, with υit iid∼ Logistic
(
0,
(piψ)2
3
)
dit = Prob (V
i
t ≤ V it ∗ + υit − κd )
⇒ Υit = ψ ln
(
exp
(
V it
ψ
)
+ exp
(
V it
∗ − κd
ψ
))
, dit =
[
1 + exp
(
V it − V it ∗ + κd
ψ
)]−1
The second stage decision is
V it = max
cit, l
i
t, B
i
H,t, B
i
F,t
1
1− σc
(
cit −
1
1 + σl
lit
1+σl
)1−σc
+ β Et Υit+1,
s.t. BiH,t−1R
e
t−1 +B
i
F,t−1R
e∗
t−1/et + TRt + Ptwt l
i
t + Γt + I
τ
t
= BiH,t +B
i
F,t/et + Pt c
i
t + Pt
K
2
(
BiF,t
Pt et
− o¯
)2
The budget constraint for a F household is:
Bi∗H,t−1R
e
t−1 et +B
i∗
F,t−1R
e∗
t−1 + TR
e∗
t + P
∗
t w
∗
t l
i∗
t + Γ
∗
t + I
τ
t
= Bi∗H,t et +B
i∗
F,t + P
∗
t c
i∗
t + P
∗
t
K
2
(
Bi∗H,t et
P ∗t
− o¯∗
)2
where the nominal exchange rate et is expressed in quantity notation, i.e. foreign currency
per domestic currency. As explained in the main text, all households within a region make
the same decision, hence we drop the household index i. Writing the real exchange rate as
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Er,t = Pt et/P
∗
t the first order conditions imply
λt =
(
ct − l
1+σl
t
1 + σl
)−σc
(2.B.1)
λ∗t =
(
c∗t −
(l∗t )1+σl
1 + σl
)−σc
(2.B.2)
λt = β R
e
t Et
(
(1− dt+1) λt+1
Πt+1
+
dt+1 λ
∗
t+1Er,t+1
Πt+1
)
(2.B.3)
λ∗t = β R
e∗
t Et
((
1− d∗t+1
)
λ∗t+1
Π∗t+1
+
d∗t+1 λt+1
Π∗t+1Er,t+1
)
(2.B.4)
λt = β R
e∗
t
1
1 + K (bF,t/Er,t − o¯)
et
et+1
Et
(
(1− dt+1) λt+1
Πt+1
+
dt+1 λ
∗
t+1Er,t+1
Πt+1
)
(2.B.5)
λ∗t = β R
e
t
1
1 + K
(
b∗H,tEr,t − o¯∗
) et+1
et
Et
((
1− d∗t+1
)
λ∗t+1
Π∗t+1
+
d∗t+1 λt+1
Π∗t+1Er,t+1
)
(2.B.6)
lσlt = wt (2.B.7)
l∗t
σl = w∗t (2.B.8)
The population evolves according to
nt = nt−1 (1− dt) + d∗t n∗t−1 (2.B.9)
n∗t = 1− nt (2.B.10)
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Firm j’s optimization problem is
max
PH,t(j)
Et
∞∑
k=0
{
(βθ)k
λt+k
λt
Pt
Pt+k
[
PH,t(j)yt(j)
−wt+kPt+klt+k(j)
]}
(2.B.11)
s.t. yt+k(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t+k
)−µ
yt+k (2.B.12)
yt+k(j) = At+kl
γ
t+k (2.B.13)
The first order condition leads to
Ft = λt yt
(
PH,t
Pt
) (
P optH,t
PH,t
)1−µ
+β θEt

(
P optH,t
PH,t
)
(
P optH,t+1
PH,t+1
) 1
ΠH,t+1

1−µ
Ft+1 (2.B.14)
Kt = wt
λt
γ
µ
µ− 1
(
yt
At
) 1
γ
(
P optH,t
PH,t
)−µ
γ
+β θEt

(
P optH,t
PH,t
)
(
P optH,t+1
PH,t+1
) 1
ΠH,t+1

−µ
γ
Kt+1 (2.B.15)
Kt = Ft (2.B.16)
The price dynamics are described by
1− θ
(
1
ΠH,t
)1−µ
= (1− θ)
(
P optH,t
PH,t
)1−µ
(2.B.17)
∆Pt = θ∆
P
t−1 Π
µ
γ
H,t + (1− θ)
(
P optH,t
PH,t
) (−µ)
γ
(2.B.18)
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where ∆Pt =
1
n
∫ n
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−µ
γ
dj denotes the price dispersion. The monetary side of the
model is described by the following four equations
Rt = R¯
1−ρRρt−1
(
yt
y¯
)(1−ρ) Φy (γt
γ¯
)(1−ρ) Φg (et
e¯
)−(1−ρ) Φe
(2.B.19)
PH,t n yt = exp(χt)Mt k(Rt) (2.B.20)
Gt = Gt−1 + F (et) exp(m,t) (2.B.21)
γtMt = PgGt, (2.B.22)
The market clearing conditions are
yt n = (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−
ct nt + α
∗
(
P ?H,t
P ?t
)−?
c∗t n
∗
t (2.B.23)
∆Pt n y
1
γ
t = lt ntA
1
γ
t (2.B.24)
0 = ntBH,t + n
∗
t B
∗
H,t (2.B.25)
0 = ntBF,t + n
∗
t B
∗
F,t (2.B.26)
Auxiliary variables:
ToTt =
P ?H,t
PF,t
(2.B.27)
Πt =
Pt
Pt−1
(2.B.28)
ΠH,t =
PH,t
PH,t−1
(2.B.29)
TBt = n
∗
t c
∗
H,tPH,t − ntcF,tPF,t (2.B.30)
cH,t = (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−
ct (2.B.31)
c∗H,t = α
∗
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−∗
c∗t (2.B.32)
cF,t = α
(
PF,t
Pt
)−
ct (2.B.33)
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c∗F,t = (1− α∗)
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−∗
c∗t (2.B.34)
2.B.2 Steady state
We log-linearize the nonlinear model around a steady state with zero inflation, constant
population and βR = 1 . Steady state values are denoted by a bar symbol. From (2.B.4) and
(2.B.6) it follows that R¯ = R¯∗. Using (2.B.4) and (2.B.5) we have βR¯
∗d¯∗
1−βR¯∗(1−d¯∗) =
1−βR¯(1−d¯)
βR¯d¯
.
It is easy to see that βR¯ = 1, a standard assumption in the literature, is a solution to the
equation. We also have
λ¯/E¯r = λ¯
∗ (2.B.35)
λ¯ =
(
c¯− l¯
1+σl
1 + σl
)−σc
(2.B.36)
λ¯∗ =
(
c¯∗ − (l¯
∗)1+σl
1 + σl
)−σc
(2.B.37)
From (2.B.14), (2.B.16), and (2.B.16) and the corresponding equations for F, we obtain
w¯ = γ y¯
P¯H
P¯
( y¯
A¯
)−1/γ µ− 1
µ
(2.B.38)
w¯∗ = γ y¯∗
P¯ ∗F
P¯ ∗
(
y¯∗
A¯∗
)−1/γ µ− 1
µ
(2.B.39)
The steady state labor supply satisfies
l¯σl = w¯ (2.B.40)
(l¯∗)σl = w¯∗ (2.B.41)
At the steady state, the asset pooling assumption gives us
n¯ b¯ = n (1− d¯) (b¯HR¯+ b¯F R¯/E¯r) + d¯∗ (1− n¯) (b¯∗HR¯+ b¯∗F R¯/E¯r)
(1− n¯) b¯∗ = (1− n¯) (1− d¯∗) (b¯∗F R¯+ b¯∗HR¯E¯r) + d¯ n¯ (b¯F R¯+ b¯HR¯E¯r)
Using the steady state bond market clearing conditions and writing real net foreign assets
as Ω¯ ≡ b¯H + b¯F /E¯r, we have
n¯ b¯ = R¯ (1− d¯− d¯∗) Ω¯n¯
(1− n¯) b¯∗/E¯r = −R¯ (1− d¯− d¯∗) Ω¯n¯
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The budget constraints of the households in H and F give us Ω¯ = 1
(1−d¯−d¯∗) R¯−1
(
c¯− P¯H
P¯
y¯
)
,
and also
n¯
P¯H
P¯
y¯ + (1− n¯) P¯
∗
F
P¯ ∗
y¯∗/E¯r = n¯ c¯+ (1− n¯) c¯∗/E¯r (2.B.42)
which reflects the resources constraint of the whole economy in terms of H currency. The
goods and labor market clearing conditions imply
y¯ n¯ = (1− α)
(
P¯H
P¯
)−
c¯ n¯+ α∗
(
P¯HE¯r
P¯
)−?
c¯∗ (1− n¯) (2.B.43)
y¯∗ (1− n¯) = α
(
P¯ ∗F
P¯ ∗Er
)−?
c¯ n¯+ (1− α∗)
(
P¯ ∗F
P¯ ∗
)−?
(1− n¯) c¯∗ (2.B.44)
y¯ = A¯ l¯γ (2.B.45)
y¯∗ = A¯∗ (l¯∗)γ (2.B.46)
Prices in the steady state satisfy
1 = (1− α)
(
P¯H
P¯
)1−
+ α
(
P¯F ∗
P¯ ∗E¯r
)1−
(2.B.47)
Finally, the steady state populations satisfy d¯ n¯ = d¯∗ (1− n¯). We solve for c¯, c¯∗, E¯r, P¯HP¯ ,
P¯ ∗F
P¯ ∗ , y¯, y¯
∗, l¯, l¯∗, λ¯, λ¯∗, w¯, w¯∗ using equations (2.B.35) - (2.B.47).
2.B.3 Log-linearized model
In this section, we present the complete log-linearized model equation system that
is used in the Bayesian estimation. Lower-case variables with a hat symbol represent
logarithmic deviations from the steady state value of the variable (denoted by a bar symbol,
xˆ = log
(
x
x¯
)
). ∆ indicates the first difference (∆x̂t = x̂t − x̂t−1). κ˜ denotes the slope of the
Phillips curve, which is related to the structural parameters β, γ, µ and θ according to
κ˜ = (1− βθ)(1− θ)/[1/θ(1− µ+ µ/γ)]. We introduce also Ωˆ ≡ b¯H bˆH,t + E¯tb¯F bˆF,t.
λˆt =
(−σc)
c¯ (1− h)− 11+σl (l¯)1+σl
(
c¯ cˆt − (l¯)1+σl lˆt
)
(2.B.48)
λˆ∗t =
(−σc)
(1− h) c¯∗ − 11+σl (l¯∗)1+σl
(
c¯∗ cˆ∗t − (l¯∗)1+σl lˆ∗t
)
(2.B.49)
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λˆt = R̂
e
t − EtΠ̂t+1 +
(
1− d¯) Etλˆt+1 + d¯ (Etλˆ∗t+1 + EtÊr,t+1) (2.B.50)
λˆ∗t = Rˆ
e∗
t − EtΠ̂∗t+1 + λˆ∗t+1
(
1− d¯∗)+ d¯∗ (Etλˆt+1 − EtÊr,t+1) (2.B.51)
Rˆet = Rˆ
e∗
t − Eteˆt+1 + eˆt −
Kn
n+ 1/E¯r (1− n) (Ω̂t −
(
b¯F /E¯r − b¯H
)
Êrt (2.B.52)
+ b¯H (nˆt − nˆ∗t ))
b¯ (nˆt−1 +
1
b¯F /E¯r + b¯H
(Ω̂t−1 + b¯H
(
Rˆt−1 − Πˆt
)
+ b¯F /E¯r(−Eˆrt + Rˆ∗t−1 (2.B.53)
− Πˆ∗t ))−
1
1− d¯− d¯∗
(
d¯ dˆt + d¯
∗ dˆ∗t
)
) = Ω̂t − y¯ P¯H
P¯
(
yˆt + α
(
P¯F
P¯
)1−
T̂ oT t
)
+ nˆt
(
c¯+ b¯F /E¯r + b¯H
)− b¯F /E¯rEˆrt + c¯ cˆt
dˆt =
(
1− d¯− d¯∗) β Etdˆt+1 + 1− d¯
ψ
(
(c¯∗
(
cˆ∗t − h cˆ∗t−1
)− (l¯∗)1+σl lˆ∗t) λ¯∗ (2.B.54)
−
(
c¯ (cˆt − h cˆt−1)− (l¯)1+σl lˆt
)
λ¯)
dˆ∗t =
(
1− d¯− d¯∗) β Etdˆ∗t+1 − ((c¯∗ (cˆ∗t − h cˆ∗t−1)− (l¯∗)1+σl lˆ∗t) λ¯∗ (2.B.55)
−
(
c¯ (cˆt − h cˆt−1)− (l¯)1+σl lˆt
)
λ¯)
1− d¯∗
ψ∗
nˆt =
(
1− d¯) nˆt−1 + d¯ nˆ∗t−1 − d¯ dˆt + d¯ dˆ∗t (2.B.56)
nˆ∗t = nˆt
−n
1− n (2.B.57)
ΠˆH,t = β EtΠˆH,t+1 + κ˜ (−α
(
P¯F
P¯
)1−
T̂ oT t − yˆt + wˆt (2.B.58)
+
1
γ
(
yˆt − Aˆt
)
) + gt
ΠˆF,t = β EtΠˆF,t+1 + κ˜ (T̂ oT t
(
α∗
(
P¯ ∗H
P¯ ∗
)1−∗)
− yˆ∗t + wˆ∗t (2.B.59)
+
1
γ
(
yˆ∗t − Aˆ∗t
)
) + g∗t
T̂ oT t
(
1− α∗
(
P¯ ∗H
P¯ ∗
)1−∗
− α
(
P¯F
P¯
)1−)
= Eˆr,t (2.B.60)
ΠˆH,t = Πˆt + α
(
P¯F
P¯
)1− (
T̂ oT t − T̂ oT t−1
)
(2.B.61)
ΠˆF,t = Πˆ
∗
t − α∗
(
P¯ ∗H
P¯ ∗
)1−∗ (
T̂ oT t − T̂ oT t−1
)
(2.B.62)
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yˆt =
c¯
y¯
(1− α) P¯H
P¯
−
(cˆt + nˆt) +
(1−n) c¯∗ P¯H
P¯
−
n
y¯E¯r
α∗
(
cˆ∗t + nˆ
∗
t − Eˆrt 
)
(2.B.63)
− T̂ oT t
α
(
P¯F
P¯
)1−
n
y¯
(
P¯H
P¯
−
(1− α) n c¯ + 1/E¯r α∗ (1− n)
P¯H
P¯
−
c¯∗ 
)
yˆ∗t = (cˆ
∗
t + nˆ
∗
t )
c¯∗
y¯∗
(1− α∗) P¯
∗
F
P¯ ∗
−
+
P¯ ∗F
P¯ ∗
− α c¯ n1−nE¯

r
y¯∗
(
cˆt + nˆt + Eˆrt 
)
(2.B.64)
+ T̂ oT t
α∗
(
P¯∗H
P¯∗
)1−∗
1−n
y¯∗
(
P¯ ∗F
P¯ ∗
−
(1− α∗) (1− n) c¯∗ + P¯
∗
F
P¯ ∗
−
αn c¯ E¯r
)
Rˆt = Rˆt−1 ρR + yˆt
(
1− ρR) Φy − eˆt (1− ρR) Φe (2.B.65)
− (1− ρR) Φgγˆt + rt
Rˆ∗t = Rˆ
∗
t−1 ρ
R∗ + yˆ∗t
(
1− ρR∗
)
Φy
∗
+
(
1− ρR∗
)
Φe
∗
eˆt (2.B.66)
−
(
1− ρR∗
)
Φg
∗
γˆ∗t + 
r∗
t
Rˆet = Rˆt + 
b
t (2.B.67)
Rˆe∗t = Rˆ
∗
t + 
b∗
t (2.B.68)
∆Gˆt
G¯
G¯∗
1 + G¯
G¯∗
= eˆt 
e + mt (2.B.69)
∆Gˆ∗t
1
1 + G¯
G¯∗
= eˆt (−e) + m∗t (2.B.70)
∆M̂t = yˆt + ΠˆH,t − yˆt−1 − υr
(
R̂t − R̂t−1
)
−∆χt (2.B.71)
∆M̂∗t = ΠˆF,t + yˆ∗t − yˆ∗t−1 − υr
(
R̂∗t − R̂∗t−1
)
−∆χ∗t (2.B.72)
γˆt = ∆Ĝt + γˆt−1 −∆M̂t (2.B.73)
γˆ∗t = ∆Ĝ
∗
t + γˆ
∗
t−1 −∆M̂∗t (2.B.74)
Eˆr,t = Πˆ
∗
t − eˆt − Eˆrt−1 + eˆt−1 − Πˆt (2.B.75)
tˆbt t¯b =
(
yˆt + T̂ oT t α
(
P¯F
P¯
)1−)
n y¯
P¯H
P¯
− (cˆt + nˆt) c¯ n (2.B.76)
nˆt − nˆt−1 = d¯
(
dˆ∗t + nˆ
∗
t−1 − dˆt − nˆt−1
)
(2.B.77)
nˆ∗t − nˆ∗t−1 = d¯∗
(
nˆt−1 + dˆt +
(
−dˆ∗t
)
− nˆ∗t−1
)
(2.B.78)
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wˆt = σl lˆt (2.B.79)
wˆ∗t = σl lˆ
∗
t (2.B.80)
lˆt =
1
γ
(
yˆt − Aˆt
)
− nˆt (2.B.81)
lˆ∗t =
1
γ
(
yˆ∗t − Aˆ∗t
)
− nˆ∗t (2.B.82)
Aˆt = ρ
a Aˆt−1 − ηAt (2.B.83)
Aˆ∗t = ρ
a∗ Aˆ∗t−1 − ηA
∗
t (2.B.84)
rt = ρ
R rt−1 − ηRt (2.B.85)
r∗t = ρ
R∗ r∗t−1 − ηR
∗
t (2.B.86)
gt = ρ
g gt−1 − ηgt (2.B.87)
g∗t = ρ
g∗ g∗t−1 − ηg
∗
t (2.B.88)
mt = ρm 
m
t−1 − ηmt (2.B.89)
m∗t = ρ
∗
m, 
m∗
t−1 − ηm∗t (2.B.90)
χt = ρ
x χt−1 − ηxt (2.B.91)
χ∗t = ρ
x∗ χ∗t−1 − ηx∗t (2.B.92)
(2.B.93)
For the monetary policy counterfactual (no independence) we eliminated the freedom
central banks enjoyed in setting their discount rates by assuming that H has to adjust its
interest rate to ensure an absolutely fixed exchange rate, while F – a much larger region
than H – sets its discount rate as estimated. In particular, we substitute the monetary
policy equation in the baseline model (2.B.65) by the following equation
R̂et = R̂
e∗
t −
Kn
n+ E¯r (1− n)
[
b¯H
(
b̂H,t − Êr,t + n̂t − n̂∗t
)
+ b¯F E¯r
(
b̂F,t + Êr,t
)]
+ φ˜eeˆt ,
The last term (φ˜e > 0) is necessary to ensure eˆt = 0 (see Benigno and Benigno, 2008). In
our counterfactual, we assume φ˜e = 0.01.
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2.B.4 An extended model with sectoral structure
This section presents an extended GS model that explicitly models a tradable and
non-tradable goods producing sector. The model throws light on two salient features of
external adjustment under the GS: First, external adjustment under the GS was closely
intertwined with its sectoral structure. Second, the terms of trade remained relatively stable
during external adjustments under the GS, while the domestic price level deflated. This
section shows how both of these features are naturally accommodated by a two-sector model
with distribution services.74 Finally, counterfactual simulations based on an estimated
version of the extended model also constitute a robustness check for the papers main result
(see Appendix 2.C.3.6).
To keep the model description short, it focuses on the H region where possible. F
equations are analogs to the H ones, and foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk. Small
letters denote real variables, defined as x = X/P and x∗ = X∗/P ∗.
The extension mainly affects the households’ decision regarding the allocation of expenses
on different consumption bundles, as well as the price dynamics and the market clearing
conditions. The H -households’ consumption ct consists of non-tradable goods and retail
tradable goods. The retail tradable goods themselves are composed of wholesale tradable
goods and non-tradable services – e.g. local retail services. Here, for simplicity, we model the
final goods directly as a CES composite of wholesale tradable goods cT,t and non-tradable
goods cN,t: ct =
[
γ˜
1
λ˜ c
λ˜−1
λ˜
T,t + (1− γ˜)
1
λ˜ c
λ˜−1
λ˜
N,t
] λ˜
λ˜−1
. λ˜ is the elasticity of substitution between
tradable and non-tradable goods, and γ˜ reflects the households’ relative preference.
The tradable goods bundle itself is a CES bundle of home produced goods cH,t and imported
goods cF,t: cT,t =
[
α˜
1
˜ c
˜−1
˜
H,t + (1− α˜)
1
˜ c
˜−1
˜
F,t
] ˜
˜−1
. ˜ denotes the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods. If α˜ > n, the household exhibits home bias.
H produced wholesale tradable goods are a combination of H produced tradable inputs
IH,t and H produced non-tradable inputs VH,t: cH,t =
[
φ˜
1
ψ˜ I
ψ˜−1
ψ˜
H,t + (1− φ˜)
1
ψ˜V
ψ˜−1
ψ˜
H,t
] ψ˜
ψ˜−1
with
φ˜ denoting the weight of tradable inputs, and ψ˜ denoting the elasticity of substitution
between tradable and non-tradable inputs. To illustrate, locally sold agricultural goods
are composed of the agricultural product itsself (e.g. grain) and local services (e.g. utility
74The extension is an adapted version of the model developed in Berka et al. (forthcoming).
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and financial services). The home consumption of imported goods is defined as cF,t =[
φˇ
1
ψ˜? I
ψ˜?−1
ψ˜?
F,t + (1− φˇ)
1
ψ˜? V
ψ˜?−1
ψ˜?
F,t
] ψ˜?
ψ˜?−1
, with φˇ ≤ φ˜ reflecting that imported goods require
more distribution services already in the region of origin. For example, selling one ton
of grain locally involves less services than selling the same ton of grain overseas, because
selling overseas requires finding overseas buyers through export companies, as well as more
transportation services.
The tradable goods and non-tradable goods themselves are bundles of differentiated goods
that are produced by the n home- and 1− n foreign firms:
IH,t =
( 1
n
) 1
µ
n∫
0
IH,t(j)
µ−1
µ d j

µ
µ−1
, IF,t =
( 1
1− n
) 1
µ
1∫
n
IF,t(j)
µ−1
µ d j

µ
µ−1
,
VH,t =
( 1
n
) 1
µ
n∫
0
VH,t(j)
µ−1
µ d j

µ
µ−1
, VF,t =
( 1
1− n
) 1
µ
1∫
n
VF,t(j)
µ−1
µ d j

µ
µ−1
,
where j is the firm index and µ is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in
the same region. Direct consumption of non-tradable goods is defined in the same way:
cN,t =
( 1
n
) 1
µ
n∫
0
cN,t(j)
µ−1
µ d j

µ
µ−1
, cN,t =
( 1
1− n
) 1
µ
1∫
n
cN,t(j)
µ−1
µ d j

µ
µ−1
.
The H consumer price index is then given by Pt =
[
γ˜P 1−λ˜T,t + (1− γ˜)P 1−λ˜N,t
] 1
1−λ˜
. PT,t is the
local wholesale price of tradable consumption goods cT,t: PT,t =
[
α˜P˜ 1−˜H,t + (1− α˜)P˜ 1−˜F,t
] 1
1−˜
,
where P˜H,t and P˜F,t are the prices for H -produced and imported goods, inclusive of prices for
the tradable inputs PH,t, P
∗
F,t, as well as the prices for the non-tradable inputs PN,t, P
∗
N,t. We
have P˜H,t =
[
φ˜P 1−ψ˜H,t +(1−φ˜)P 1−ψ˜N,t
] 1
1−ψ˜
and P˜F,t =
[
φˇ(P ∗F,t/et)
1−ψ˜+(1−φˇ)(P ∗N,t/et)1−ψ˜
] 1
1−ψ˜
.
The prices for the H - and F -produced goods bundles are PH,t =
[
1
n
∫ n
0 PH,t(j)
1−µ d j
] 1
1−µ
and P ∗F,t =
[
1
1−n
∫ 1
n P
∗
F,t(j)
1−µ d j
] 1
1−µ
respectively. The prices of H - and F -produced non-
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tradable goods are PN,t =
[
1
n
∫ n
0 PN,t(j)
1−µ d j
] 1
1−µ
and P ∗N,t =
[
1
1−n
∫ 1
n P
∗
N,t(j)
1−µ d j
] 1
1−µ
.
It is worth pointing out that the law of one price does not hold due to distribution service
costs.
On the production side, firms’ optimization problem is only slightly affected by the extension.
It is assumed that there exist sector-specific technology shocks – At for the tradable sector
and AN,t for the non-tradable sector. Depending on whether the firm is operating in the
tradable goods or the non-tradable goods sector, it has the chance to reset its price with
probability (1− θT ) or (1− θN ). When it can change prices, it optimizes over PH,t(j) or
PN,t(j) while taking into account its demand schedule and production function. Thus, firm
j’s optimization problem in the tradable sector is
max
PH,t(j)
Et
∞∑
k=0
{
(βθT )
k λt+k
λt
Pt
Pt+k
[
PH,t(j)yT,t+k(j)
−wt+kPt+klT,t+k(j)
]}
(2.B.94)
s.t. yT,t+k(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t+k
)−µ
yT,t+k (2.B.95)
yT,t+k(j) = At+kl
γ
T,t+k(j) (2.B.96)
where lT and yT denote H primary sector employment and average output. The resulting
first order conditions and price dynamics are very similar to those of the model without the
sectoral structure. The optimization of a firm in the non-tradable sector is analogous.
The labor market clearing conditions now include the labor employed in the tradable and
the non-tradable sector:
∆PT,t n y
1
γ
T,t = lT,t ntA
1
γ
t (2.B.97)
∆PN,t n y
1
γ
N,t = lN,t ntA
1
γ
N,t (2.B.98)
lt = lT,t + lN,t, (2.B.99)
with the measures for price dispersion
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∆PT,t =
1
n
n∫
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−µ
γ
dj and ∆PN,t =
1
n
n∫
0
(
PN,t(j)
PN,t
)−µ
γ
dj.
The goods market clearing conditions take into account tradable and non-tradable goods:
n yT,t(j) = nt IH,t(j) + (1− nt)I∗H,t(j) (2.B.100)
n yN,t(j) = nt cN,t(j) + nt VH,t(j) + (1− nt)V ∗H,t(j) (2.B.101)
(1− n) y∗T,t(j) = nt IF,t(j) + (1− nt)I∗F,t(j) (2.B.102)
(1− n) y∗N,t(j) = (1− nt) c∗N,t(j) + (1− nt)V ∗F,t(j) + nt VF,t(j) (2.B.103)
Finally, real output yt is defined as the weighted average of tradable and non-tradable sector
output: yt =
PH,t
Pt
yT,t +
PN,t
Pt
yN,t. This average output enters the monetary policy reaction
functions, as well as the money demand equations.
Terms of trade and local prices
Section 2.7 in the main text describes the price movements that accompanied external
adjustment under the GS. The following uses the extended model to discuss the substitution
effects that each of these price movements gives rise to. The terms of trade in the extended
model measures the ratio of export prices to import prices at the port. The log-linearized
terms of trade is
T̂ oT t =
ˆ˜P ?H,t − ˆ˜PF,t.
The CPI in the extended model can also be written as follows (see (2.5) in the main text):
Pˆt = (1− γˇ)PˆN,t + γˇ
[
αˇ ˆ˜PH,t + (1− αˇ) ˆ˜PF,t
]
,
with γˇ ≡ γ˜
(
PT
P
)1−λ˜
and αˇ ≡ α˜
(
P˜H
PT
)1−˜
.
How do the different price components that define the terms of trade and the CPI affect real
imports and real exports? From the model, we have the following demand schedules that
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describe how prices affect H -households’ and F -households’ demand for imported goods:
cF,t = (1− α˜)
(
P˜F,t
PT,t
)−˜
cT,t, c
?
H,t = (1− α˜?)
(
P˜ ?H,t
P ?T,t
)−˜?
c?T,t.
Using these demand schedules, we can write the log-linearized real imports to H (IMt =
cF,tnt) as
ÎM t = cˆT,t + nˆt − ˜
(
ˆ˜PF,t − PˆT,t
)
= cˆT,t + nˆt − ˜α˜
(
P˜H
PT
)1−˜ (
ˆ˜PF,t − ˆ˜PH,t
)
,
where the second line makes use of the relation PˆT,t = α˜
(
P˜H
PT
)1−˜ ˆ˜PH,t+(1−α˜)( P˜FPT )1−˜ ˆ˜PF,t,
as well as the steady state definition of PT . The equation demonstrates that a unit drop in
the import price ( ˆ˜PF,t) is associated with an increase in imports of ˜α˜
(
P˜H
PT
)1−˜
. Furthermore,
a unit increase in the local price of tradable goods ( ˆ˜PH,t) would have exactly the opposite
effect on imports. As discussed in Section 2.7, during major external adjustments, the local
price of tradable goods falls by more than the import price. This implies a net reduction in
H -imports.
Real H -exports (EXt = c
?
H,tn
?
t ) in log-linearized form can be written as
ÊXt = cˆ
?
T,t + nˆ
?
t − ˜?
(
ˆ˜P ?H,t − Pˆ ?T,t
)
= cˆ?T,t + nˆ
?
t − ˜?α˜?
(
P˜ ?F
P ?T
)1−˜? (
ˆ˜P ?H,t − ˆ˜P ?F,t
)
,
where the second line makes use of the relation
Pˆ ?T,t = α˜
?
(
P˜ ?F
P ?T
)1−˜?
ˆ˜P ?F,t + (1− α˜?)
(
P˜ ?H
P ?T
)1−˜?
ˆ˜P ?H,t,
as well as the steady state definition of P ?T . A one unit decrease in the H -export price (
ˆ˜P ?H,t)
leads to an increase in the foreign demand for H -produced tradable goods of ˜?α˜?
(
P˜ ?F
P ?T
)1−˜?
.
For an equal fall in H -import prices ( ˆ˜PF,t) and H -export prices (
ˆ˜P ?H,t), the increase in
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exports will exceed the increase in imports. The reason for this is that the H -region is
smaller than the F -region (n < 1− n ≡ n?). Absent home bias (i.e. n = α˜ and n? = α˜?),
this implies that a fall in export prices increases exports by more than an equivalent fall
in import prices increases imports. This remains the case for all realistic degrees of home
bias.75
Sectoral structure and external adjustment: model vs. data
Here, in order to show that the extended model naturally accommodates features of external
adjustment under the GS, we compare simulated moments to the data. For the most part,
the extended model is calibrated according to the baseline model estimation for the U.K.
(see Table 2.1, Table 2.3).
The extended model’s additional parameters are calibrated as follows: The shares of tradable
goods in final consumption (γ˜, γ˜?) are calibrated to target the U.K.’s share of tradable
value added relative to total value added (47%), and the sample average of tradable value
added relative to total value added (40%). For this we rely on the sectoral share data
provided by Buera and Kaboski (2012), defining services as non-tradable and all other
sectors as tradable. The weights of domestically produced goods in tradable goods (α˜, α˜?)
are calibrated to target the U.K. import-to-GDP and export-to-GDP ratios, as in the
baseline model calibration. According to input-output tables the share of non-tradable
inputs in tradable goods (1 − φ˜) was around 10% during the GS era. More specifically,
based on the Swedish input-output table for 1913 (Bohlin, 2007), non-tradable inputs to the
tradable sector amounted to 5.4% of the total tradable sector’s output. The corresponding
number for the U.K., as calculated from the British input-output table for 1907 (Meyer,
1955), is higher, at 11.3%.76 Thus, a value of 10% for 1− φ˜ is of the right order of magnitude.
For export goods, φˇ is chosen to reflect a 40% transportation cost, which implies that the
export good consists of 60% tradable wholesale goods.77
75Only extreme degrees of home bias in the H region, and an extreme preference of the F region for H
goods can overturn this.
76As φ˜ reflects the non-tradable input in a wholesale product, we would ideally distinguish retail distribution
services from other non-tradable inputs. However, the historical input-output tables for Sweden and the
U.K. do not provide this degree of granularity.
77This is in line with origin-destination spreads for agricultural produce (Wilson and Dahl, 2011). For
example, the price spread between corn prices in Minneapolis (the origin region) and corn prices in Georgia
or the Pacific North West (ports for export) lies in the 12 to 25% range (Yu et al., 2006). On top of
this, international overseas transport under the GS drove another 10 to 20% wedge between origin and
destination port prices (see Persson, 2004).
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Concerning the intra-temporal elasticity, we follow Berka et al. (forthcoming) in assuming
an elasticity of substitution between tradable goods and non-tradable goods of 0.7 (λ˜ =
λ˜? = 0.7), an elasticity of substitution between tradable goods and services of 0.25 (ψ˜ =
ψ˜? = 0.25), and a trade elasticity of 8 (˜ = ˜? = 8).78
The introduction of a sectoral structure also results in four Phillips curves, that determine
the price evolution of PH,t, PN,t, P
?
H,t, and P
?
N,t. To reflect the price rigidity in the non-
tradable sector, we set the Phillips curve slopes for the non-tradable goods κ˜N , and κ˜
∗
N to
0.05. This value corresponds to an average price duration of around 4.5 quarters, which
is within the range of price rigidity estimates for advanced economies today. The Phillips
curve slopes for the tradable goods are set to target a weighted average Phillip curve slope
(weighted according to value-added sector shares), which equals the aggregate Phillips curve
slope of 0.35 in the baseline estimation. This results in κ˜T = κ˜
∗
T = 0.65.
The simulation results are presented in Table 2.12. As in the data, increases in the CA/GDP
ratio in the model are associated with an increase in tradable sector size and a decrease
in non-tradable sector size (Table 2.12 panel A). The sectoral prices in the model also
behave similarly to the data: the tradable prices drop during external adjustments while
non-tradable prices stay more stable (panel B). The model is able to generate a relatively
stable terms of trade and a larger fall in the CPI when the CA/GDP ratio increases (panel
C). Finally, the model matches the observed correlation between export and import prices
(panel D).
78The higher elasticity estimates obtained from industry- and product-level data are more relevant for the
two-sector model, whereas the lower trade elasticity estimates obtained from aggregate trade data are
more in line with the single good baseline model (see Bas et al., 2017).
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Table 2.12: Correlation between external adjustments, sectoral size and prices
∆ CA / GDP
Model Data
Panel A: Sectoral sizes
∆Tradable sector share 0.49 0.11
∆ Non-tradable sector share -0.49 -0.08
Panel B: Sectoral prices
∆ Tradable prices -0.36 -0.22
∆ Non-tradable prices 0.16 -0.05
Panel C: ToT and CPI
∆ Terms of trade -0.11 0.07
∆ CPI -0.21 -0.15
Panel D: Export and import prices
∆ Export prices
∆ Import prices 0.52 0.59
Notes: The model moments are calculated on the basis of 2000 34-year simulations of the extended
model. For more details on the stochastic simulation, see Section 2.6. Non-tradable sector share was
approximated by tertiary sector share. Tradable sector share was approximated by primary sector
share. Tradable prices were approximated by agricultural and raw material prices. Non-tradable
prices were approximated by service sector prices.
88
2.C. Additional results
2.C Additional results
2.C.1 Alternative adjustment periods
Figure 2.14: CA/GDP within the Gold Standard
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Notes: Grey – not on Gold Standard. Vertical bar – CA/GDP trough. CA/GDP troughs are
informally defined as all visually salient CA/GDP troughs.
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Figure 2.15: Alternative adjustment periods: prices, migration and monetary policy
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Notes: Black solid – Gold Standard. Shaded areas – 90% confidence bands based on robust Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors (small sample corrected, autocorrelation lag order = 2 years). CA/GDP
troughs are informally defined as all visually salient CA/GDP troughs (see Figure 2.C.1).
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Figure 2.16: Alternative adjustment periods: sectoral prices and sectoral exports
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Figure 2.17: Alternative adjustment periods: terms of trade vs. local prices
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Figure 2.18: Alternative adjustment periods: sectoral adjustment
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2.C.1).
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2.C.2 Contemporaneous correlations
Table 2.13: Prices, migration and monetary policy
correlation with the trade balance
∆ CA/GDP
ρ p N
Prices:
REER -0.137*** 0.00 596
CPI -0.158*** 0.00 596
CPI? -0.057 0.17 596
Migration:
∆ Immigration/Pop -0.293*** 0.00 413
∆ Emigration/Pop 0.040 0.35 554
∆ Net Immigration/Pop -0.311*** 0.00 374
Monetary policy:
∆ Discount rate -0.147*** 0.00 420
∆ Gold cover ratio 0.186*** 0.00 497
NEER 0.038 0.35 596
Notes: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. The table shows Pearson cor-
relation coefficients for the CA/GDP ratio (first differences ∆)
and prices, migration and monetary policy (first differences ∆
or growth rates).
Table 2.14: Correlation between external adjustment,
sectoral prices and sectoral exports
∆ CA/GDP
ρ p N
Disaggregate prices:
Agricultural -0.210*** 0.00 595
Raw material -0.062 0.14 572
Industrial -0.062 0.17 503
Services -0.170*** 0.00 430
Disaggregate exports:
Agricultural 0.184*** 0.00 528
Raw material 0.093** 0.03 518
Industrial 0.120*** 0.01 494
Notes: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. The table shows the Pearson cor-
relation coefficients for the CA/GDP ratio (first differences ∆)
and the growth rates of sectoral prices and sectoral exports/total
exports.
92
2.C
.
A
d
d
ition
al
resu
lts
Table 2.15: Correlation between external adjustment,
export prices, import prices and local prices
∆ CA/GDP
ρ p N
Terms of trade 0.059 0.16 561
CPI -0.158*** 0.00 596
Export prices
ρ p N
Import prices 0.509*** 0.00 522
Notes: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. The table shows the Pearson
correlation coefficients for the CA/GDP ratio (first differences
∆) and the growth rates of the terms of trade and the domestic
CPI.
Table 2.16: Correlation between external adjustment and
sectoral adjustment
∆ CA/GDP
ρ p N
∆ Primary sector share 0.107*** 0.01 586
∆ Secondary sector share -0.022 0.61 518
∆ Tertiary sector share -0.082* 0.06 518
Notes: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. The table shows Pearson corre-
lation coefficients for 2-year changes in the CA/GDP ratio and
2-year changes in the agricultural, industrial and service sector
shares.
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2.C.3 Additional model results
2.C.3.1 Historical Observations and Smoothed Data
Figure 2.19: Observables and smoothed variables
(a) U.K.
Notes: For variables without measurement error, the smoothed and observed series are identical.
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(b) Sweden
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(c) Belgium
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2.C.3.2 Autocorrelations - Observed vs. Simulated Data
Figure 2.21: (Auto-)correlations
(a) U.K.
Notes: y-axes indicate correlations. x-axes indicate lags of column variables. Rows show reference variables. Black solid lines –
median moment of simulated data. Grey dashed lines – 90 percent coverage percentiles of the simulated data. All simulated
moments are based on 2000 simulation runs conditional on the posterior mean. ypt – Per capita output, Πt – CPI inflation, Rt –
Discount rate, et – Nominal exchange rate, ∆nt – Population change, tbt/yt) – Trade balance/output.
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(b) Sweden
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2.C.3.3 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Table 2.17: Forecast error variance deomposition
ηa ηa∗ ηr ηr∗ ηg ηg∗ ηm ηm∗ ηx ηx∗ ηb ηb∗
At 1 year horizon
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.55 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.00
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.32 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.33 0.00 0.00
REER (Er,t) 0.70 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.97 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
At 10 years horizon
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.25 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.49 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.00
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.37 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.31 0.01 0.00
REER (Er,t) 0.57 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.93 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Unconditional
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.23 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.44 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.00
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.37 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.31 0.01 0.00
REER (Er,t) 0.53 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.87 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(a) U.K.
Notes: One-year-, ten-year-, and unconditional FEVDs. ηa – technology shock, ηr – discount rate shock, ηg – markup shock, ηm –
gold supply shock, ηx – money demand shock, ηb – risk premium shock.
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ηa ηa∗ ηr ηr∗ ηg ηg∗ ηm ηm∗ ηx ηx∗ ηb ηb∗
At 1 year horizon
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.87 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.50 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.02
REER (Er,t) 0.64 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.72 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
At 10 years horizon
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.16 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.73 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.55 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.08 0.02
REER (Er,t) 0.58 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.70 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
Unconditional
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.16 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.69 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.54 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.08 0.02
REER (Er,t) 0.57 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.59 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02
(b) Sweden
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ηa ηa∗ ηr ηr∗ ηg ηg∗ ηm ηm∗ ηx ηx∗ ηb ηb∗
At 1 year horizon
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.58 0.22 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.50 0.13 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.01
REER (Er,t) 0.60 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.47 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.03
At 10 years horizon
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.39 0.23 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.02
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.50 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.01
REER (Er,t) 0.59 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.21 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.33 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.03
Unconditional
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.32 0.21 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.02
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.49 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.02
REER (Er,t) 0.55 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.09 0.24 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.04
(c) Belgium
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2.C.3.4 Baseline and counterfactual impulse responses
Figure 2.22: Baseline and counterfactual impulse responses
(a) U.K.
Notes: The graphic depicts the impulse responses to negative one standard deviation shocks. ypt , Πt and Er,t are displayed as
percentage deviations from steady state. tbt/yt is displayed in percentage point deviations from steady state. At – technology
shock H, A∗t – technology shock F, 
g
t – markup shock H, 
g∗
t – markup shock F, 
m
t – gold shock.
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2.C.3.5 Additional counterfactual volatilities (baseline model)
Table 2.18: Counterfactual volatility
Baseline
model
Rigid
prices
No
migration
No inde-
pendence
No
migration,
given rigid
prices
No inde-
pendence,
given rigid
prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3—2) (4—2)
United Kingdom
ypt Per capita output 1.76 3.20 1.75 1.82 3.19 3.42
(81.50%) (-0.89%) (3.19%) (-0.16%) (7.03%)
Πt Inflation 1.73 1.56 1.73 1.51 1.56 1.39
(-9.61%) (-0.06%) (-12.47%) (-0.01%) (-10.93%)
Er,t REER 0.49 0.61 0.48 0.50 0.60 0.63
(23.93%) (-3.74%) (1.20%) (-2.01%) (3.14%)
tbt/yt Trade balance/output 0.81 0.84 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.84
(4.32%) (-4.91%) (-0.22%) (-4.94%) (-0.18%)
Sweden
ypt Per capita output 1.88 4.26 1.87 1.90 4.28 4.38
(126.77%) (-0.20%) (0.91%) (0.46%) (2.82%)
Πt Inflation 2.64 2.28 2.62 2.57 2.28 2.19
(-13.69%) (-0.58%) (-2.81%) (-0.13%) (-3.74%)
Er,t REER 1.65 1.88 1.64 1.66 1.89 1.89
(13.79%) (-1.13%) (0.15%) (0.19%) (0.67%)
tbt/yt Trade balance/output 0.87 1.16 0.84 0.87 1.08 1.17
(33.94%) (-2.91%) (0.03%) (-6.93%) (0.64%)
Belgium
ypt Per capita output 0.94 2.29 0.97 0.93 2.29 2.29
(145.15%) (3.77%) (-0.19%) (-0.01%) (-0.16%)
Πt Inflation 2.13 2.39 2.13 2.10 2.42 2.37
(12.32%) (0.38%) (-1.22%) (1.17%) (-0.83%)
Er,t REER 1.96 2.61 2.00 1.96 2.69 2.60
(32.96%) (1.87%) (-0.24%) (2.88%) (-0.20%)
tbt/yt Trade balance/output 0.84 1.90 0.81 0.84 1.80 1.90
(127.05%) (-3.22%) (0.08%) (-5.18%) (0.23%)
Notes: Percentage change in counterfactual S.D. relative to baseline S.D. in parenthesis. Rigid
prices – model with rigid prices. No migration – model without migration. No independence – model
without policy independence for central bank.
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2.C.3.6 Various robustness checks on model estimation and simulation
Bayesian estimation of a hybrid model
The two-region baseline model in the main text abstracts from those countries that were
not part of the Gold Standard (GS). Cata˜o and Solomou (2005) point out that external
adjustment of GS countries was facilitated by their trade with non-GS countries. As a
robustness check we therefore also estimated a version of the model in which we treat the
F -region as a hybrid region that includes gold, as well as non-gold countries. We treat the
U.K. as the H -region.
The distinguishing feature of the hybrid region is that its nominal exchange rate with
respect to the home region (the GS country) is more flexible than if the foreign region was a
strict adherent to the GS. This allows us to analyze whether our baseline results are robust
to larger fluctuations in the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER).
We collected new price level series, exchange rates, short-term rates and real per capita
GDP indices for 12 non-gold block countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Greece, India,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, Russia). On the basis of this data we then calculated
global trade-weighted averages which we treat as the F -region observables for the hybrid
model estimation: trade-weighted short-term rates and per capita GDP series, as well as
REER and NEER series that encompass the non-gold block. All other observables remain
the same as in the baseline U.K. model estimation.
Most of the estimated parameters are similar to those of the baseline model. Reassuringly,
the estimated monetary policy parameters reflect the hybrid setup. In particular, compared
to our baseline model, the H -region’s monetary policy now reacts less to the NEER (0.14
in the hybrid setup, 0.72 in the baseline model). F -region’s monetary policy also reacts less
to both its NEER (0.16 in hybrid setup, 1.62 in baseline model).
Table 2.19, panel A presents the counterfactual model simulations for the estimated hybrid
model. We find that, even when the higher degree of NEER flexibility is taken into account,
it is still price flexibility that explains most of the benign adjustment experience under the
GS.
Extended two-sector model
Appendix 2.B.4 presents a two-sector version of the GS model. Here we report the
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counterfactual simulation volatilities it gives rise to.79
Based on the extended model, we can mimic the 20th century shift away from primary
goods production in order to take a look at the counterfactual volatilities this implies.
Through the lens of the extended model the 20th century sectoral shift is represented by
the following parameter changes. First, non-tradable goods and services, have become more
important over time as inputs to wholesale tradable goods (e.g. R&D). This is reflected
by a lower value for φ˜. We set φ˜ = 0.8 (as opposed to 0.9 during the early 20th century),
which is consistent with recent input-output tables.
Second, the composition of households’ consumption has shifted towards non-tradable
services, which can be captured as a decrease in the weight of wholesale tradable goods in
the final consumption bundle, i.e. a lower γ˜ and γ˜?. Another reason for why γ˜ and γ˜? have
become smaller is that retail tradable goods require a larger amount of local distribution
services today than 100 years ago (e.g. marketing and retail sales).80 We calibrate these
two parameters to target today’s tradable sector share (i.e. the share of tradable value
added in total value added of 16% for the H region, and 24% for the F region, as opposed
to 47% and 40% during the early 20th century. This corresponds to the U.K. statistics for
2011).81
Table 2.19 panel B displays the results of the counterfactual analysis (see Section 6 for a
detailed description of the counterfactual exercise). The results for the extended model are
similar to the results for the baseline model. Nominal flexibility remains the most important
explanation for the benign adjustment experience under the GS. Migration- and monetary
policy played smaller roles.
Norway
Besides Sweden, another country which experienced large emigration flows in the late 19th
century is Norway. It is thus interesting to see how important the migration channel was
for this country. Because we have no immigration series for Norway we replace the net-
immigration/population ratio with the emigration/population ratio among the observables.
The thus estimated model produces counterfactual volatilities that are broadly in line with
79The model calibration is described in Appendix 2.B.4.
80One of the earliest input-output tables available that indicate this is indeed the case is the German table
for 1936 (see Fremdling and Staeglin, 2014).
81While the H value is based on the U.K. input-output table for 2011, the F value is an average for Germany
and Sweden. All input-output tables are from OECD Statistics.
108
2.C. Additional results
those of from other countries’ models (see Table 2.19 panel C). Price flexibility again is the
most important contributor to per capita output stability.
France
Similarly to the central bank of Belgium, the central bank of France is known for having
pushed the limits of monetary policy independence under the Gold Standard (Eichengreen
and Flandreau, 2016; Bazot et al., 2014). We therefore also estimated the model with France
as the H -region, and all other GS economies as the F -region. Unfortunately, there does not
exist an uninterrupted immigration series for France between 1880 and 1913. Among the
observables for model estimation we thus replaced the net-immigration/population series
with the emigration/population series.
Table 2.19 panel D displays the counterfactual simulation results for France. Price flexibility
again is the most influential factor when it comes to output stability.
Table 2.19: Counterfactual volatility
Baseline
model
Rigid
prices
No
migration
No inde-
pendence
No
migration,
given rigid
prices
No inde-
pendence,
given rigid
prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3—2) (4—2)
Panel A: United Kingdom hybrid
ypt Per capita output 1.72 3.16 1.71 1.78 3.17 3.51
(83.67%) (-0.76%) (3.55%) (0.31%) (11.00%)
Panel B: United Kingdom extended
ypt Per capita output 1.95 3.67 1.95 2.03 3.76 4.10
(88.23%) (-0.07%) (4.19%) (2.45%) (11.94%)
Panel C: Norway
ypt Per capita output 1.57 4.31 1.55 1.56 4.32 4.32
(175.09%) (-1.25%) (-0.17%) (0.17%) (0.33%)
Panel D: France
ypt Per capita output 2.84 4.57 2.84 2.82 4.56 4.62
(60.89%) (-0.12%) (-0.58%) (-0.26%) (1.06%)
Notes: Percentage change in counterfactual S.D. relative to baseline S.D. in parenthesis. Rigid
prices – model with rigid prices. No migration – model without migration. No independence – model
without policy independence for central bank.
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Sovereign Default Risk and the Role of
International Transfers
3.1 Introduction
When countries join a currency union, they give up the exchange rate as a tool for
business cycle stabilization. A long stream of literature argues that fiscal integration and
interregional transfers have to substitute for the lost monetary autonomy.1 This paper
contributes to this discussion by examining interregional risk sharing arrangements in a
currency union where member states are afflicted by sovereign default risk. I show that
international risk sharing can have a sizable and positive welfare-impact to the extent that
it ameliorates severe recessions.
In this paper, I introduce a sovereign default model in which sovereign risk spills over
into local private sector financing costs. The concurrence of a large increase in private sector
borrowing costs and sovereign debt crises has been widely studied in the context of the
euro area debt crisis.2 This linkage between public and private sector financing conditions
can amplify recessions, and hence opens the door for international risk sharing to have a
sizable positive welfare-impact. This is because risk sharing no longer only helps to smooth
consumption – the traditional effect of insurance – but by ameliorating the asymmetric risk
for severe recessions, it also raises the average consumption level.
The model’s setup resembles the sovereign default models of Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) and Arellano (2008). The regional government of a small open economy can issue
one-period non-state-contingent bonds on the international financial market. Access to the
international market allows the government to smooth the consumption of its economy.
1See for example the seminal work of Kenen (1969) and more recently Farhi and Werning (forthcoming),
and the references therein.
2See for example Committee on the Global Financial System (2011), International Monetary Fund (2013)
and Bocola (2016).
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However, the government’s ability to insure its economy is limited by the incompleteness
of the international financial market, as well as the government’s inability to commit
to debt repayment. In order to reflect the impact of external borrowing costs on the
regional economy, I introduce a working capital financing channel to the model, which
together with variable capacity utilization endogenously determines output. In this way
unfavorable economic conditions that increase the sovereign’s default incentive also increase
private-sector financing costs, giving rise to the risk for severe recessions.
I use the model to analyze two different balanced-budget international risk sharing
arrangements. The arrangements differ with respect to the balance they strike between
insuring the small open economy against bad outcomes and instilling it with an incentive not
to default. First, I derive the optimal risk sharing scheme and evaluate its effect on output,
consumption, and welfare. The optimal insurance scheme features transfers and repayments
that vary with the economic conditions of the small open economy, similar to transfers
within a fiscal union. The optimal insurance not only serves to smooth consumption, but it
also reduces the government’s incentive to default on international investors. This positively
affects average output, as a lower sovereign default probability lowers the magnitude of
recessions. In a quantitative exercise calibrated to Greece, the existence of an optimal
insurance scheme ameliorates the output drop by 4% and results in a welfare improvement
equivalent to a 1% increase in certainty equivalent consumption.
The optimal risk sharing scheme can be implemented as a state-contingent transfer
within a fiscal union. Although the implementation of such a fiscal union in the euro area
is often discussed, it still faces noticeable political resistance. In contrast, simpler standby
facilities, such as the European Stability Mechanism, are already in place. Motivated
by this, I proceed to compare the optimal international risk sharing arrangement to a
standby facility. The standby facility provides emergency funding in economic downturns
and in this way, it lowers the governments’ default incentive and helps to ameliorate severe
recessions. In contrast to the optimal insurance scheme, however, the standby facility
features non-state-contingent repayments. Nevertheless, the existence of a standby facility
results in a welfare improvement of up to 0.74% – around three-quarters of the welfare
improvement the optimal insurance scheme provides.
What makes the simple standby facility compare so favorably to the optimal insurance
scheme? In my setup international risk sharing has two effects. First, it helps to smooth
consumption – the traditional effect of insurance. Second, and more importantly, interna-
tional insurance reduces the asymmetric downside risk for a severe recession that emerges
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out of the interaction between sovereign risk spreads and private sector financing costs. It is
this second effect of international risk sharing that generates the significant welfare impact.
The standby facility, which is redundant except when the economy is facing large negative
shocks, has a much more limited capacity to smooth consumption compared to the optimal
risk sharing scheme. Nevertheless, the welfare impact of the two risk sharing arrangements
is comparable, because just like the optimal insurance scheme the standby facility reduces
sovereign default risk and thereby limits the exacerbation of recessions. By ameliorating
this risk, the standby facility increases the average level of output and consumption, and
thus reaps most of the benefits that an optimal insurance scheme can provide.
The finding that a simple standby facility does comparably well is of practical relevance.
When two or more sovereign states consider entering an international risk sharing arrange-
ment the willingness to part with fiscal autonomy is often low. Under such circumstances,
the formation of a simple emergency fund can be politically feasible in many cases where
deeper fiscal integration is not an option. My findings suggest that the lower degree of fiscal
integration has few drawbacks in terms of welfare gains foregone.
This paper is closely related to several strands of the literature. First, my theoretical
framework is an extension of the work on sovereign default by Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) and Arellano (2008), who analyze the relationship between default probabilities and
output fluctuations in a one-period non-state-contingent debt framework. Chatterjee and
Eyigungor (2012) extend the model to incorporate long-term debt. While these papers
assume exogenous endowment economies, the endogenous output channel I introduce here
is inspired by Mendoza and Yue (2012). An important implication of such an endogenous
output channel is that default costs are increasing and convex in output – a relationship
that is often modeled in reduced form in previous papers. While these papers explain
the business cycle dynamics around default events, my research uses the sovereign default
framework to study the role of international risk sharing. Dovis (forthcoming) also studies
risk sharing in a sovereign default setup and shows that sovereign debt crises can be part
of the efficient risk sharing arrangement when there are informational friction and limited
commitment. This paper focus instead on the quantitative effect of sovereign risk spillover
on the role of international risk sharing.
Second, this paper is also related to the literature that examines the role of interregional
transfers within a currency union. In a seminal contribution, Kenen (1969) argues that
interregional fiscal transfers are essential to offset regional differences and ensure the well-
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functioning of a currency union. Eichengreen (1992) points out that the limited commitment
problem may be particularly important for euro area member states with high levels of
public debt. He predicts that this may necessitate the institutionalization of interregional
transfers. My research formalizes and quantitatively evaluates the argument put forward
in Eichengreen (1992). More recently, Farhi and Werning (forthcoming) characterize a
fiscal union as an optimal risk sharing arrangement within a currency union. They show
that a fiscal union is beneficial not only because of market incompleteness but also due to
aggregate demand externalities. My paper is complementary to their paper in that it zooms
in on limited commitment as a rationale – but also limitation – for interregional insurance.
Third, this paper is related to Corsetti, Kuester, Meier and Mu¨ller (2013, 2014), who,
against the backdrop of the euro area debt crisis, examine the impact of sovereign risk
spillovers on macroeconomic stability and fiscal policy. As in their papers, I assume
that sovereign default risk spills into private sector financing costs. Empirical evidence
for this spillover is presented by Neri (2013), and International Monetary Fund (2013).3
Bocola (2016) provides a theoretical microfoundation of such a pass-through. He points
out that not only do banks with exposure to government bonds suffer losses when the
bond price drops, increasing sovereign default risk also generates a precautionary motive
for the banks to deleverage. Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi (2014) also develop a theoretical
model that characterizes the connection between sovereign defaults and the private financial
market through banks’ exposure to government bonds. They argue that more developed
financial markets translate into a stronger linkage between sovereign defaults and private
sector financing conditions. This provides governments with stronger incentives to repay.
Furthermore, this paper also speaks to the literature that studies the relationship between
sovereign interest rates and private sector activity in emerging markets (see Neumeyer and
Perri, 2005; Uribe and Yue, 2006). While in these papers sovereign risk is given exogenously
the framework presented here features an endogenous default decision. This is essential for
better understanding the interplay between interregional transfers and limited commitment.
Fourth, through my analysis of a standby facility, this paper also adds to the sovereign
default literature that zooms in on bailouts. Boz (2011) proposes a framework to analyze
the dynamics of lending by International Financial Institutions like the IMF. Kirsch and
Ru¨hmkorf (2015) consider how conditional financial assistance affects the default incentive
of governments, and Fink and Scholl (2016) evaluate the effectiveness of conditionality in
3See also Lane (2012) for a description on the evolution of the European debt crisis and the interaction
between the sovereign debt crisis and the banking crisis.
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bailouts. Roch and Uhlig (2016) analyze the role of a bailout guarantee in eliminating
self-fulfilling debt crises. Pancrazi, Seoane and Vukotic (2017) examine the welfare effects
of bailouts and point out that some bailouts that are welfare improving ex-ante can have
detrimental welfare effects ex-post, if recessions are long-lasting. Mueller, Storesletten
and Zilibotti (2015) study the interaction between sovereign default, external intervention,
and structural reform. Complementary to their study, I show that bailouts can help to
ameliorate the impact of negative shocks and that the effectiveness of bailouts is comparable
to that of an optimal risk sharing scheme.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework, Section 3 assesses its quantitative implications, and Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical framework
In this section, I describe the theoretical framework. The model describes a currency
union that consists of a regional and a federal level. On the regional level, there exists
a small open economy with three groups of domestic agents. The domestic agents are
households, firms and the regional government. There also exists one group of foreign
agents, the international investors. On the federal level of the currency union, interregional
risk sharing is either provided by the federal planner, in case of the optimal risk sharing
scheme or by a simple standby facility.
I outline the framework in three steps. First, I present the baseline model without any
risk sharing arrangements. After that, I characterize the optimal risk sharing scheme using
an optimization problem of a welfare-maximizing federal planner. Finally, the last part of
this section describes the standby facility.
3.2.1 The baseline model
Domestic households
Households choose consumption ct and labor ht to maximize their lifetime utility
E
[∑∞
t=0 β
tu(ct, ht)
]
, where β ∈ (0, 1) is the time discount factor. u(·) is the households’ pe-
riod utility function, which is assumed to have the functional form introduced by Greenwood,
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Hercowitz and Huffman (1988) (GHH) 4
u(ct, ht) =
[
ct − h1+υt /(1 + υ)
]1−σ − 1
1− σ , with σ, υ > 0.
The households do not participate directly in the international financial market, but the
government can borrow from abroad and pays a lump sum transfer τt to the households.
5
Furthermore, the households have income from working at the market wage wt as well
as from lump sum dividends paid by domestic firms Πt. The representative household’s
maximization problem is
max
{ct,ht}∞t=0
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, ht)
]
(3.1)
subject to ct − wt ht − τt −Πt = 0.
The optimal labor supply satisfies
hυt = wt. (3.2)
Domestic firms
Domestic firms produce a homogeneous and tradable good with a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function
yt = zt (utK)
1−γ hγt , with γ > 0. (3.3)
zt is the exogenous productivity level in the economy and it is assumed to follow a J-state
Markov process with a transition probability P(zt | zt−1). ut ∈ (0, 1] is a variable level
of capacity utilization and K is the time-invariant level of capital. As in Greenwood et
al. (1988), King and Rebelo (1999) and Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2007), capacity
utilization is associated with resource costs Ψ(ut). These costs reflect capital depreciation
4The GHH preferences are commonly used in the open economy literature. They remove the wealth effect
on labor supply and allow labor supply to display plausible business cycle dynamics. See for example
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003), Neumeyer and Perri (2005), and Mendoza and Yue (2012).
5As shown in Na, Schmitt-Grohe´, Uribe and Yue (forthcoming), sovereign default models in the tradition of
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), that feature a “government-controlled” allocation, can be decentralized with
an appropriate taxation on debt. This is the case also in the model presented here.
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and they are increasing in the level of utilization
Ψ(ut) = Ψ +
δ
1 + ξ
u1+ξt , with Ψ, δ > 0. (3.4)
Before sales, firms have to pay for a fraction φ of the production costs, i.e. the wage bill
and the cost of capacity utilization. To finance this, they take out within-period working
capital loans from the domestic financial sector at the net interest rate rt. Working capital
is a mechanism that has been often used in the literature to reflect the role of financial
intermediation costs on emerging market business cycles. Firms’ profits are
Πt = yt − wtht −KΨ(ut)− φ rt (wtht +KΨ(ut)) , (3.5)
which are paid out lump sum to domestics households. Firms operate in a perfectly
competitive goods market and choose the level of utilization ut and labor ht to maximize
profits.
This paper differs from the existing literature on sovereign debt default by adding
the feature of variable capacity utilization to the production sector. While the capital
stock is relatively stable at business cycle frequencies and plays only a limited role in
output dynamics around default and sudden stop events, capacity utilization does exhibit
pronounced cyclical fluctuations (see for example Mendoza, 2010; Meza and Quintin, 2007;
Mendoza and Yue, 2012). As shown by King and Rebelo (1999), capacity utilization can
help to amplify the impact of productivity shocks on output. Together with working capital,
variable capacity utilization also amplifies the effect of interest rate changes on output.
When the domestic costs of financial intermediation rt and a productivity realization zt
are taken as given, the (partial) equilibrium in the small open economy is described by the
following equations
ht =
(
1 + φ rt
ztKˇ
)1/γ˜
, (3.6)
ut =
(
h1+υt (1− γ)
K2 δγ
) 1
1+ξ
, (3.7)
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yt =
1
γ
(1 + φ rt)
1+ 1+υ
γ˜(
ztKˇ
) 1+υ
γ˜
, (3.8)
with Kˇ = K1−γγ
(
(1− γ)(γK2δ))(1−γ)/(1+ξ) and γ˜ = −(υγ + ξ(1− γ + υ))/(1 + ξ). Under
the calibration used for the quantitative analysis (see below), output, utilization and labor
in equilibrium are increasing in zt and decreasing in rt.
A core aspect of my model is the spillover of sovereign risk spreads into private sector
financing costs. There exist several papers which assume that interest rates for working
capital and sovereign debt spreads comove in emerging markets (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005;
Uribe and Yue, 2006). For developed economies, the interplay of sovereign default spreads,
private sector financing costs, and business cycles has also recently gained attention, in
light of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. Many studies have documented the disruptive
effects of the euro area debt crisis on private financial intermediation, as well as the close
relationship between sovereign risk spreads and private sector financing costs.6 The crisis
has also sparked theoretical research on the pass-through of sovereign risk spreads to the
private sector (see Bocola, 2016). Let qt denote the price of the government bonds. 1 + r is
the time-invariant riskfree interest rate, which is also the international investors’ opportunity
costs of funds (see below). I assume that the private sector intermediation cost rt depends
on the government bond spread (1/qt)/(1 + r) = 1/((1 + r)qt) and the government’s access
to the international financial market in the following way:
1 + rt =
(1 + r)χ
[
1
(1+r)qt
]α
with access to international financial markets,
1 + rD without access to international financial markets
(3.9)
where χ ≥ 1 and α > 0, and rD is the financing cost when the government loses access to the
financial market. Whenever the government has access to the international financial market,
the cost of financial intermediation is decreasing in the government’s bond price.7 The
government’s bond price, in turn, is decreasing in the government’s default probability (see
below). In other words, an increase in sovereign’s default probability leads to an increase in
the financing costs of domestic firms. This in turns depresses output through the working
6See for example Committee on the Global Financial System (2011).
7The assumed functional form resembles the modeling of sovereign risk spillover in Corsetti et al. (2013,
2014).
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capital channel and amplifies the effect of negative productivity shock.8
If on the other hand, the government has lost access to the international financial market
due to its defaulting on its debt, this is assumed to have a detrimental effect on domestic
financial intermediation. More precisely, private sector financing costs are assumed to
increase to a level rD much higher than the riskfree rate r. The stress on domestic financial
intermediation is assumed to persist for as long as the government is excluded from the
international financial market. The implicit assumption here is that the default has a
persistent impact on the financial sector’s intermediation ability and that regaining access
to the international financial market takes about as much time as it takes for the domestic
financial system to recover. As the cost of intermediation is constant during the exclusion
periods, the equilibrium level of output, labor, and capacity utilization are functions of the
productivity level zt only. These modeling assumptions are a simple way to reflect the
economic impact of sovereign default risk and sovereign default.9
It is worth pointing out that the output costs of default differ from the output costs
usually assumed in the literature. Most of the default literature follows Arellano (2008)
in assuming an exogenous default cost that directly affects the productivity level of the
economy in autarky.10 In contrast, the output costs in my model are due to financial stress
which results in higher domestic costs of financial intermediation after a default. With the
sovereign risk spillover channel, the government’s default incentive and debt policy affect
private sector credit conditions and hence regional output. This, in turn, is internalized by
the government when it faces its decision problem, to which we turn now.
Regional government
The regional government is benevolent and its objective is to maximize the domestic
households’ lifetime utility. The government has access to the international financial market,
where it can sell one-period non-state-contingent government bonds bt to international
investors. I assume that these investors are risk neutral and that the market for sovereign
8Aguiar, Amador and Gopinath (2009) show that limited commitment and high levels of sovereign debt can
also increase the cyclicality through the impact on investment.
9Note that Mendoza and Yue (2012) study a version of their model where sovereign default risk affects
private sector financing costs. They find that this linkage has little quantitative implication. As it will
become clear in the quantitative exercise below, the sovereign risk spillover does play a crucial role in the
model with variable capacity utilization presented here.
10See also Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) and Arellano and Bai (2016). An exception is Mendoza and Yue
(2012), where the costs of default emerge endogenously as a result of an inefficiency on the production side
because imported inputs have to be imperfectly replaced with domestically produced inputs.
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bonds is competitive. The price of the government bond is q(bt, zt) and it depends on the
amount of new government bonds issued bt as well as the current productivity realization of
the small open economy zt. This is described in more detail below. Absent any interregional
risk sharing arrangement, the bonds are the only instrument that the government has to
smooth domestic households’ consumption. However, the government lacks the ability to
commit to repay its debt and it may choose to default after observing the productivity level.
When the government defaults, it defaults on 100% of the maturing debt and it becomes
excluded from the international financial market.11 After the initial default period, the
government regains market access with an exogenous probability θ, in which case it starts
with zero debt.12
Consider the case where the government is not in default. At the beginning of the
current period t, the government chooses a debt policy that maximizes households’ welfare.
The government can either (1) default or (2) repay and decide upon the amount of new debt
issuance. Both, the payoff of repayment and that of default consist of the lifetime utility of
the households (V r for repayment and V d for default) as well as a random component (rt
or dt ). As we will see soon, the lifetime utility of repayment is a function of the inherited
debt level bt−1 and the current productivity level zt. The lifetime utility of default, on the
other hand, only depends on the productivity level due to the assumption of full default.
The government makes the default decision by comparing the payoff of repayment with the
payoff of default:
max
{
V r(bt−1, zt)− rt︸ ︷︷ ︸
repayment
, V d(zt)− dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
default
}
.
It is assumed that if the government is indifferent between repayment and default, it chooses
to repay. The stochastic components stand in for political uncertainty in the default decision.
They affect the households’ preferences over repayment or default and are only observable
to the domestic agents.13 Tomz and Wright (2007) show that low output can only partly
11In practice observed haircuts in sovereign defaults are often less than 100%, see Sturzenegger and
Zettelmeyer (2008) and Cruces and Trebesch (2013).
12It is common in the sovereign default literature to assume that the chance of renewed access to international
financial markets is an exogenous process. This reflects protracted negotiation processes between the
government and its creditors, only after the completion of which the country may borrow again.
13The assumption of unobserved shocks that affect outside options has been explored in the sovereign default
context, see Aguiar and Amador (2014) and the references therein. An alternative interpretation is based
on the random utility approach.
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explain governments’ default decisions and the literature has considered political factors to
play a non-negligible role in default events. Here, without explicitly modeling the political
economy of default, I capture the political uncertainty about the default decision with a
political cost that directly affects the expected payoffs.14 The political default shocks are
modeled as transitory utility shocks rt and 
d
t drawn independently each period from the
same distribution such that their difference (rt − dt ) is logistically distributed with mean
zero and variance σ2 = (piψ)
2/3; ψ is a positive scaling parameter.15 To keep the notation
short, in the following I denote the lifetime utilities net of their respective current period
political costs with a tilde, e.g., V˜ r or V˜ d with
V˜ r(bt−1, zt) := V r(bt−1, zt)− rt ; V˜ d(zt) := V d(zt)− dt .
Despite the political costs, the government’s default decision is still fundamentally driven
by the economic costs and benefits of default. As we will see in the following, the benefit of
default is an immediate higher consumption, as the inherited debt bt−1 no longer needs to
be repaid. The costs of default are comprised of the cost of exclusion from the international
financial market and the cost of impaired domestic financial intermediation.
The payoff of repayment is determined by the current level of productivity zt, and the
choice of new debt issuance bt. The new debt issuance bt solves the following constrained
maximization problem, formulated in a recursive fashion
V r(bt−1, zt) = max
bt,ct
{
u(ct, h(bt, zt))
+β Et max
[
V˜ r(bt, zt+1), V˜
d(zt+1)
]}
(3.10)
subject to ct + bt−1 = q(bt, zt) bt + y˜(bt, zt),
where the government’s choices are constrained by the available resources of the economy.
14An alternative setup of the model is to assume that the political default costs affect the government’s
utility but not that of the households. This would induce a discrepancy between the government’s and the
households’ welfare. However, it can be shown that the two setups provide identical results.
15In particular, I assume that the political costs i are i.i.d. according to a double exponential distribution.
This allows me to apply the random utility approach to the multinominal logit model. See Suppes and
Luce (1965) and the reference therein. pi refers to the mathematical constant
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y˜t is output net of real resource costs used in the financial intermediation
y˜t = yt −KΨ(ut)− φ rt (wtht +KΨ(ut)) . (3.11)
Through the sovereign risk spillovers and the existence of working capital, both y˜t and ht,
become a function of the government’s new debt issuance and the productivity level.
If the government has no access to the international market, the households can only
consume output net of resource costs. Let y˜D, hD denote labor and output net of resource
costs, evaluated using (3.6) and (3.8) at rt = r
D. The payoff of defaulting thus is
V d(zt) = u(y˜
D(zt), h
D(zt)) + βEt
[
θV r(bt = 0, zt+1) + (1− θ)V d(zt+1)
]
. (3.12)
The continuation value reflects the assumption that with probability θ the government
regains access to the international financial market in the next period, with zero initial
debt.16
International investors
The international investors are risk-neutral and have an opportunity cost of funds equal
to the risk-free rate r. The international market is competitive, implying that investors
have zero expected profits when they lend to the regional government. The price schedule
for government bonds thus is
qt =
Et prob(bt, zt+1)
1 + r
, (3.13)
where prob(bt, zt+1) is the probability with which the regional government repays its liability
bt in t+ 1. For a j-state productivity realization, the repayment probability is
prob(bt, zj) = P
{
V˜ r(bt, zt+1 = zj) ≥ V˜ d(zt+1 = zj)
}
. (3.14)
3.2.2 The optimal risk sharing scheme
In the baseline model, the regional government’s ability to self-insure is constrained not
only by the incompleteness of the international financial market but also by its inability to
commit. The resulting sovereign risk spillovers further amplify recessions and hamper the
16The political costs do not appear in the continuation value because they are i.i.d. distributed with mean
zero.
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government’s ability to borrow in unfavorable economic times. In this section, I examine
the optimal interregional risk sharing arrangement in this setup. I characterize the optimal
risk sharing arrangement as an optimal contract using the promised utility approach.17
The federal planner’s objective is to maximize the sum of the welfare of the small open
economy and the international investors, and it observes the realization of the productivity
states of the economy but not the political costs. The planner designs the contract that
specifies the payment terms and the debt structure of the debtor country at each specific
time and productivity state. This includes the level of official liabilities and the level of
external borrowing from the international market under the conditions described above. In
other words, the planner chooses when and how much is transferred/repaid and she also
constrains the sovereign’s borrowing on the international market.
The planner designs the contract by maximizing the present value of expected cash
flows, given the utility level of the small open economy. The regional government still
cannot commit and may default on its borrowing from the international investors as well as
its liabilities to the planner as specified in the contract. However, to reflect the seniority
of the risk sharing agreement on the federal level, I assume that the government cannot
choose to default on the contract alone. In particular, if the government defaults on private
external debt, it will be excluded from the international financial market (as described
above) but it still participates in the risk sharing arrangement. However, if it defaults on
the contract the international market also stops lending to the government. Furthermore,
defaulting on the contract excludes any future possibility for the government to reenter
the optimal contract again. The implicit assumption is that the planner has a stronger
punishment instrument and can credibly threaten the government that it will stop providing
any more emergency funds after a violation of the contract. The international investors,
however, fail to coordinate to achieve such a punishment. Consequently, if the government
decides to default on the contract, the economy reverts to the one described in the baseline
model after default. When the government has not defaulted on the contract, the planner’s
optimization problem is to maximize discounted cash flows from the contract {pj}∞j=t subject
to a given level of promised utility to the government.18 The planner distinguishes between
two cases: (1) the regional government has access to the international market; (2) the
17The promised utility approach has been widely used. See for example Spear and Srivastava (1987), Thomas
and Worrall (1988), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), Aguiar and Amador (2014), Dovis (forthcoming) for
an application in the sovereign default context.
18pt < 0 implies transfers to the regional government; pt > 0 repayments from the government.
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regional government has no access to the international financial market.
No access to the international financial market
Let us first look at the federal planner’s problem when the regional government has
no access to the international financial market. J denotes the contract value from the
planner’s perspective if the government has access to the financial market, and Jd if not.
The contract has a value of zero if the government has reneged on the contract. The state
variables are the productivity level zt as well as the promised utility v
d
t . The planner’s choice
variables include the current period repayment/transfer pt and the next period promised
utilities. In particular, if the government regains market access in t+ 1 and the realized
productivity level is zt+1 = zj , its promised utility is v
db
j,t+1. If the government remains
without market access, the planner promises to deliver a utility level of vddj,t+1 conditional on
the productivity state j. Again, I use a tilde to denote the promised value net of political
costs. The planner’s optimization problem is
Jd(vdt , zt) = maxpt,ct,
{vdbj,t+1}Jj=1,
{vddj,t+1}Jj=1
{
pt +
1
R
Et
[
θ probdb (vdbt+1, zt+1) J(v
db
t+1, bt = 0, zt+1)
+(1− θ) probdd (vddt+1, zt+1)Jd(vddt+1, zt+1)
]
(3.15)
subject to vdt = u(ct, h
D(zt)) + βEt
[
θmax
{
v˜dbt+1, V˜
d(zt+1)
}
(3.16)
+ (1− θ) max{v˜ddt+1, V˜ d(zt+1)}]
ct = y˜
D(zt)− pt
The first constraint facing the planner is the “promise-keeping” constraint. It ensures that
the small open economy indeed receives the level of lifetime utility vdt that was promised
by the planner last period. This lifetime utility consists of the current period’s utility
and the continuation value of the government. This continuation value reflects the two
t+ 1-scenarios concerning the government’s access to the international financial market, as
well as the government’s limited commitment problem. With probability θ, the government
regains market access, in which case it chooses to repay the contract obligation with
probability probdb(·). With probability (1 − θ), the government remains without access
to the international financial market, in which case it honors its contract obligation with
probability probdd(·). The second constraint reflects the resource constraint of the regional
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economy: since it does not have access to the international financial market, it can only
consume its output net of real resource costs minus the payment pt.
With access to the international financial market
When the government has access to the international market, the value of the contract
is a function of the promised utility vt and the productivity level zt, as well as the level
of the inherited debt of the government bt−1. Besides the current period transfer, the
federal planner also chooses the current period’s new issuance of debt bt. As shown in
(3.17), the contract value J(·) consists of the current repayment by the government pt and
a continuation value, which is itself a weighted average of possible contract values in t+ 1.
With probability pi(zj | zt), the productivity level is zj in t+1. Given this productivity state,
the government will receive a lifetime utility vj,t+1 if it chooses to repay the international
debt and honor its contract obligation. It will have a lifetime utility vdj,t+1 if it repays
only its contract obligation but defaults on international debt. In t + 1, after observing
the realized productivity level and the political costs, the government makes its default
decision by comparing these promised utilities including their individual political costs
with its other option – defaulting on all obligations and receiving V˜ d. With probability
prob(·) the government repays all its liabilities, with probability probd(·) it defaults only
on international debt. The optimal contract is characterized by the following optimization
problem
J(vt, bt−1, zt) = max
pt,ct,bt,
{vj,t+1}Jj=1,
{vdj,t+1}Jj=1
{
pt +
1
R
Et
[
prob (vt+1, bt, zt+1) J(vt+1, bt, zt+1)
+probd(vdt+1, bt, zt+1) J
d(vdt+1, zt+1)
]}
(3.17)
subject to vt = u(ct, ht) + βEt
[
max
{
v˜t+1, v˜
d
t+1, V˜
d(zt+1)
}]
ct + bt−1 + pt = qt bt + y˜t
The first constraint is again the “promise-keeping” constraint. The continuation value from
the perspective of the regional government reflects the three options which it can choose
from in t+ 1: (1) repay all liabilities; (2) repay only the contract obligation; (3) default on
all liabilities. The second constraint is the resource constraint of the regional economy. The
bond price schedule q is defined as in (3.13) and depends on the expected probability that
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debts to international investors will be repaid next period. As in the baseline model, ht
and yt depend on the productivity state as well as the government bond prices.
The planner, by directly choosing the transfers/repayments and promised utility, can
provide productivity-state-contingent transfers to the government. This enables the planner
to strike a balance between insuring the regional economy against economic downturns and
instilling it with an incentive not to default. Under the optimal contract, the government’s
obligations are tailored to the productivity level. The government is required to contribute
to the risk sharing arrangement when its economy is in good shape and receives transfer
when facing negative productivity shock. As a result, a surprisingly low level of productivity
is no longer associated with a repayment that requires a painful cut in domestic consumption.
In equilibrium, defaults can still happen for economic or political reasons. But thanks to
the state contingency, defaults triggered by adverse productivity shocks are much less likely.
In this way, the planner can provide better insurance and ameliorate recessions, despite the
government’s limited commitment.
3.2.3 The standby facility
The optimal contract described above can be implemented in a fiscal union where the
government of the small open economy and the other member states agree upon ex-post
interregional transfers and repayments that are contingent on the realized productivity
shocks and agree to restrictions on borrowing on the international market. A simpler way
to provide insurance is the provision of a standby facility – an emergency fund – with
repayment obligations that do not depend on future economic outcomes. Since the European
debt crisis has begun, several such emergency fund mechanisms have been set up to tackle
the lack of risk sharing within the euro area (e.g., the European Stability Mechanism).19 I
now turn to the analysis of such a standby facility. How does it compare to the optimal
insurance scheme?
The standby facility provides a limited amount of funds bˇ < b¯ at a fixed interest rate
rb ≥ r. For simplicity, I assume that if the government decides to take up the emergency
fund, it uses it in full (i.e., bˇt = b¯). As a condition, it is subject to a fiscal constraint that
restricts the amount of debt that it can issue on the international market.20 Analogous
19Another notable standby facility that is in place as an insurance mechanism is the IMF standby facility.
20The European Stability Mechanism explicitly states that its lending happens only under strict conditions
and countries using it must implement reforms. Such fiscal conditionality also often accompanies the IMF
bailout fund. It is furthermore worth pointing out that although the optimal contract does not explicitly
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to the optimal contract, the bailout fund is more senior than the private sector debt. The
government can choose to default on its liabilities toward international investors, or this
and the emergency fund together. It cannot choose to default only on the standby facility.
Entering the standby facility is associated with some political cost κ ≥ 0. Staying in or
exiting the facility is not associated with any political cost. So there are three features of
the standby facility that potentially prevent the government from always making use of the
fund: the spread between the riskfree rate and the interest rate on the emergency fund,
the borrowing constraint, and the political costs. The interest rate rb serves to ensure that
the standby facility is balanced-budget, despite the limited commitment problem on the
side of the regional government. Let bˇt−1 denote the level of the emergency fund that the
government used in the last period t− 1. bˇt−1 can take two values
bˇt−1 =
{
0 if the government was not using the emergency fund in t− 1
b¯ otherwise
(3.18)
Table 3.1: Government’s debt decision
Access to int. fin. Standby facility Option payoffs
market in t in t− 1
(1) no no V˜ d,nofund(0, zt), V˜
d,fund(0, zt)− κ
(2) no yes V˜ d,nofund(b¯, zt), V˜
d,fund(b¯, zt), V˜
d(zt)
(3) regain no V˜ r,nofund(0, 0, zt), V˜
r,fund(0, 0, zt)− κ
(4) regain yes V˜ r,nofund(0, b¯, zt), V˜
r,fund(0, b¯, zt), V˜
d(zt)
(5) yes no V˜ r,nofund(bt−1, 0, zt), V˜ r,fund(bt−1, 0, zt)− κ,
V˜ d,nofund(0, zt), V˜
d,fund(0, zt)− κ
(6) yes yes V˜ r,nofund(bt−1, b¯, zt), V˜ r,fund(bt−1, b¯, zt),
V˜ d,nofund(b¯, zt), V˜
d,fund(b¯, zt), V˜
d(zt)
The timeline is similar to that in the baseline model. At the beginning of period t, after
observing the realization of the productivity level, the government decides over its debt
specify a similar borrowing constraint, the planner, in fact, chooses the exact level of private external debt
that the government takes up.
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policy and whether to use the standby facility. If the government has defaulted on the
emergency fund its continuation value is V d since it no longer has access to the standby
facility. If it has not defaulted on the standby facility, its decision problem depends on
whether it has access to the international financial market as well as whether it has used
the standby facility in the last period. We have to distinguish between six cases, which are
summarized in Table 3.1. V˜ d,nofund(bˇt−1, zt) is the value function net of political cost of the
regional government when it has no access to the international market and decides not to use
the emergency fund, V˜ d,fund(bˇt−1, zt) is the value function under the same circumstances
but the government uses the emergency fund. V˜ r,nofund(bt−1, bˇt−1, zt) is the value function
net of political cost when the government has access to the international market and is not
using the emergency fund, V˜ r,fund(bt−1, bˇt−1, zt) is the corresponding value function if the
government uses the emergency fund.
(1) If the government has no access to the financial market and was not using the
standby facility, it can choose between not using the emergency fund or start using it.21 (2)
If the government has no access to the financial market and was already using the standby
facility last period, it can choose between exiting the standby facility, rolling over the fund
or defaulting on the standby facility. (3) If the government has just regained access to the
financial market and was not using the standby facility, it chooses between whether or not
to start using the fund. (4) If the government has just regained access to the financial
market and was using the standby facility, it can also choose to default on the bailout fund.
(5) If the government has access to the financial market and it has inherited international
liability bt−1 but was not using the standby facility, it chooses between not using the fund,
starting to use the fund, defaulting on the international debt but not using the fund, as
well as defaulting and starting to use the fund. Finally, (6) If the government has access
to the financial market and has inherited international liability bt−1 but has to pay back
last period’s standby facility, it chooses between exiting the standby facility, rolling over
the fund, defaulting on the international debt, payback and exiting the emergency fund,
defaulting on the international debt and rolling over the standby facility or defaulting on all
liabilities. The four value functions are determined by the following maximization problem
of the government
21As the government has zero external obligation, in this case, default is not a relevant option.
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V d,nofund(zt) = u(ct, h
D
t ) + β Et
{
θmax
[
V˜ r,nofund(0, 0, zt+1), V˜
r,fund(0, 0, zt+1)− κ
]
+ (1− θ) max
[
V˜ d,fund(0, zt+1)− κ, V˜ d,nofund(0, zt+1)
]}
and ct + (1 + r
b)bˇt−1 = y˜Dt
V d,fund(bˇt−1, zt) = u(ct, hDt ) + β Et
{
θmax
[
V˜ r,nofund(0, b¯, zt+1), V˜
r,fund(0, b¯, zt+1),
V˜ d(zt+1)
]
+ (1− θ) max
[
V˜ d,nofund(b¯, zt+1), V˜
d,fund(b¯, zt+1), V˜
d(zt+1)
]}
and ct + (1 + r
b)bˇt−1 = y˜Dt + b¯
V r,fund(bt−1, bˇt−1, zt) = max
bt,ct
u(ct, h(bt, zt)) + β Et max
{
V˜ r,nofund(bt, b¯, zt+1),
V˜ r,fund(bt, b¯, zt+1), V˜
d,nofund(b¯, zt+1), V˜
d,fund(b¯, zt+1), V˜
d(zt+1)
}
subject to ct + bt−1 + (1 + rb)b¯ = y˜(bt, zt) + q(bt, zt) bt + bˇt−1
and bt ≤ bt−1
V r,nofund(bt−1, bˇt−1, zt) = max
bt,ct
u(ct, h(bt, zt)) + β Et max
{
V˜ r,nofund(bt, 0, zt+1),
V˜ r,fund(bt, 0, zt+1)− κ, V˜ d,nofund(0, zt+1), V˜ d,fund(0, zt+1)− κ
}
subject to ct + bt−1 + (1 + rb)b¯ = y˜(bt, zt) + q(bt, zt) bt
The bond price schedule is again defined analogously to (3.13) and the next period repayment
probability is the sum of the probability that the government exits the fund and repays the
debt and that of the government rolling over the fund and repaying the international debt.
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3.3 Quantitative analysis
3.3.1 Calibration
I calibrate the quarterly model to Greece starting in 2001Q1 when Greece joined the euro
area and ending in 2012Q1 just before the Greek default.22 Some of the parameter values
are chosen directly, in accordance with the sovereign debt or RBC literature; others are
estimated or calibrated to reflect data moments. The calibration is reported in Table 3.2.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to 1/2 and the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply to 1/2.2 as in Mendoza and Yue (2012). The curvature of the production
function γ is set to 2/3. All these values are consistent with the RBC literature. The world
riskfree interest rate equals the average real 10-year government bond yield of 1.02 (1.005
at quarterly frequency). As the capital stock in the model reflects the one used in the
production process, I calibrate K to the sample average Greek non-residential capital to
GDP ratio of 120%.23 The productivity level is chosen so that the model non-stochastic
steady state output is normalized to one. I assume that after default the government regains
access to the international financial market with a quarterly probability of θ = 0.125. This
implies an average expected duration of exclusion from the financial market of 2 years,
which is consistent with the empirical findings in Gelos, Sahay and Sandleris (2011). Greece
adheres to this pattern in that it issued government bonds on the international markets in
2014 after defaulting in 2012.
φ measures the fraction of working capital that has to be paid in advance of sales. The
parameter is set to target the average ratio of Greek short-term bank loans to domestic
non-financial corporations to GDP (18%).24 The elasticity of capacity utilization costs
concerning the level of utilization ξ, together with the Frisch elasticity of labor, pins
down the degree to which the costs of financial intermediation affect output. I calibrate
this parameter based on the finding in Romer and Romer (2004) that in the U.S. a one
percentage increase in the nominal interest rate leads to a four percentage decrease in
industrial output after two years. The cost parameter δ is calibrated to target an average
22See Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati (2013) for a detailed analyze of the Greek debt restructuring.
23The ratio is calculated based on the capital stock data from Kamps (2006) and the seasonally adjusted
quarterly Greek nominal GDP from the OECD.
24The data on short-term bank loans are from the Bank of Greece. Since this series starts in 2002Q2, the
average is calculated for the period 2002Q2 to 2012Q1. The resulting value of φ is rather high when
compared to Mendoza (2010) and Mendoza and Yue (2012). This reflects the high volume of short-term
loans in the Greek economy. This is also reflected in the M1 to GDP ratios.
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capacity utilization of 75%. Ψ generates an annual depreciation of 8%. The parameters χ
and α measure the magnitude of the sovereign risk spillover into private sector rates: α pins
down how much the private sector financing costs increase when the sovereign bond price
drops by one percent, while χ determines the mean level of the private sector interest rate.
These parameters are calibrated to match the empirical relationship between the Greek
sovereign bond spread and the lending interest rate spread of Greek short-term bank loans
of domestic banks to non-financial corporations. The financial intermediation cost rD is
calibrated to match the same bank lending rate spread in 2012Q2, the quarter when the
Greek government defaulted. Regarding the exogenous productivity process, I assume that
it follows an AR(1) process
log(zt) = (1− ρz) log(z) + ρz log(zt−1) + z,t, with z,t iid∼ N(0, σ2z)
which is approximated by a Markov process following Tauchen (1986). ρz and σz are
calibrated in accordance with King and Rebelo (1999), who estimate the productivity
process in the U.S. using a model with indivisible labor and variable capacity utilization.
The remaining two parameters, the time discount factor β and the scale parameter of
the distribution of the political default costs ψ are calibrated so that the model generates
statistics that match the average Greek government bond spread of 2.67% and its standard
deviation of 5.08% as observed in the data.25 The model is solved numerically by iteratively
finding the nonlinear policy functions that satisfy the first order conditions as well as other
equilibrium conditions in each of the setups. The policy functions are approximated using
100 grid points with linear interpolation between them on the dimension of the bond holding
(or promised utility) and 13 grid points on the dimension of productivity states.
25The Greek government bond spread is calculated as the difference between the yields on 10-year Greek
government bonds and that of the 10-year German government bonds. Both data series are available from
the OECD.
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Table 3.2: Calibration
Baseline model parameters Value Targeted statistics
Intertemporal elasticity of 1/σ 1/2 standard RBC values
substitution
Frisch elasticity of υ 1/2.2 Frisch wage elasticity (2.2) (Mendoza and Yue, 2012)
labor supply
Labor share in production γ 2/3 standard RBC values
Riskfree interest rate 1 + r 1.005 average 10Y German government bond yields
Capital stock K 4.8 Greek private nonresidential capital/GDP ratio 1.2
Reentry probability θ 0.125 average length of market exclusion after default
of 2 years (Gelos et al. (2011))
Working capital parameter φ 0.95 Greek short term bank loan to domestic nonfinancial
corporations to GDP 18% (02’Q2-12’Q2)
Utilization cost parameter ξ -0.316 1% increase in r associated
with 4% drop in output (Romer and Romer (2004))
Utilization cost parameter Ψ -0.001 annual depreciation 8% at avg. capacity utilization
Utilization cost parameter δ 0.017 average Greek industry capacity utilization 75%
Risk spillover parameter α 0.18 relation of the ST lending rate spread of bank loans
Risk spillover parameter χ 1.005 to domestic non-fin. corporations and the sov. spread
Intermediation costs in rd 0.019 Greek ST bank lending rate spread of bank loans to
default domestic non-financial corporations in 12Q2 600 bps
Mean productivity level z 0.789 average output normalized to 1
Persistence prod. shock ρz 0.99 King and Rebelo (1999)
Sd. prod. shock σz 0.001 King and Rebelo (1999)
Targets from data
Time discount factor β 0.962 average Greek govt bond spread 2.67%
Scale parameter distribution ψ 0.06 standard deviation of Greek gov. bond spread 5.08%
of political default costs 
3.3.2 Quantitative performance of the baseline model
In this section, I examine the model’s quantitative performance. First, I compare the
business cycle statistics generated by the baseline model with the data, then I study the
ability of the model to match macroeconomic dynamics around default events. Table 3.3
shows the data statistics (columns (I)) and the baseline model statistics (columns (II)). The
model moments are (sample) averages calculated by simulating the economy 5,000 times
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using productivity sequences drawn from the productivity distribution. To be consistent
with the Greek pre-default sample, I only use the 45 observations prior to default events
in each simulation to calculate mean statistics.26 Considering the targeted statistics, the
baseline model generates a 2.99% government bond spread, close to the 2.67% spread
observable in the data. The model standard deviation of the government bond spread is
4.36%, slightly below the volatility observed in the data for the sample period 5.08%.
In the table, I also report data and model statistics that are not targeted in the
calibration but that are often reported in the sovereign default literature. The external debt
data are from the Bank of Greece, and it consists of debt securities held by foreigners.27
The GDP and trade balance, as well as the ’hours worked’ data are from the OECD. The
data for the capacity utilization are also from OECD and based on the Business Tendency
Survey covering the Greek manufacturing sector. The debt-to-output ratio generated by the
model is 4.58%. As in other sovereign default models with short-term debt, the model has
difficulty to generate an external-debt-to-output ratio as high as that observed in Greece.
However, as the model features only short-term debt, it would exaggerate the short-term
refinancing need if we compare the model to the total external sovereign debt-to-output
ratio. Over the sample period, the Greek external-debt-to-output ratio averaged at 51.6%
and on average 9.9% of the total outstanding external debt is due within the next year.28
This implies a Greek average short-term debt-to-GDP ratio of 5.11%, comparable to the
debt-to-output ratio in the model. On the production side, the model generates volatility
in log(output) that is close to that in the data but understates the persistence. The model
can reasonably well capture the correlations between output and the government bond
spread, the trade balance, labor, as well as the level of capacity utilization. Furthermore,
the model generates correlations between government bond spread and the trade balance,
labor, as well as the level of capacity utilization closed to the data.
Evidently, the model does a good job of predicting the cyclical co-movements. It is
also able to match the dynamics of the main variables around default events. As the main
benefits of the risk sharing arrangement come from the avoidance of severe recessions, I
2645 quarters corresponds to the length of the Greek sample from 2001Q1 to 2012Q1. Time series from the
simulation are processed in the same way as the empirical time series. To limit the results’ dependence on
initial conditions, I discarded the first 30 observations.
27Before the default in 2012Q2, the majority of Greek external debt was in the form of debt securities. This
changes after the default and the second bailout package, as the bailout program counts as a loan.
28This is based on data on Greece’s central government debt (maturing within one year) from the Bank of
International Settlement.
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Table 3.3: Statistical moments: model vs. data
(I) (II)
Targeted statistics Data Baseline model
Govt. bond spread (%) 2.67 2.99
Standard deviation of govt. bond spread (%) 5.08 4.36
Non-targeted statistics
Short term debt to output ratio (%) 5.11 4.58
Persistence log(output) 0.88 0.71
Standard deviation of log(output) 5.86 5.74
Correlation with log output
govt bond spread - 0.92 - 0.57
trade balance - 0.76 - 0.44
labor 0.68 0.72
capacity utilization 0.74 0.71
Correlation with govt bond spread
trade balance 0.71 0.52
labor - 0.56 - 0.52
capacity utilization - 0.77 - 0.51
Note: All data statistics are calculated for the period from 2001Q1 to 2010Q1 (45 quarters), except for
output. The log(output) statistics are calculated on the basis of the linearly detrended log real GDP series
for Greece from 1980Q1 - 2010Q1. Trade balance is defined as net export as percentage of GDP. All model
statistics are (average) statistics based on the 45 pre-default observations obtained from 5,000 stochastic
simulations (see text).
check whether the model generates recessions of the magnitude observed in Greece during
its debt crisis. Figure 3.1 shows the model’s average path around default events and depicts
the simulated time series of the linearly detrended logarithm of output, debt-to-output ratio,
annualized government bond spreads, domestic costs of financial intermediation, labor, and
capacity utilization. The average path is calculated as the sample mean of 5,000 simulations
underlying the previous model statistics. The figure plots the event window covering 24
quarters before and 12 quarters after a default. For comparison, the figure also shows the
Greek data around the 2012Q2 default, from 2007Q2 to 2014Q4 (dashed lines).
The model output and labor show a strong resemblance to the Greek data before the
2012 default. Noteworthy, the model features gradual drops in output and labor before
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Figure 3.1: Model dynamics around default events
Note: Model simulations are time series averages of stochastic simulations, in which a default was observed.
The horizontal axis shows the quarters before (-) and after (+) a default. Log(output) is linearly detrended.
The government bond spread and private sector spreads are annualized. Log(capacity utilization) and labor
are indices with t = −24 normalized to zero or one. Data of electricity consumption are linearly interpolated
based on annual data available at the World Bank.
default events as observed in the data.29 The model is also able to generate a strong
increase in the government bond spread and, by construction, a jump in the private sector
cost of financial intermediation. However, the matching of the debt-to-output ratio is less
satisfactory. The model features only a small accumulation of debt and has a debt-to-output
ratio that peaks around default events. In Greece, the debt ratio had a much larger increase
before 2010 and the ratio started to decline in 2010Q3, just after Greece received its first
29This also poses a strong resemblance to the data of defaults also in other countries (see for example
Mendoza and Yue, 2012).
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bailout package.
Finally, the model generates a severe drop in capacity utilization. This drop is much
larger than the drop in the capacity utilization time series based on the Business Tendency
Survey conducted for the manufacturing sector. However, the model matches better an
alternative proxy for capital utilization that is commonly used – electricity consumption.30
The electricity utilization series suggest that economy-wide capacity utilization in Greece
during the crisis has indeed declined substantially. The discrepancy between the man-
ufacturing business survey data and the electricity utilization data most likely reflects
sectoral performance differences within the Greek economy during the crisis. The Greek
manufacturing sector was only one among the sectors hit hard by the debt crisis.31 I
deem the electricity utilization data the more relevant series here, because it better reflects
economy-wide capacity utilization.32
3.3.3 Impact of the optimal risk sharing scheme and the standby facility
Equipped with the calibrated model I now proceed to analyze the welfare effects of
the two different interregional risk sharing arrangements: (1) the optimal transfer scheme
and (2) the standby facility. In particular, I analyze whether such forms of international
insurance are welfare improving, and if so, by how much the optimal insurance scheme is
superior to the simpler and politically more feasible standby facility.
Table 3.4 compares the business cycle statistics of the baseline model without interna-
tional insurance with the business cycle statistics of the models with the two international
insurance schemes. The statistics are calculated as sample averages of 100,000 stochastic
simulations, each with 45 observations, which may include periods where the government
does not have access to the international market.33 Including the default states allows
the statistics to reflect the role of the risk sharing arrangement on default frequency. It is
30Examples of other papers using electricity consumption as a proxy for capacity utilization are King and
Rebelo (1999) and Gertler et al. (2007) and the references therein. The data is available at the World
Bank at an annual frequency.
31Between 2007 and 2014, Greece has also seen a large drop in real gross value added in construction, sales,
transports, and services sectors, which together account for more than 50% of the economy-wide drop in
gross value added.
32Both the manufacturing capacity utilization and the (detrended) electricity consumption in Greece was
stable until the onset of the global crisis in 2007, after which electricity consumption has shown a larger
decrease than the manufacturing capacity utilization.
33The underlying productivity sequences are identical for each of the designs. To limit the results’ dependence
on initial conditions, I discarded the first 30 observations.
136
3.3. Quantitative analysis
assumed that the insurance schemes are introduced in the first period of the simulation
(t = 0). In this period the government still has access to the international financial market.
While the starting point for the standby facility is thus defined, the initial conditions of
the optimal contract are not. The optimal contract as characterized by J(v0; b−1, z0) traces
out the Pareto frontier for the small open economy and the rest of the currency union.
However, it is silent about the initial value v0.
34 Some constraints need to be satisfied to
ensure that all parties are indeed willing to enter into the optimal risk sharing arrangement:
(1) the regional government should not be worse of, in welfare terms, under the contract
than in the baseline setup without the contract, i.e. v0 ≥ V r(b−1, zt). (2) The optimal
contract is not associated with net transfers, i.e. the contract has an initial net present
value that at least breaks even J(v0, b−1, zt) ≥ 0. This means that the risk sharing scheme,
in expectation, constitutes no extra burden to the taxpayers in other member states of the
currency union. Within the euro area context, this is a feature of international insurance
commonly demanded by creditor countries. As a shortcut to the explicit modeling of
the complex and multidimensional bargaining process between member states, I set the
initial conditions of the contract in such a way that it exactly breaks even, i.e. J = 0.35
Analogously, the interest rate on the standby facility rb is set in such a way that on average
the discounted net cash flow to the standby facility equals zero. In other words, despite
the possibility of the regional government defaulting on the standby facility, in expectation,
this does not represent a net transfer from other member states.
The baseline model (column I) is compared to the setup with the optimal insurance
scheme featuring productivity-state-contingent transfers and repayments (column II). The
level of output under the optimal insurance scheme exceeds the level of output in the
baseline model without international insurance by 1.5%. Also, the standard deviation of
output is reduced from 7.04% to 5.79% – an 18% decrease. Relatedly, the default probability
under the optimal insurance is substantially lower when the optimal international insurance
scheme is in place. As the optimal insurance scheme reduces default probability, it weakens
the asymmetric amplification of negative shocks through the sovereign risk spillover channel.
34Per assumption the government repays the maturing debt b−1 to the international private creditors at the
time of the introduction of the insurance scheme.
35Results for the case in which vd0 = V
r(b−1, zt) are very similar. This is because, as is typical in the context
of optimal contracts with one-sided no-commitment, promised utility converges over time. The intuition
has been described as amnesia in the literature: because the government can always walk away from the
contract, whenever it has a good outside option, the planner also has to offer an attractive promised utility
to prevent default, leading to the convergence of promised utility over time. See for example Kocherlakota
(1996) and Aguiar and Amador (2014).
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As a result, the average output during recessions increases from 0.92 to 0.96 by about 4%.
Here, I define a recession as observations with a productivity level below trend. Furthermore,
the level of consumption is higher under optimal insurance, and its standard deviation
is lower. All in all, the optimal insurance scheme improves households’ welfare over the
non-insurance baseline by 0.96% in terms of certainty equivalent consumption.36
Table 3.4: Statistical moment: baseline model vs. insurance schemes
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Average statistics Optimal Standby facility
Baseline transfer low κ high κ high b¯
Output 1.02 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04
Standard deviation of output (%) 7.04 5.80 5.86 6.48 5.83
Average output in recessions 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Consumption 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Standard deviation of consumption (%) 6.84 4.67 5.75 6.52 5.71
Probability of default (% per year) 2.06 0.02 0.03 1.88 0.03
Time in bailout (%) - - 64.01 2.75 62.62
Welfare improvement (%) 0.96 0.74 0.64 0.51
All statistics calculated as average statistics of 100,000 stochastic simulation. Each simulation episode has 45
observations. Average output with productivity below trend are the sample average of output observations
where the productivity level z is below its mean. Welfare improvements under the interregional transfers are
expressed as percentage changes in the certainty equivalent consumption compared to the baseline model,
where the labor level is assumed to be the baseline average level. Low κ: κ = 0.2, b¯ = 50% of average debt.
High κ: κ = 0.6, b¯ = 50% of average debt. high b¯: κ = 0.2, b¯ = 70% of average debt.
How does the optimal insurance scheme compare to the politically more feasible standby
facility? In general, the standby facility achieves welfare gains that come surprisingly close
to the welfare gains of the optimal insurance scheme (see columns III to V). The impact of
the standby facility depends on the several parameters that characterize its design, including
36I compare the certainty equivalent consumption while assuming the labor is kept at its average level in
the baseline model. The certainty equivalent consumption level c¯ is one that solves V = ((c¯− h¯1+υ/(1 +
υ))1−σ − 1)/(1− σ), where h¯ is set to the baseline average. The welfare effect is calculated by comparing
the average value function value of the households of the regional economy (e.g. V r) and the political
costs does not affect this comparison because they average at zero.
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the amount of funds available (b¯), and the political costs (κ). To gauge how these features
affect the role of the standby facility, I examine three different cases. Columns (III) and
(IV) display the results for the scenarios when the amount of funds available is 50% of the
average debt level in the baseline model. This is comparable to the size of the first Greek
bailout in 2010. The low κ scenario assumes a low political cost of bailout fund access, while
the high κ scenario assumes a high political cost. Column (V) shows the results for the
case when the amount of funds is higher at 75% of the average debt level and the political
cost of starting to use the standby facility is low. As expected, the high and low political
cost scenarios differ in the frequency that the government makes use of the standby facility.
In the two scenarios with a lower political cost “low κ”, the government is using the facility
in more than 60% of the observations.37 A higher political cost – “high κ” – reduces this to
only about 3% of all observations. Despite the different amount of funds available under
the standby facility, and the different frequency that the regional government makes use
of it, the impact of the standby facilities on output and consumption is similar, and all of
them are associated with sizable welfare improvements.
The benefit of international risk sharing comes in two dimensions. First, it helps to
smooth consumption – the traditional channel of insurance. More importantly, it reduces
the asymmetric impact of productivity shocks and increases the average output in two
related ways. It reduces the frequency of defaults and in doing so avoids the economic
costs associated with default. Furthermore, also in nondefault states, the risk sharing
arrangement reduces the role of sovereign risk spillovers in amplifying negative productivity
shocks and thus helps to avoid large recessions. The latter effect is responsible for the major
part of the welfare improvement. The standby facility, which is redundant except when
the economy is facing large negative shocks, has a much more limited capacity to smooth
consumption compared to the optimal risk sharing scheme. Nevertheless, its welfare impact
is comparable to that of the optimal scheme, as it is capable of reducing the frequency of
severe recessions and thus increasing the overall output level. Even in the case when the
regional government only rarely uses the emergency fund due to high political costs, the
standby facility is capable of delivering a welfare benefit of 0.64%.
37This also implies that the fiscal constraint is not very effective in reducing the government’s incentive to
make use of the facility.
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3.4 Conclusion
This paper has examined interregional risk sharing arrangements in a currency union
whose member states are afflicted with sovereign default risk that spills over into private
sector financing costs. This spillover effect amplifies the recessionary impetus of negative
shocks to the economy precisely when sovereign risk spreads are high and it is costly for
the local government to access international financial markets. In such an environment
international insurance can have a sizable and positive welfare effect because it counteracts
the asymmetric impact of shocks on sovereign default risks and thereby lifts the average
level of output.
Importantly, I show that a large part of the positive welfare effects of the optimal risk
sharing scheme can be obtained through a simple standby facility. Although it is redundant
except when the economy is facing large negative shocks and thus its capacity to smooth
consumption is limited, the standby facility is still capable of reducing the frequency of
severe recessions and thereby increasing the overall output level. The optimal insurance
scheme allows for some extra consumption smoothing on top of that. However, the welfare
benefits due to the extra consumption smoothing are relatively small compared to the
welfare benefits that derive from lowering the asymmetric risk of severe recessions. The
finding that a simple emergency fund can reap most of the benefits of the optimal insurance
scheme is of practical relevance because whenever international insurance schemes are
discussed between sovereign nation states the willingness to part with fiscal autonomy is
often severely limited.
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Sovereign Risk Spillover and Monetary Policy in a
Currency Union
4.1 Introduction
The euro area debt crisis was marked by a change of dynamics. Before 2010, movements
in bank interest rates were synchronized across the currency union; since 2010 asymmetric
sovereign risk has gained the determinant role in driving regional interest rates. As worries
about government solvency intensified, sovereigns in the periphery faced much higher
financing costs than those in the core region. The increased sovereign default risk in the
periphery resulted in significant stress on local banks that had invested in their government
debts. This, in turn, led to an increase in the regional bank lending rates to the private
sector as well as diverging development in private financing conditions from the union’s
perspective.1
It is particularly interesting against the backdrop of the euro area debt crisis to study the
impact of sovereign risk spillover on monetary policy. The comovement between sovereign
and private borrowing rates distorts the monetary policy transmission in the periphery but
to a lesser extent in the core region. As part of a currency union, this regional dispersion
cannot be addressed by country-specific monetary policy but instead adds to the challenge
facing the single monetary authority, the European Central Bank (ECB).2 Even if spreads
on public debt have subdued, the persistent high debt level in parts of the euro area implies
that sovereign default risk stays relevant.
What consequences does the linkage between sovereign risk and private sector financing
1See, for example, (Committee on the Global Financial System, 2011).
2Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, has commented on 15 November 2012 that the sovereign crisis “[...]
has made difficult the transmission of impulses coming from an accommodative monetary policy through
adjustments in interest rates on loans to households and firms by banks. [...] The fragmentation of the
single financial market has led to a fragmentation of the single monetary policy.”
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costs have for the effects of economic shocks? And what impact does the sovereign risk
spillover have for optimal monetary policy in a currency union? This paper aims to answer
the two questions using a currency union model featuring sovereign risk spillover to private
sector financing costs.
The theoretical framework is an extension of the two-region New-Keynesian (NK)
model developed in Corsetti, Kuester, Meier and Mu¨ller (2014). In the model, households’
borrowings and deposits are channeled through financial intermediaries. Due to financial
frictions, private sector borrowing costs exceed the deposit interest rate – the risk-free
rate – by a positive spread. On the government side, borrowings can be defaulted on, and
this default risk raises sovereign risk premia over the risk-free rate. The higher the real
indebtedness of the government, the more probable a sovereign default becomes. Sovereign
default risk further affects private sector financing conditions: an increase in a region’s
sovereign risk premia is associated with an increase in the regional private sector borrowing
spreads. This increase in private sector borrowing costs exerts downward pressure on
inflation and output. As a result, the fiscal strength of the regional government affects
local economic outcomes, which in turn influences the government’s tax revenues, creating a
feedback loop between macroeconomic situation, sovereign default probability, and private
sector financing condition.
The sovereign risk spillover distorts shock transmissions through the working of this
feedback loop. The extent of distortion, in particular, depends on shocks’ effect on the
sovereign default probability. This has three dimensions. First, shocks that increase
a regional government’s real indebtedness, for example by decreasing output (thus tax
revenues) and inflation, now exercise an additional downward pressure on output and
inflation through the feedback loop. Second, the monetary policy and the maturity of
government debts matter. As a shock hits the economy, it triggers a change in the risk-free
policy rate; the magnitude of changes depends on the reaction function of the monetary
authority. Because the government financing costs move with the risk-free rate, a larger
reduction of risk-free rate generates a larger reduction of the government indebtedness.
This, however, also interacts with the maturity structure of the government debt. While
government debts are short term, current changes in interest rate can have a substantial
effect on the government debt level. The impact fades away, as the maturity of government
debt increases. Finally, how much an increase in indebtedness raises default probability
hinges on the initial level of the government indebtedness. This is because sovereign default
probability becomes more sensitive to changes in debt level at a higher level of indebtedness,
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an empirical fact that has been widely documented.3
To quantify the effect of sovereign risk spillover on shock transmissions, I calibrate
the model to the euro area with an average residual maturity of around six years (Lojsch,
Rodriguez-Vives and Slavik, 2011). If the union-wide central bank follows a simple Taylor
rule, the impact of the sovereign risk spillover is negligible for most of the shocks. Exceptions
are shocks that directly affect government indebtedness or sovereign debt risk premia – these
shocks would not have had any effect if not due to the sovereign risk channel. Assuming
short-term debt would, however, exaggerates the impact of the spillover on the transmission
of all shocks.
As already pointed out in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2016), a spread between interest
rates available to borrowers and savers can have welfare consequences. As mentioned
before, the existence of spreads can alter the shock transmissions, leading output and
inflation further away from its efficient level. Moreover, movements in spread also prevent
the relative consumption of borrowers and savers from reaching its efficient level, leading
to a distributional efficiency. Finally, in a two-region currency union with asymmetrical
spreads, from the difference between regions emerges an additional dimension of cross-region
distributional efficiency that cannot be addressed with a monetary policy tailored to each
of the regions. As a result, the theoretical welfare-loss function of the currency union now
comprises of four gaps – output, inflation, average union-wide private sector spreads, and
the relative spread between regions – each measured as the (squared) distance to their
respective efficient levels.
Optimal monetary policy needs to strike the right balance between minimizing these
gaps. To provide analytical insights into how optimal monetary policy is affected by the
sovereign risk spillover, I derive an optimal target criterion for a simplified version of the
model. The target criterion shows that when facing positive spreads, the central bank
should tolerate a higher level of output and inflation than absent the sovereign risk to
reduce sovereign indebtedness and the distributional inefficiency. Moreover, in the currency
union setup, the central bank should act more expansionary if the region experiencing high
spreads is also one that has a higher government debt level. This helps to counteract the
cross-region distributional inefficiency.
But what is the quantitative implication for optimal monetary policy? In a numerical
3See, among others, Alesina, De Broeck, Prati and Tabellini (1992) and Corsetti, Kuester, Meier and
Mu¨ller (2013) for empirical evidence on the nonlinearity between sovereign risk premia and government
indebtedness.
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exercise under the euro area calibration, I show that optimal monetary policy can be
well-approximated by the NK-target criterion that describes the optimal linear relation
between inflation and output gap in the standard NK model without credit spreads. A
target criterion augmented with reactions to private sector spreads can bring the economy
closer to the optimum. But, room for improvement is limited compared to the standard
NK-target criterion.
If government debts were short-term, however, optimal monetary policy requires a
much larger initial reaction to shocks then the (augmented-) target criterion prescribes.
With short-term debts, the current changes in interest rate can have a large impact on
the sovereign debt level. It is thus desirable to tolerate an initial larger output gap and
inflation, for the sake of a large level effect on debt, the benefit from which persists into the
future. With an average maturity of six years, as it is in the euro area, the simple target
criterion continues to provide a good approximation of optimal policy.
This result is very similar to the findings of Cu´rdia and Woodford (2016). In a closed
economy where private sector spreads are driven by private sector indebtedness, they also
find that the simple target criterion still provides a fairly good approximation to optimal
policy. Thus they conclude, it is not necessary to adjust the target criterion according to
the extent of credit frictions.4 My finding complements to Cu´rdia and Woodford (2016)
in two folds. First, irrespective of the drivers of the spreads, be it private or public sector
indebtedness, the simple target criterion continues to be desirable. Second, this continues
to be the case even when spreads are asymmetric between regions. The central bank,
when pursuing this flexible targeting, should however take into account the effects of credit
frictions and sovereign risk spillovers on the shock transmissions, as these affect the path of
output and inflation.
The findings from this paper also highlight the capacity of interest rate policy to stabilize
sovereign risk and its effect on the economy. Under plausible calibration, sovereign risk
spillover has a limited macroeconomic effect as long as interest rate can adjust. The situation
when the policy rate is constrained at the zero lower bound, which is the case in the euro
area since 2012, can pose a larger challenge. As the sovereign risk premia can no longer be
reined in with expansionary monetary policy, the sovereign risk spillover can contribute
to the amplification of recessionary shocks. In fact, in a closed economy setup, Corsetti
4Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010) use the same theoretical framework and show that while an adjustment for
credit spreads improves upon the Taylor rule, the extent of adjustment varies on the source of exogenous
disturbances.
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et al. (2013) find that, with the policy rate at zero, sovereign risk spillover exacerbates
indeterminacy problem and affects macroeconomic stability. In another paper, Corsetti
et al. (2014) show that in a currency union, sovereign risk in one region combined with
strongly procyclical fiscal policy at the aggregate level exacerbates the risk of belief-driven
deflationary downturns.
Besides the papers just mentioned, this paper is related to the growing literature that
examines the sovereign-private sector linkage. On the empirical side, for example, evidence
for the spillover is presented by Neri (2013), and International Monetary Fund (2013).5 On
the theoretical front, Bocola (2016) provides a microfoundation of sovereign risk spillovers.
He points out that not only do banks with exposure to government debts suffer losses when
the bond price drops; increasing sovereign default risk also generates a precautionary motive
for the banks to deleverage.
This paper also builds on the literature that studies monetary policy in an environment
with credit spreads, including Cu´rdia and Woodford (2016, 2010), Goodfriend and McCallum
(2007), as well as De Fiore and Tristani (2011). Bhattarai, Lee and Park (2015) extend the
Cu´rdia and Woodford (2016) analysis to a currency union setup. They find that optimal
monetary policy should aggressively decrease the policy rate in response to a financial shock
to reduce aggregate and distributional inefficiency.
This paper complements their contribution in two aspects. First, this paper focuses on
the spillover from sovereign default risk to private sector spreads. As the source of spread
variations – private or public sector debt – have different implication for shock transmissions,
given the prominent role of sovereign risk in the euro area debt crisis, it is of interest to also
examine how spreads driven by the public sector influence monetary policy. Second, while
the three papers all feature one-period debt, the current analysis highlights the importance
of the debt maturity structure in shaping how financial frictions affect shock transmissions
and monetary policy.
The remaining paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the model framework;
Section 3 investigates the impact of sovereign risk spillover on shock transmissions, followed
by an analysis of optimal monetary policy in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
5See also Lane (2012) for a description on the evolution of the European debt crisis and the interaction
between the sovereign debt crisis and the banking crisis.
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4.2 The model framework
The theoretical framework builds on the currency union model in Corsetti et al. (2014).
It features two regions – Home and Foreign. There are households, firms and a local
government in each of the region, and a single central bank at the union level.
In the following, I will shortly outline the model and thereby focus mainly on the Home
region. The economy in the Foreign region is analogous. Foreign variables are distinguished
from Home by an asterisk, and union-wide variables are indexed by a bar. Unless noted
otherwise, variables are expressed in per capita terms (of the local population). A full list
of equations is provided in Appendix 4.A.1.
Households
The currency union has a continuum of households of mass one. Households can have
the preference types s or b. Each period, a share of household (1− δ) ∈ (0, 1) is randomly
drawn to change their region of residence and type. These households are assigned to
Home with a probability of θ ∈ (0, 1) and Foreign with a probability of 1− θ. After being
relocated, households have a probability of pis to be endowed with a type s preference and
a probability of pib = 1− pis to have a type b preference.
Let τ ∈ {s, b} stand for the preference type. Each household maximizes its expected
discounted utility of consumption cτ,t and labor supply hτ,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ξτ
c1−στ,t
1− σ − ψτ
h1+vτ,t
1 + v
]
subject to a flow budget constraint. E is the mathematical expectation, β ∈ (0, 1) is the
intertemporal discount factor, σ > 0 the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
v > 0 the inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The difference in preference is reflected
in ξb > ξs. This difference generates a role for financial intermediaries, and in equilibrium,
every household of type s is a saver while type b households are borrowers.
Household consumption is a composite good of Home and Foreign goods-bundle (cH,t
and cF,t):
ct =
cθH,tc
1−θ
F,t
θθ(1− θ)1−θ .
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Each goods-bundle itself is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of differentiated goods produced by
local firm j, with j ∈ [0, θ) located in Home and j ∈ [θ, 1] in Foreign:
cH,t =
(1
θ
)
1
µ
θ∫
0
cH,t(j)
µ−1
µ dj

µ
µ−1
, cF,t =
( 1
1− θ )
1
µ
1∫
θ
cF,t(j)
µ−1
µ dj

µ
µ−1
.
µ > 1 denotes the price elasticity of substitution. Law of one price applies at the individual
goods level, thus the consumer price index for both Home and Foreign households is given
by
Pt = P
∗
t = P
θ
H,tP
1−θ
F,t ,
where PH,t(j) and PF,t(j) are the prices for cH,t(j) and cF,t(j) respectively:
PH,t =
1
θ
θ∫
0
PH,t(j)
1−µdj

1
1−µ
, PF,t =
 1
1− θ
1∫
θ
PF,t(j)
1−µdj

1
1−µ
.
All households have access to financial intermediaries. Households can save at the
financial intermediaries by purchasing one-period risk-free discount bonds at the price qt,
which equals to the inverse of the risk-free policy rate set by the central bank. Households
can also take up one-period loans from the financial intermediaries. The loans require a
nominal repayment of one unit at maturity and have the prices qbt for Home borrowers and
qb∗t for Foreign borrowers.
An alternative investment option for the households is local government debts, which are
priced at qgt for Home government or q
g∗
t for Foreign. Different from Corsetti et al. (2014),
I model the government debt as a long-term bond. Following Chatterjee and Eyigungor
(2012), it is assumed that each period, a randomly drawn fraction η of the outstanding
government bonds matures. The non-maturing government bonds pay out a coupon r (on
the face value). Investments in government bonds are subject to default risk. At the very
beginning of period t, before the selection of households to change types/locations, the local
government defaults on its bonds with some probability pt (described in more detail below).
If it defaults, there is a haircut of ϑ ∈ [0, 1]. It is assumed that the governments cannot
discriminate between the maturing and the non-maturing bonds so that when a default
happens, the haircut will apply to all payments as well as the nominal value of the remaining
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bonds. The defaulting government makes a lump-sum transfer T ct to its bondholders, and
the transfer equals to the defaulted amount.6 Let Bgt−1 denote the total face value of
government at the beginning of the period, then T ct = ϑB
g
t−1 [(1− η) qgt + η + (1− η) r].
To keep the model tractable, I follow Corsetti et al. (2013, 2014) and assume that after
the possible type/location changes but before households’ consumption and work decision,
they join a large family with other households of the same type and same region. They
pool their assets within the family. Thus all households of a particular type and location
have the same marginal utility of income.7
Let Bt represent the face value of the one-period loan borrowed in period t and maturing
in period t+ 1 and St the face value of risk-free discount bonds. The combined nominal
wealth As−t of Home type s households just before the selection of type/location changing
households is
As−t = St−1 + (1− ϑt)Bgt−1 [(1− η)(qgt + r) + η] + T ct
with ϑt = ϑ in the case of default, B
g
t−1(1−η)(qgt +r) the coupon payment and market value
of the non-maturing government bonds and Bgt−1η the repayment of maturing government
bonds. The combined nominal wealth of Home type b households is
Ab−t = Bt−1.
Let A+t denote the per capita wealth of households that have been selected to change
type/location, then A†t = θ(A
s−
t +A
b−
t ) + (1− θ)(As−t ∗ +Ab−t
∗
).
The flow budget constraint of Home type s household is
St qt +B
g
t q
g
t = δ
[
St−1 +B
g
t−1 [(1− η)(qgt + r) + η]
]
+ pis(1− δ)A†t − pisXs,t
with Xs,t = Ptcs,t − wtPths,t −DfH,t −Dintt + T gt denoting the per capita net expenditure.
wt is the Home real wage level, D
f
H,t are dividends paid by Home firms to Home households,
Dintt = θ(St qt−Bt qbt ) + (1− θ)(S∗t qt−B∗t qb∗t ) are dividends paid by international financial
6This assumption, while not affecting individual households’ portfolio decision, allows the model to abstract
from consequences of defaults on the debt level, and instead focus on how sovereign default risks affect
returns on government bonds, which in turn influence private-sector spreads.
7This helps to reduce the dimension concerning heterogeneity of households to the four types and avoid the
necessity to keep track of the history of moving.
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intermediaries to Home household and finally, T gt denotes taxes paid to Home government.
All DfH,t, D
int
t and T
g
t are paid in lump-sum fashion. Similarly, the budget constraint of
Home borrower household is
Bt q
b
t = δBt−1 − pib(1− δ)A†t + pibXb,t
with Xb,t = Ptcb,t − wtPthb,t −DfH,t −Dintt + T gt .
Let λτ,t denote the marginal utility of income, the optimizing behavior of the Home
households further yields the following Euler equations:
qt = β Et
{
δλs,t+1 + (1− δ)λ¯t+1
λs,t Πt+1
}
,
qgt = β Et
{
(1− ϑpt+1)
[
η + (1− η)(r + qgt+1)
] δλs,t+1 + (1− δ)λ¯t+1
λs,t Πt+1
}
,
qbt = β Et
{
δλb,t+1 + (1− δ)λ¯t+1
λb,t Πt+1
}
with the gross inflation rate Πt+1 = Pt+1/Pt and the average marginal utility of income
λ¯t = θ(pibλb,t + pisλs,t) + (1− θ)(pibλ∗b,t + pisλ∗s,t).
Firms
A continuum of firms in Home and Foreign produce differentiated goods. Firm j
produces with local labor ht and a linear production technology yt(j) = ztht(j). zt is the
region-specific technology level. Firms are subject to monopolistic competition and sticky
prices as in Calvo (1983). In each period, a fraction (1− α) of they may re-optimize their
prices, and they set the new prices to maximize expected discounted profits. The rest of
the firms increase their prices by the steady state rate of inflation Π.
Financial intermediaries
Financial intermediaries in the currency union are perfectly competitive. They collect
deposits from both savers from Home and Foreign at the price qt and lend to Home borrowers
at the price qbt and Foreign borrowers at the price q
b∗
t . It is assumed that borrowings are
associated with a higher interest rate than deposits, resulting in region-specific non-negative
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interest spreads:8
1 + ωt = qt/q
b
t ≥ 0, 1 + ω∗t = qt/qb∗t ≥ 0.
Financial intermediaries collect the largest quantity of deposits that can be repaid with
the proceeds from the loans. This means that the private saving and lending have to satisfy
the following union-wide condition:
θSpt + (1− θ)Sp∗t = θBt + (1− θ)B∗t .
As a result, the beginning of period wealth can be written as
A†t = θB
g
t−1 [(1− η)(qgt + r) + η] + (1− θ)Bg∗t−1
[
(1− η)(qg∗t + r∗) + η
]
.
Government and the sovereign risk spillover
Governments each carry out their own fiscal policy: they consume the composite good
(gt or g
∗
t ), collect lump-sum taxes (T
g
t or T
g∗
t ) from local households and finance the deficits
with government bonds (Bgt or B
g∗
t ). Each period a fraction η of the outstanding government
bonds mature while the remaining government bonds pay out a coupon r. The average
maturity of the government bonds is 1/η, and the one-period bond case is nested in the
model as the special case of η = 1.
At the beginning of each period before the type changes play out, governments may
choose to default but cannot discriminate between the maturing and the remaining debt. As
described before, in case of default the defaulted amount of government bonds is returned
in lump-sum fashion to bond holders. It follows that Home government’s budget constraint
in per capita terms satisfies
[
Bgt − (1− η)Bgt−1
]
qgt = [η + (1− η) r] Bgt−1 − T gt + Pt gt.
The tax is increasing in output yt and also serves to stabilize government debt level in the
8One way to rationalize the spread is to assume that the issuance of loans is costly. For example in Cu´rdia
and Woodford (2010, 2016) and Corsetti et al. (2013, 2014), a fraction of the issued loans in the Home and
Foreign regions are assumed to be unrecoverable.
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long run
T gt = Pt t
g + φT,yPt yt + φT,bgB
g
t−1,
with φT,y > 0, φT,bg > 0.
The default probability is modeled as a function of the government real debt level bgt .
9
In particular, similar to Corsetti et al. (2013, 2014) I assume that the default probability
pt+1, is determined with a beta-distribution:
pt+1 = Fbeta
(
bgt
4y
1
bg,max
;αbg , βbg
)
where y is the steady state level of total Home output and bg,max the highest debt-to-GDP
ratio that can be supported.
Because of default risks, in equilibrium, returns on government bonds have to be higher
than an otherwise identical but risk-free bond. I calculate this risk premia ωgt using the ratio
of the internal rate of return of government bonds Rgt and the return R
g,rf
t of a fictional risk-
free bond with the same maturity structure and coupon: 1+ωgt = R
g
t /R
g,rf
t . The internal rate
of return of government bonds is pinned down by the relation qgt = [η+(1−η) r]/[Rgt−(1−η]];
the fictional bond’s return is implicitly defined in qg,rft = [η + (1− η) r]/[Rg,rft − (1− η)]
and qg,rft = β Et
{
[η + (1− η)(r + qg.rft+1 )][δλs,t+1 + (1− δ)λ¯t+1]/(λs,t Πt+1)
}
.
To reflect the sovereign risk spillover, it is assumed that the private-sector spreads
between borrowers and savers are influenced by the default risk of governments. In
particular, the Home for example, the private borrowing spread increases with the spread
on the government bonds:
1 + ωt = χψ
(
Rgt
Rg,rft
)αψ
exp(st)
where parameters χψ > 0 and αψ > 0 capture the exposure of a country’s private-sector
funding condition to its sovereign default risk and st is a private sector financial shock.
9The theoretical literature on sovereign default has highlighted the importance of government indebtedness
in determining the default probability. See for example Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano (2008).
While the theory also suggests that output level is crucial in shaping the default decision, the empirical
evidence is weaker Tomz and Wright (2007).
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Goods and labor market clearing
In equilibrium the following market clearing conditions for goods- and labor markets
hold:
yt =
(
PH,t
Pt
)−1[
θ(ct + g) + (1− θ)(c∗t + g∗)
]
,
y∗t =
(
PF,t
Pt
)−1[
θ(ct + g) + (1− θ)(c∗t + g∗)
]
.
yt∆H,t = ztht, ht = pishs,t + pibhb,t,
y∗t∆F,t = z
∗
t h
∗
t , h
∗
t = pish
∗
s,t + pibh
∗
b,t.
∆H,t =
1
θ
∫ θ
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−µ
dj and ∆F,t =
1
1−θ
∫ 1
θ
(
PF,t(j)
PF,t
)−µ
dj are measurements of price
dispersion.
4.3 Sovereign risk spillover and shock transmissions
Before turning to optimal monetary policy, it is useful first to examine how the sovereign
risk spillover affects the economy. For this, I look at the effect of the spillover on different
shock transmissions under a specific monetary policy – the simple Taylor rule.
The model is log-linearized around the efficient steady state.10 The log-linearized model
is first summarized in the following to provide analytical insights into how the sovereign
risk spillover channel affects the otherwise standard New Keynesian model.11 After that,
the model is calibrated to the euro area to quantify the effects.
Regarding notation, unless otherwise noted, xˆt = log(xt/x) is the log-derivation of
variable xt from its steady state value x. Bar indicates union average variables, i.e.,
¯ˆxt = θxˆt + (1 − θ)xˆ∗t . D denotes the difference between Home and Foreign variables:
xˆDt = xˆt − xˆ∗t . Finally, ∆ expresses first differences of variables: ∆xˆt = xˆt − xˆt−1.
10In particular, at the efficient steady state, consumer price inflation equals Π¯ and private sector spreads in
both countries equal zero. More details about the efficient steady state are provided in Appendix 4.A.2.
11The derivation of the equations is provided in Appendix 4.A.4.
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4.3.1 Log-linearized structural relations
The demand side of the model is represented by the union-wide dynamic IS curve. Denote
average output ¯ˆyt, the risk-free short-term policy rate Rˆt = − log(qt/q¯). And define average
government spending shock as ¯˜gt = θ(gt−g¯)+(1−θ)(g∗t −g¯∗), the union-wide average level of
private sector interest spreads as ¯ˆωt = θ log [(1 + ωt)/(1 + ω)]+(1−θ) log [(1 + ω∗t )/(1 + ω∗)].
The dynamic IS curve is
¯ˆyt = Et ¯ˆyt+1 − Et∆¯˜gt+1 (4.1)
− 1
σ
[
(Rˆt + pib ¯ˆωt)− EtΠˆt+1 − SλEt∆¯ˆλR,t+1
]
.
with Sλ = pispib(cs − cb). As in the dynamic IS relation derived in Cu´rdia and Woodford
(2010), the average interest rate (Rˆt + pib ¯ˆωt) now takes the place of the risk-free policy
rate in determining the aggregate demand. Moreover, as the private sector spreads only
apply to borrowers, their variations cause different reactions in savers and borrowers’
consumption, resulting in a wedge between their marginal utility of income
¯ˆ
λR,t = θ(λˆs,t −
λˆb,t) + (1− θ)(λˆ∗s,t − λˆ∗b,t). The relative marginal utility ¯ˆλR,t measures the union-wide level
of distributional inefficiency due to the credit spread and it evolves according to
¯ˆ
λR,t = − ¯ˆωt + δEt ¯ˆλR,t+1. (4.2)
An increase in union-wide average spread in the private sector, which will be reflected
in an increase of
¯ˆ
λR,t < 0 according to (4.2), can be recessionary. This is case when in
steady state savers’ consumption is greater than that of borrowers’ (Sλ > 0 ), as in the
later calibrated exercise.
The aggregate supply side of the model can be summarized in the union-wide Phillips
curve that links the union-wide inflation
¯ˆ
Πt to the union-wide output gap:
Πˆt = βEtΠˆt+1 + κ¯ˆyt + κλ
¯ˆ
λR,t +
κ
v + σ
[
u¯t − (v + 1)¯ˆzt − σ¯˜gt
]
(4.3)
with κ = (1−α)(1−αβ)α (v + σ), κλ =
(1−α)(1−αβ)
α [Sλ + pis(1− hs/h)], and u¯t represent the
average markup shock. The Phillips curve again is a straight forward extension of the
Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010) Phillips curve to an open economy context. It resembles the
traditional New Keynesian Phillips curve but with an additional term that accounts for
the effect of credit spreads. A (union-wide average) positive spread in the private sector is
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deflationary because positive spreads, besides the effect on output, increase the borrowers’
marginal utility of income and thus also increases their incentive to work at a lower wage.
The supply block of the economy is completed with the following equation for the terms
of trade τt = PH,t/PF,t:
∆τˆt = βEt∆τˆt+1 + K
[− (v + 1)τˆt + zpibhbλˆDR,t + uDt − (v + 1)zˆDt ]. (4.4)
The terms of trade is driven by differences in the technology levels and differences in markup
shocks. As a result of credit spreads, it is, in addition, affected by λˆDR,t – the cross-region
difference between savers-borrowers- relative marginal utility. This difference between the
relative marginal utility λˆDR,t is a result of the different level of credit spreads in Home and
Foreign:
λˆDR,t = −ωˆDt + δEtλˆDR,t+1. (4.5)
If a region has a higher credit spread, it borrowers are willing to work at a lower wage than
the other region. This reduces the marginal costs in the region with higher spreads and
thus affects the terms of trade.
Equations (4.1) - (4.5) demonstrate how credit spread is incorporated in an otherwise
standard New Keynesian model of a currency union. The drivers of the spreads, however,
remain to be specified. With the sovereign risk spillover, the private sector spreads (average
and difference) are determined by the sovereign risk premia:
¯ˆωt = αψ[ θωˆ
g
t + (1− θ)ωˆg∗t ] + s¯t, (4.6)
ωˆDt = αψ(ωˆ
g
t − ωˆg∗t ) + sDt , (4.7)
where s¯t is the average, and s
D
t the cross-region difference of the private sector financial
shocks.
The risk premia on the government bonds depend on the public sector indebtedness,
which is described in the following equation:
bˆgt = χg bˆ
g
t−1 − χgΠˆt −
1
bg qg
(φT,yyˆt − g˜t)−
(
1− 1− η
Π
)
qˆgt + 
g
t , (4.8)
with χg = [η+(1−η)(r+qg)−φT,bg ]/(Π qg). The current Home government’s real debt level
is high if it has inherited a high debt level bˆgt−1 from last period. It is also high if current
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inflation Πˆt is low and fiscal deficit (φT,yyˆt− g˜t) is high, or if the government bond price qˆgt is
low. Finally, the indebtedness can be affected by gt , a shock to the government indebtedness.
Sovereign default risks affect the government indebtedness through the government bond
price, and the bond price evolves according to:
qˆgt = −Rˆt +
(1− η)qg
η + (1− η)(r + qg) Etqˆ
g
t+1 −
ϑp
1− ϑp
(
F ′beta
bg
p
bˆgt + 
p
t
)
, (4.9)
where F ′beta is the first derivative of default probability with respect to government debt
and evaluated in steady state and pt is a default probability shock. Absent default risks,
the bond price would be determined by risk-free rate and the expected future bond price
(the first two terms in (4.9)). Default risks, reflected in the last term of the equation, reduce
the bond price.
Finally, the government bond spread is pinned down the following equation.
ωˆgt = (1− η)q
(
Et ωˆgt+1 + χϑpEt qˆ
g
t+1 + ϑp Rˆt
)
(4.10)
+χ
ϑp
1− ϑp
(
F ′beta
bg
p
bˆgt + +
p
t
)
,
where χ =
[
1 − (1 − η)q (1 − ϑp)]. Just like government bond price, the current spread
reflects the expected development of future spread, bond price, and the current risk free
rate. It also increases with government indebtedness. With plausible calibration of the
steady state default probability p – which is normally low for the euro area countries, the
latter effect will be the driving force of the government bond spread.
In the following, I will first describe the model calibration, and then analyze the drivers
of the government debt level and how it depends on the maturity structure of the government
bonds. This will serve as a basis for us to understand the effect of sovereign risk spillover
on the propagation of disturbances in the numerical analysis later in the section.
4.3.2 Model calibration
The model is calibrated to the euro area on a quarterly basis. Most of parameters
are assumed to be the same across regions. The exceptions are their population sizes and
government debt levels. Some parameters are chosen directly, while others are calibrated to
target certain steady state relations. Many parameters are also present in the canonical
version of New Keynesian model or Corsetti et al. (2013, 2014). In these cases, I use values
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from the literature. The calibration is summarized in Table 4.1.
Home corresponds to the core euro area countries and has population θ of two third.
Both regions are assumed to have equal size of savers and borrowers. With δ = 0.95, the
expected time for which households stay the current type is five years, as in Corsetti et al.
(2014).
Turning to household’s utility parameters, the time discount factor β is chosen such
that the steady state risk-free rate equals 4.5% (annualized). The intertemporal elasticity
of substitution takes a value widely assumed in the literature, and the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply is in line with Hall (2009). The scaling parameter of type s households ξs
is normalized to 1. The other scales parameters ξb, ψs and ψb are chosen such that the
average private debt to annual GDP in the currency union amounts to 130%, steady state
labor supplies of the two types of households are equalized, and the steady state output in
Home is normalized to one.
With respect to the firm side, I follow Corsetti et al. (2013) and set the Calvo parameter
at α = 0.925. µ = 7.66 to achieve a gross markup of 1.15, and the steady state inflation is
assumed to be 2% (annualized). The steady state aggregate hours worked is targeted at
1/3, leading to z¯ = 3.
The government expenditure in steady state in set to 20% of annual total output.
The response of taxes to output φT,y = 0.5, while φT,bg is chosen to be large enough to
eventually stabilize government bonds.12 In steady state, Home has a public-debt-to-GDP
ratio b¯g/(4 ∗ y¯) of 93% and Foreign has a higher government indebtedness of 126%.13 The
average maturity of the government bonds is assumed to be six years, consistent with Lojsch
et al. (2011). For simplicity, zero coupons are assumed.
The calibration of parameters concerning the sovereign risk and the spillover to private
sector follows closely Corsetti et al. (2013, 2014). The degree of spillover is pinned down
by the elasticity αψ = 0.55 as estimated in Harjes (2011). χψ = 0.998 is calibrated to
achieve zero steady state private sector credit spread, required for an efficient steady state.
The beta-distribution determining the sovereign default probability is parameterized with
12The minimum φT,bg required to stabilize debt, in the long run, depends on the average maturity of the
debt. The shorter the maturity, the larger the tax response needs to be. To keep the parameter fixed
when comparing short-term and long-term government bonds, φT,bg is as the minimum value sufficient to
stabilize one-period bonds.
13The ratios are calculated with general government debt as projected in the IMF’s April 2012 WEO, plus
estimated contingent liabilities related to financial sector support. See Corsetti et al. (2014) and the
reference therein.
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the αb
g
= 3.70, βb
g
= 0.54, bgmax = 2.56. These parameters are calibrated to match the
relationship between public debt level and 5-year CDS spread in a sample of industrialized
economies.14 Haircut ϑ is set to 0.55, in the middle range of the empirical evidence provided
in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2008).
Table 4.1: Calibration
Baseline model parameters Value
Home population size θ 2/3
Saver population size pis 1/2
Probability of type changing 1− δ 1 - 0.95
Time discount rate β 0.994
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/σ 1/2
Frisch elasticity of labor supply υ 1/1.9
Consumption utility parameter: s ξs 1
Consumption utility parameter: b ξb 0.02
Labor utility parameter ψs, ψb 2.74
Price rigidity Calvo parameter α 0.925
Markup µ/(µ− 1) 1.15
Steady state inflation Π 1.005
Steady state technology level z 3
Steady state government expenditure/output g/y 20%
Tax sensitivity to output φT,y 0.5
Tax sensitivity to debt level φT,bg 0.078
Steady state government debt/GDP: Home bg/(4y) 93%
Steady state government debt/GDP: Foreign bg∗/(4y∗) 126%
Government bond coupon r 0
Government bond duration η 1/24
Sovereign risk spillover parameter αψ 0.55
Sovereign risk spillover parameter χψ 0.998
Default risk parameter αb
g
3.7
Default risk parameter βb
g
0.54
Default haircut ϑ 0.55
All exogenous disturbances - except shock to the sovereign debt level - are assumed
to follow an AR(1) process in the form ofxt = ρxt−1 + xt , where xt i.i.d. distributed with
mean zero and the persistence parameter ρ is fixed at 0.75. The sovereign debt shock is
assumed to be transitory.
14The steady state (nonlinear) relation between sovereign debt spread and the debt level is independent of
the maturity structure. In steady state Rg/Rg,rf = 1/[1− ϑFbeta(bg)], thus we can still reply on Corsetti
et al. (2013)’s estimation despite introducing long-maturity debts.
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Figure 4.1: Determinants of government debt level and the bond maturity
4.3.3 Maturity
Equations (4.8) and (4.9) show that the government indebtedness is determined by
its own lagged value, the current output and inflation, as well as current policy rate and
expected future bond prices. As a shock directly moves output, inflation, and indirectly the
risk-free rate, its effect on the public debt level through each of these endogenous variables
depends on the maturity structure of the government bonds. To illustrate, Figure 4.1 plots
the impact of a one-percentage change in Home variables on the Home government debt
level under the calibration described above. The impact is plotted for as a function of the
debt maturity, and for simplicity, it is assumed that the government bond price returns to
its steady state level in the next period.
While the impact of output and inflation on government debt level is not sensitive
to the average duration of the government debt, the impact of the risk-free rate on the
indebtedness decreases steeply with the maturity. Under the model calibration with an
average maturity of 24 quarters, the impact of the policy rate is much smaller than that
of the inflation and output. If instead, government bonds are short-term, changes in the
risk-free rate would trigger a much larger change in the sovereign debt level. This translates
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into different magnitudes of effect on shock transmissions due to sovereign risk spillover for
short-term and long-term public debt.
4.3.4 Sovereign risk spillover and shock transmissions
The quantitative impact of sovereign risk spillover on shock propagation can be illustrated
under the often-studied standard Taylor rule:
Rˆt = φpiΠˆt + φy ¯ˆyt + 
r
t ,
with rt a monetary policy shock, φpi = 1.5, and φy = 0.5/4.
Figures 4.2 - 4.4 illustrate the impact of the sovereign risk spillover by looking at the
responses of key union-average variables to a set of union-level shocks.15 The impulse
responses are compared in three different setups: (1) no sovereign risk spillover, labeled
‘Exog’, a case where credit spreads do not depend on sovereign risk; (2) with sovereign risk
spillover under the baseline long-term debt calibration, labeled ‘SovFF’; (3) with sovereign
risk spillover and one-period government bonds, labeled ‘SovFFST’.
Figure 4.2 shows the responses to a union-wide cost-push shock. Absent the risk spillover,
the ‘Exog’ case, the shock does not trigger any movement in the spreads. Output and
inflation dynamics are as expected in a basic NK model and the government indebtedness
decreases mainly because of inflation and despite the lower output and higher interest rate.
Notice that as the government debt is irrelevant in the ‘Exog’ case, the impulse responses
of output, inflation and policy rate are the same for different government bond maturities.
Under the baseline calibration with long-term government bonds and sovereign risk spillover,
the public debt level evolves similarly to that in the ‘Exog’ case. Now, with the spillover,
the lower government debt level leads to a lower level of private sector spread. This slightly
ameliorates the drop in output and hat negligible impact on inflation. Moreover, the impact
of the sovereign spillover is much limited that the risk-free rate dynamic is indistinguishable
from the ‘Exog’ case.
The interest rate dynamic in the case with short-term government debt is also very
similar to that of the other two cases. However, the impact of the sovereign risk spillover on
the shock propagation is somewhat different. Because of the short maturity, the increase
in interest rate outweighs inflation in driving up government indebtedness, leading to an
15Union-level shocks hit both regions simultaneously. This allows us to abstract from the regional asymmetry
and to focus on the impact of the existence of the sovereign risk spillover.
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Figure 4.2: Impulse responses under the Taylor rule: cost-push shocks
Impulse response of endogenous model variables to 1% cost-push shocks in Home and Foreign (u and
u∗). Variable are plotted as percentage point derivation from the steady state. p.a. = annualized.
amplification of the recession.
In the case of a monetary policy shock (Figure 4.3), there is again a stark contrast of
the impact of the spillover when government debt is short-term to when it is long-term.
Without the spillover, a contractionary monetary policy shock is associated with a drop in
output and inflation, and as a result an increase in government debt. The low output and
inflation contribute to the increase in government indebtedness, which in turn, exacerbates
the downward pressure on output and inflation. The magnitude of this amplification is
larger if the government debt is short-term.
It is, however, not always the case that shocks that move output and inflation in the
same direction will be amplified by the spillover. Suppose the government bond is short
term, a shock that leads to recession and deflation would trigger an expansionary monetary
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Figure 4.3: Impulse responses under the Taylor rule: monetary policy shock
Impulse response of endogenous model variables to a 1% (annualized) monetary policy shock (r).
Variable are plotted as percentage point derivation from the steady state. p.a. = annualized.
policy under Taylor rule. As short-term debt is strongly affected by changes in the policy
rate, this might result in a drop in government indebtedness which in turn would weaken
the disturbance’s impact on inflation and output.16 Thus, given a shock, whether the
sovereign risk spillover amplifies the shock transmission depends on the characteristic of
the disturbance itself and the monetary policy, but also crucially on the maturity of the
government bonds.
While the consequences of the sovereign risk spillover are limited under the Taylor rule
in some cases, it put the sovereign indebtedness into a crucial role for model dynamics
and allows significant impact for shocks that affect the fiscal position directly. Figure 4.4
16See, for example, the impulse responses to financial shocks that directly increase private sector spreads in
Appendix 4.A.8.
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Figure 4.4: Impulse responses under the Taylor rule: default probability shocks
Impulse response of endogenous model variables to default probability shocks that increase sovereign
default probabilities in Home and Foreign by 5 percentage points initially (p and p∗). Variable are
plotted as percentage point derivation from the steady state. p.a. = annualized.
plots the impulse responses to a five percentage points increase in the default probability of
government debt. This may be particularly interesting as, during the euro area debt crisis,
we observe a sudden large increase in the government spreads in the periphery countries.
The shock, which absent the sovereign risk spillover would be irrelevant for aggregate output
and inflation, leads to a jump in about 100 basis points (annualized) in private sector
spread, a drop in aggregate output as well as deflation. Again, the impact of the shock is
quantitatively much large if the government debt is short-term. The intuition is that when
government debt is short-term, a larger fraction of the debt would have to be refinanced at
the low government bond prices. And the resulting higher level of government indebtedness
reinforces the problem of high default probability and low bond price. A similar pattern is
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observed in the case of a shock to the government debt level, see Appendix 4.A.8.
To sum up, we find that the maturity structure of government debt is critical for
the effect of the sovereign risk spillover on shock transmissions. Assuming short-term
government debt would largely increase the impact of the risk-free rate on the sovereign risk
channel. Under the Taylor rule and a realistic calibration to the euro area with long-term
government bonds, the impact of sovereign risk spillover is limited for shocks that do not
affect fiscal positions directly, but more important for the transmission of shocks directly
hit the fiscal position.
4.4 Optimal monetary policy
I now turn to examine how sovereign risk spillover affects optimal monetary policy –
the policy that maximizes the union-wide welfare.
It is assumed that the central bank assigns equal weights to all households in the
currency union. The objective function of the central bank is thus:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
θ
[
pisus,t + pibub,t
]
+ (1− θ)[pisu∗s,t + pibu∗b,t]} (4.11)
= −E0
∞∑
t=0
βtLt + t.i.p.+ ϑ(||Ξ||3)
with uτ,t = ξτ c
1−σ
τ,t /(1 − σ) − ψτh1+vτ,t /(1 + v). Following Woodford (2003), I take the
quadratic-linear approach and derive a welfare-loss function Lt of the objective function
by taking a second-order approximation. t.i.p. stands for terms independent of policy
and ϑ(||Ξ||3) is a collection of approximation errors of the third order or higher. The
second-order approximated welfare-loss function of the central bank is given by
Lt = θ(xt)
2 + (1− θ)(x∗t )2 +
µ
κ
Πˆt +
[
1− σ
v + σ
+
µ
κ
]
θ(1− θ)τˆ2 (4.12)
+Ω(
¯ˆ
λR,t)
2 + ΩD(λˆDR,t)
2
with Ω = 1σ+v
(
piscspibcb
σ +
pish˜spibh˜b
v
)
, ΩD = θ(1−θ)σ+v
(
pibcb
σ +
pish˜spibh˜b
v
)
and h˜τ = hτ/h. xt and x
∗
t
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is the deviation of the actual output from the efficient output defined as
xt = yˆt − yˆet , x∗t = yˆ∗t − yˆe∗t
yˆet =
1
v + σ
(
(v + 1)zˆt + σg¯t
)
, yˆe∗t =
1
v + σ
(
(v + 1)zˆ∗t + σg¯t
)
The derivation is provided in the Appendix 4.A.5.
The first four terms of the welfare-loss function (¯ˆyt and
¯ˆ
Πt) are standard components
of the welfare-loss function of a NK currency union model.17 The last two terms emerge
because of the credit spreads. The average marginal-utility gap (
¯ˆ
λR,t) is also seen in a similar
form in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2016) as a measurement of the distributional inefficiency
between savers and borrowers. The importance of
¯ˆ
λR,t relative to output decreases in
σ + v because - as is standard - large values of the “curvature” parameters implies a higher
relative importance of output deviation from the welfare perspective. Aside from that,
the weight of (
¯ˆ
λR,t) increases in steady state total consumption of savers and borrowers
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This is because deviations of marginal
utility from its efficient level are related to larger variations in consumption level the larger
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the higher the steady state level of consumption
is. Analogously, the weight of (
¯ˆ
λR,t) is also increasing in the steady state labor and the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The last term in the welfare-loss function is the difference
of marginal-utility gap. It reflects the distributional inefficiency between countries and
appears because of the currency union setup. Its weight in the welfare-loss function differs
from that of the average marginal-utility in two aspects. Firstly, it adjusts for the different
sizes of the countries. Secondly, it reflects that the cross-countries distributional inefficiency
is caused by the different levels of Home and Foreign borrower’s consumption. In fact, when
starting from the efficient steady state, the consumption level of Home and Foreign type s
households are always identical as they face the same risk-free interest rate and price level.
4.4.1 Optimal monetary policy in a simplified model
We consider optimal policy under commitment from a “timeless perspective” as defined
in Woodford (2003) chapter 7. Optimal monetary policy is determined by minimizing the
theoretical loss function (4.12) subject to the equilibrium with the 14 endogenous variables
17See for example Benigno (2004) for a welfare-loss function derived for a currency union with different level
of nominal rigidity.
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pinned down by the equations outlined in the previous section.
Given the model complexity, solving for optimal monetary policy is rather involved.
To yield analytical solutions and to gain insights into the implication of the sovereign risk
spillover for optimal monetary policy, some simplifying assumptions are indispensable. In
the following, I derive the optimal target criterion for a simplified version of the model and
focus on the more realistic case with long-term government bonds. This “approximated”
target criterion helps to illustrate tradeoffs facing the central bank as a result of the spillover.
It also indicates beneficial adjustments to the monetary policy. Afterwards, I proceed to
numerically investigate optimal monetary policy in the full model.
The simplified model has to be plain enough to cede insights analytically but still
reflects the role of sovereign risk spillover on model dynamics. Here, I rely on the following
simplifying assumptions. First, following Corsetti et al. (2014), it is assumed that terms of
trade remain constant and the private sector spreads do not enter the union-wide Phillips
curve.18 Secondly, the private sector spreads are posited to be functions of local deficits
and inflation. This reflects the role of deficits and inflation on sovereign indebtedness but
ignores the direct effect of the risk-free rate, which is small at reasonable maturity. The
credit spreads are thus determined as
ωˆt = −Φ˜piΠˆt − Φ˜y (φT,yyˆt − g˜t) + st, and
ωˆ∗t = −Φ˜∗piΠˆt − Φ˜∗y (φ∗T,yyˆ∗t − g˜∗t ) + s∗t .
All four parameters Φ˜pi, Φ˜
∗
pi, Φ˜y, Φ˜
∗
y are positive and are crucial in capturing the role of
sovereign risk on the economy. The more susceptible the private sector credit frictions are
to variations in the deficits and inflation, the larger these parameters. Finally, to reflect the
impact of spreads on the distributional inefficiency (see (4.2) and (4.5)), it is assumed that
¯ˆ
λR,t = −Φ˜λ ¯ˆωt, and
λˆDR,t = −Φ˜Dλ ωˆDt ,
with Φ˜λ and Φ˜
D
λ both positive and reflects how much distributional inefficiency is caused
by the private sector credit spreads.
Under these assumption, one can derive a (relatively) simple form of the optimal target
18This can be achieved, for example, through the introduction of labor subsidies/taxes.
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criterion:19
µΠˆt + ∆x¯t (4.13)
− ΩΦ˜λ
[(
Φ˜y + κΦ˜pi
)
¯ˆωt − Φ˜y ¯ˆωt−1
]
− ΩDΦ˜Dλ
[(
Φ˜Dy + κΦ˜
D
pi
)
ωˆDt − Φ˜Dy ωˆDt−1
]
= 0
The ‘simplified’ optimal target criterion lays out the relationship between inflation,
output gap and private sector spread that the central bank should seek to maintain at all
time. Not surprisingly, absent variations in the private sector spread – or if credit spreads
are exogenous and thus independent of monetary policy, the optimal target criterion reduces
to one as in the basic NK model (first line of the target criterion).
With endogenous private sector spreads, the central bank can now influence also the
distributional inefficiency between savers and borrowers households - both on the union-level
and across regions. In particular, higher output and/or inflation should be tolerated as this
helps to reduce government default risk and in turns enhance the distributional efficiency
(the second line of the optimal target criterion). Given a level of average spread, the more
important the distributional inefficiency is for welfare (large Ω), or the more effective output
(large Φ˜y) and inflation (large Φ˜pi) in reducing credit spreads, the higher output and inflation
should be targeted.
In a currency union with asymmetrical sovereign debt level, the distributional inefficiency
across region is also within the influence of the central bank (last line of the target criterion).
Specifically, more inflation and output should be generated if the private sector spread is
higher in the region with a stronger influence of sovereign default risk as reflected in Φ˜y
and Φ˜pi.
20
The result above indicates that augmenting the simple target criterion with reaction
to union-wide average spread and the wedge between regional spreads may bring the
monetary policy closer to optimal. In the following, I will examine whether this result holds
(approximately) in the general setup.
19See Appendix 4.A.6 for the derivation .
20The target criterion can also be written in terms of ‘weighted’ average of spreads: µΠˆt + ∆x¯t − ($∆ωˆt +
$∗∆ωˆ∗t )− (ζ ωˆt + ζ∗ ωˆ∗t ) = 0, where $ > $∗ and ζ > ζ∗ the overall degree of sovereign risk spillover is
stronger in Home.
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4.4.2 Numerical analysis
Figures 4.5 - 4.7 compare the model dynamics to various shocks under four monetary
policies: (1) the Taylor rule as described in the previous section, labeled as ‘Taylor’; (2) the
numerically derived optimal policy under timeless perspective, labeled as ‘Optimal’;21 (3)
the ‘simplified optimal target criterion’ (4.13), labeled as ‘AdjTarget’ ; (4) a basic target
criterion that is the first line of the ‘simplified optimal target criterion’, labeled as ‘Target’.
The adjusted target criterion is calibrated with the following coefficients. These coeffi-
cients are combinations of structural parameters, and the calibration aims to reflect the
microfounded full model. The rationale for the parameterization is provided in Appendix
4.A.7.
7.667 Πˆt + ∆x¯t − 0.045 ¯ˆωt + 0.041 ¯ˆωt−1 + 0.019 ωˆDt − 0.018 ωˆDt−1 = 0
To examine the impact asymmetric debt level, it is assumed that the exogenous shocks hit
only the Foreign region and the size of the shock is fixed at a level so that the union-wide
average shock corresponds to the shock size analyzed in the previous section.
Figure 4.5 shows the equilibrium responses of the endogenous variables to a cost-push
shock in Foreign (u∗). As seen before under the Taylor rule, this kind of shock invokes
a limited reaction in government debt and thus has a small impact on private sector
spreads. Since the shock’s impact on distributional inefficiency is negligible, the simple
target rule is closed to optimal. Indeed, both the model dynamics under optimal policy
is indistinguishable from that under the two versions of target criterion. The equilibrium
associated with the Taylor rule is, however, lies far from the one under optimal policy.22
As discussed in the previous section, the sovereign risk spillover has a more pronounced
impact on the transmission of shocks directly affecting the government financing. One can
thus expect that optimal policy responses are more influenced by the spillover for such
shocks. Figure 4.6 shows the impulse responses to a sovereign default probability shock.
When facing the default probability shock in Foreign, the Foreign government indebtedness
increases, leading to a notable increase in the Foreign private sector spreads while private
sector spread in Home barely moves (not shown). As a result, the private sector spread in
21More specifically, first-order conditions are derived by maximizing the union welfare function (4.11)
subject to the constraints as detailed in Appendix 4.A.1. The resulting system of nonlinear equations is
log-linearized around the efficient steady state and solved for the model equilibrium.
22This is mainly because the Taylor rule is not optimal for this kind of disturbances already under a simple
NK model, and not because of the sovereign risk spillover.
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Figure 4.5: Impulse responses under alternative monetary policies: cost-push shock
Impulse response of endogenous model variables to 1/(1− θ)% Foreign cost-push shock (u∗). Vari-
able are plotted as percentage point derivation from the steady state. p.a. = annualized.
Foreign is initially around 300 basis points (annualized) above that in Home. The default
probability shock leads to a distributional inefficiency between Home and Foreign, and
under the sovereign risk spillover, this requires the central bank to generate positive output
and inflation more than prescribed by the simple target criterion. The adjusted target
criterion, by reacting to the private sector spreads, does bring the equilibrium somewhat
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Figure 4.6: Impulse responses under alternative monetary policies:
default probability shock
Impulse response of endogenous model variables to a default probability shock that increases Foreign
sovereign default probability by 1/(1− θ) percentage points initially (p∗). Variable are plotted as
percentage point derivation from the steady state. p.a. = annualized.
closer to the optimal. But as the equilibrium under simple target criterion is already not
far from the one under optimal policy, the improvement through using the adjusted target
criterion is limited. As in the case of the cost-push shock, the simple Taylor rule is again
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far from optimal.
With the examples of the two types of disturbances described above, we see that under a
realistic calibration, the simple target rule provides a reasonable approximation to optimal
policy under the sovereign risk spillover. The target rule that is augmented with reactions
to private sector spreads (4.13) presents an equilibrium closer to the optimal but the
implementation is much more complex, and the room for improvement is limited. These
results are not limited to the two types of shocks analyzed here, and the impulse responses
for a variety of other shocks are provided in Appendix 4.A.9.
What about the case when the government debt is short-term? We have already seen
that the maturity structure of the government debt has a non-negligible role on the impact
of sovereign risk spillover. How does optimal policy differ for long-term and short-term
government debt? Figure 4.7 answers this question with impulse responses to a default
probability in Foreign when the government debts in both regions are calibrated to be
one-period.23 Now with short-term debt, a drop in the risk-free rate becomes very effective
in reducing the government indebtedness. As the government debt only evolves period-by-
period, an initial drop in the government indebtedness results in a below average steady
state level for a protracted period, which helps to counteract the effect of the default
probability shock. Optimal monetary policy makes use of this and features a strong drop
in the period when the shock hits. Afterwards, optimal monetary policy resembles that
under a simple target criterion and the adjusted target criterion. Comparing the debt level
under the case ‘Target’ to that under optimal policy, one can see that thanks to the initial
large drop in Rˆt, the debt level under optimal monetary policy stay low for a long time.
The large initial deviation of output and inflation is compensated by the persistently less
distributional inefficiency as reflected in
¯ˆ
λR,t and λˆ
D
R,t.
24
23All other parameters that are not targeted are kept at the baseline calibration. Parameters that are used
to target steady state statistics are re-calibrated. The coefficients in the adjusted target criterion are also
updated with the short-maturity.
24The large initial changes in optimal monetary policy are not limited to the default probability but is a
general feature of optimal monetary policy when the government bond is short-term.
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Figure 4.7: Impulse responses under alternative monetary policies
and short-term government debt: default probability shock
Impulse response of endogenous model variables in a model calibrated with one-period government
debt to a default probability shock that increases Foreign sovereign default probability by 1/(1− θ)
percentage points initially (p∗). Variable are plotted as percentage point derivation from the steady
state. p.a. = annualized.
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4.5 Conclusion
The euro area debt crisis has seen a strong linkage between sovereign debt default risk
and the private-sector financing condition. In this paper, I examine the implication of
sovereign risk spillover for monetary policy in a currency union.
The maturity structure is crucial for the impact of the sovereign risk spillover on shock
propagation and optimal policy. When calibrated to the euro area and taken into account
the average long maturity of government debt, the impact of the sovereign risk spillover on
shock transmission is limited for a variety of shocks.
With the sovereign risk spillover, optimal monetary policy involves striking the right
balance between output, inflation, distributional inefficiency between savers and borrowers
and across regions. However, for the euro area, a simple target criterion that describes
the optimal relation between output and inflation as derived from a basic New Keynesian
model continues to provide a reasonable approximation to optimal policy.
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4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Nonlinear structural equations
This section provides the nonlinear system of equations for Home and those on the
union-level. The equations for Foreign follow analogously.
Households:
qt = β Et
{
δλs,t+1 + (1− δ)λ¯t+1
λs,t Πt+1
}
(4.A.1)
qgt = β Et
{
(1− ϑpt+1)
[
η + (1− η)(r + qgt+1)
] δλs,t+1 + (1− δ)λ¯t+1
λs,t Πt+1
}
(4.A.2)
qbt = β Et
{
δλb,t+1 + (1− δ)λ¯t+1
λb,t Πt+1
}
(4.A.3)
qg,rft = β Et
{[
η + (1− η)(r + qg,rft+1 )
] δλs,t+1 + (1− δ)λ¯t+1
λs,t Πt+1
}
(4.A.4)
cs,t =
(
ξs
λs,t
)1/σ
(4.A.5)
cb,t =
(
ξb
λb,t
)1/σ
(4.A.6)
hvs,t =
λs,twt
ψs
(4.A.7)
hvb,t =
λb,twt
ψb
(4.A.8)
qgt =
η + (1− η) r
Rgt − (1− η)
(4.A.9)
1 + ωt = χ
ψ(ωgt )
αψ exp(st) (4.A.10)
1 + ωt =
qt
qbt
(4.A.11)
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Assets:
A†t = θ
bgt−1
Πt
[(1− η) qgt + η + (1− η) r] (4.A.12)
+(1− θ)(b
g∗
t
Πt
)
[
(1− η∗) qg∗t + η∗ + (1− η∗) r∗
]
bt q
b
t = δ
bt−1
Πt
+ pib
[
cb,t − wthb,t − PH,t
Pt
yH,t + wtht (4.A.13)
−(θ(st qt − bt qbt ) + (1− θ)(s∗t qt − b∗t qb∗t ))
+tg + φT,yyt + φT,bg
bgt−1
Πt
]
− pib(1− δ)A†t
st qt + b
g
t q
g
t = δ
(
st−1
Πt
+
bgt−1
Πt
[(1− η) qgt + η + (1− η) r]
)
(4.A.14)
−pis
[
cs,t − wths,t − PH,t
Pt
yH,t + wtht
−(θ(st qt − bt qbt ) + (1− θ)(s∗t qt − b∗t qb∗t ))
+tg + φT,yyt + φT,bg
bgt−1
Πt
]
+ pis(1− δ)A†t
Firms:
Ft = Kt (4.A.15)
Ft = λtyt
(
P optH,t
PH,t
)1−µ
+ αβEt
(
P optH,tΠ
P optH,t+1
)1−µ
Ft+1 (4.A.16)
Kt = λt
µ
µ− 1Mwt
yt
zt
(
P optH,t
PH,t
)−µ
Pt
PH,t
+ αβEt
(
P optH,tΠ
P optH,t+1
)−µ
Kt+1 (4.A.17)
1− α
(
Π
ΠH,t
)1−µ
= (1− α)
(
P optH,t
PH,t
)1−µ
(4.A.18)
∆H,t = α∆H,t−1
(
ΠH,t
Π
)µ
+ (1− α)
(
P optH,t
PH,t
)−µ
(4.A.19)
τt =
PH,t
PF,t
(4.A.20)
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Government budget constraint and default risk:[
bgt − (1− η)
bgt−1
Πt
]
qgt = [η + (1− η) r]
bgt−1
Πt
+ gt (4.A.21)
−
(
tg + φt,yyt + φT,bg
bgt−1
Πt
)
pt+1 = Fbeta
(
bgt
4yH
1
bg,max
;αbg , βbg
)
(4.A.22)
ωgt =
Rgt
Rg,rft
(4.A.23)
Market clearing conditions:
yt∆H,t = ztht (4.A.24)
ht = pishs,t + pibhb,t (4.A.25)
yt =
(
PH,t
Pt
)−1[
θ(ct + g) + (1− θ)(c∗t + g∗)
]
(4.A.26)
θst + (1− θ)s∗t = θbt + (1− θ)b∗t (4.A.27)
Definitions:
∆H,t =
1
θ
θ∫
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−µ
dj
4.A.2 Efficient allocation
This section describes the efficient allocation. The efficient allocation is the solution to
a social planner’s problem of maximizing (4.11), subject to the technological and resource
constraints. Here, I assume that the social planner has the same Pareto weights as the
central bank. Because of the linear production technology, I assume symmetric equilibrium,
i.e. yH,t(j) = yH,t and yF,t(j) = yF,t.
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Each period, social planner’s problem is described by the following Lagragian:
L = θ(pisus,t + pibub,t) + (1− θ)(pisu∗s,t + pibu∗b,t)
+µ1[θ(piscs,t + pibcb,t) + (1− θ)(pisc∗s,t + pibc∗b,t)− y¯t]
+µ2(y
θ
t y
∗
t
1−θ − y¯t)
+µ3[z(pishs,t + pibhb,t)− yt]
+µ4[z(pish
∗
s,t + pibh
∗
b,t)− y∗t ]
It is easier to show that the efficient allocation features equalized marginal utility
of consumption across all four types of households: λs,t = λb,t = λ
∗
s,t = λ
∗
b,t. Given
the utility functions, it implies that cs,t = c
∗
s,t, cb,t = c
∗
b,t and cb,t = cs,t(ξb/ξs)
1/σ. On
the labor side, the marginal utility of labor are also equalized, thus we have hs,t = h
∗
s,t,
hb,t = h
∗
b,t, hb,t = hs,t(ψs/ψb)
1/v. As a result, per capita output in both countries are the
same yt = y
∗
t . The marginal utility of consumption equals the marginal utility of labor, so
we also have cτ,t =
(
ξτ z
ψτhvτ,t
)1/σ
. Finally, Home saver household’s labor supply is pinned
down by (
ξszt
ψshvs,t
)1/σ (
pis + pib
(
ξb
ξs
)1/σ)
= zhs,t
(
pis + pib
(
ψs
ψb
)1/v)
As shown below, a steady state with zero interest rate spread between savers and borrowers
is efficient.
4.A.3 Steady state
This section describes the steady state of the model. Variables without a time index
refer to the steady state value unless otherwise noted. Public indebtedness and private
sector asset/debt holdings may differ across countries. Otherwise, the regions are assumed
to be symmetric. Furthermore, the price level within a country is assumed to be uniform,
i.e., PH(j) = PH and PF (j) = PF .
From the savers’ Euler equations, it is obvious that λs,t = λ
∗
s,t ∀ t. So this is also valid
in steady state. Given ω and ω∗, the following three Euler equations together determine q,
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λR = λs/λb as well as λb,R = λ
∗
b/λb
λR =
β
qΠ
[δλR + (1− δ)pisλR + (1− δ)pib (θ + (1− θ)λb,R)]
1 =
β(1 + ω)
qΠ
[δ + (1− δ)pisλR + (1− δ)pib (θ + (1− θ)λb,R)]
λb,R =
βRd(1 + ω∗)
qΠ
[δλb,R + (1− δ)pisλR + (1− δ)pib (θ + (1− θ)λb,R)]
In steady state, the relative marginal utility is related to terms of trade by
τ1+1/v =
pis (λR/ψR)
1/v + pib (λb,R)
1/v
pis (λR/ψR)
1/v + pib
.
steady state real wage w = z and labor supplies satisfy
hs = hb (λR/ψR)
1/v , h∗s = hb (λR/(ψRτ))
1/v , h∗b = hb (λb,R/τ)
1/v ,
1 = zhb
[
pis (λR/ψR)
1/v + pib
]
, and
λsz = ψsh
v
s , λbz = ψbh
v
b .
On the consumption side, the steady state requires
cs = cb(λR/ξR)
−1/σ, c∗s = cs, c
∗
b = cb(λb,R)
−1/σ,
1 = τ−1+θcb
[
pis(λR/ξR)
−1/σ + θpib + (1− θ)pib(λb,R)−1/σ
]
,
cs =
(
ξs
λs
)1/σ
, cb =
(
ξb
λb
)1/σ
, and
piscs + pibcb = y.
For zero steady state credit spread, we have cb = c
∗
b and τ = 1. The interests rate is
1/(qΠ) = 1/((1 +w)qb Π) = 1/β and the relative marginal utility λR = 1. This steady state
satisfies the conditions for an efficient allocation derived above.
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4.A.4 Approximate equilibrium
In this section, I derive the log-linearized model by taking a first-order Taylor expansion
of the nonlinear equations around the efficient steady state with zero credit spreads.
xˆt = log
xt
x denotes the log-derivation of variable xt from its steady state value x. To save
on notation, I drop the terms representing approximation errors of second or higher orders
ϑ(||Ξ||2).
A first-order approximation to Home Euler equations yields the IS relations
λˆs,t = Rˆ
d
t − EtΠˆt+1 + δEtλˆs,t+1 + (1− δ)Et ˆ¯λt+1,
λˆb,t = Rˆ
d
t + ωˆt − EtΠˆt+1 + δEtλˆb,t+1 + (1− δ)Et ˆ¯λt+1,
with
¯ˆ
λt = θ(pibλˆs,t + pisλˆs,t) + (1− θ)(pibλˆ∗b,t + pisλˆ∗s,t). Similar equations can be derived for
Foreign households. Aggregating over the four types of household, we arrive at
ˆ¯λt = Rˆ
d
t + pib
¯ˆωt − EtΠˆt+1 + Et ˆ¯λt+1,
with ¯ˆωt = θωˆt + (1 − θ)ωˆ∗t . Using the definition of ¯ˆλR,t = θλˆR,t + (1 − θ)λˆ∗R,t, and
λˆDR,t = λˆR,t − λˆ∗R,t, we have
¯ˆ
λR,t = − ¯ˆωt + δEt ¯ˆλR,t+1, (4.A.28)
λˆDR,t = −ωˆDt + δEtλˆDR,t+1. (4.A.29)
with ¯ˆωt = θ log [(1 + ωt)/(1 + ω)] + (1− θ) log [(1 + ω∗t )/(1 + ω∗)] and ωˆDt = ωˆt − ωˆ∗t .
A first-order approximation to the goods market clearing condition yields:
¯ˆyt − g¯t = θpiscscˆs,t + θpibcbcˆb,t + (1− θ)piscscˆ∗s,t + (1− θ)pibcbcˆ∗b,t
where g¯t = θgt + (1− θ)g∗t and gt, g∗t are the government spending shocks. Define parameter
Sλ = pispib(cs − cb). Using the above relation as well as λˆτ,t = −στ cˆτ,t, we have
¯ˆ
λt = −σ (¯ˆyt − ¯˜gt)− Sλ ¯ˆλR,t.
Thus, the aggregated IS-curve is
¯ˆyt = Et ¯ˆyt+1 − Et∆g¯t+1 − 1
σ
[− qˆt + (pib − Sλ)¯ˆωt − EtΠˆt+1 − Sλ(1− δ)Et ¯ˆλR,t+1].(4.A.30)
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The derivation of the country-level Phillips curve is similar to that in a textbook NK model.
For Home, we have
ΠˆH,t =
(1− α)(1− αβ)
α
(
wˆt − zˆt − (1− θ)τˆt
)
+ βEtΠˆH,t+1.
Labor market clearing conditions imply
wˆt = vyˆt − vzˆt − zVˆt
with Vˆt = pibhbλˆb,t + pishsλˆs,t. The Home Philips curve can then be rewritten as
ΠˆH,t = βEtΠˆH,t+1 + K
[
vyˆt − (v + 1)zˆt − zVˆt − (1− θ)τˆt
]
,
with K = (1−α)(1−αβ)α . Analogously, the Foreign Phillips curve is
ΠˆF,t = βEtΠˆF,t+1 + K[vyˆ∗t − (v + 1)zˆ∗t − zVˆ ∗t + θτˆt].
Next step, using the relation
zθVˆt + z(1− θ)Vˆ ∗t = −σ ¯ˆyt −
(
Sλ + pis(1− hs
h
)
)
¯ˆ
λR,t + σg¯t,
we have the area-wide Phillips curve:
Πˆt = βEtΠˆt+1 + K
[
(v + σ)¯ˆyt + [Sλ + pis(1− hs/h)] ¯ˆλR,t − (v + 1)¯ˆzt − σg¯t
]
.
Or
Πˆt = βEtΠˆt+1 + κ¯ˆxt + κλ
¯ˆ
λR,t (4.A.31)
where x¯t = θxt + (1− θ)x∗t is the union-wide average deviation of the actual output from
the efficient output. For each region, this output gap is defined as
xt = yˆt − yˆet , x∗t = yˆ∗t − yˆe∗t
yˆet =
1
v + σ
(
(v + 1)zˆt + σg¯t
)
, yˆe∗t =
1
v + σ
(
(v + 1)zˆ∗t + σg¯t
)
.
Define κ = K(v + σ), κλ = K [Sλ + pis(1− hs/h)]. The law of motion for terms of trade is
derived by taking difference between the two regions’ Philips curves. We have
∆τˆt = βEt∆τˆt+1 + K
[− (v + 1)τˆt + zpibhbλˆDR,t − (v + 1)zˆDt ]. (4.A.32)
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Turning to the public sector, the government debt level evolves according to
bˆgt = χg bˆ
g
t−1 − χgΠˆt −
φT,y
bg qg
yˆt −
(
1− 1− η
Π
)
qˆgt (4.A.33)
with χg = [η + (1− η)(r+ qg)− φT,bg ]/(Π qg). Using the Euler equations, we can show that
government bond prices depend on the price of the risk-free deposit, the government debt
level as well as expected future price:
qˆgt = qˆt −
ϑp
1− ϑpF
′
beta
bg
p
Et bˆgt+1 +
(1− η)qg
η + (1− η)(r + qg) Etqˆ
g
t+1, (4.A.34)
where F ′beta is the first derivative of the equation (4.A.22) with respect to government debt,
evaluated at its steady state value. The definition of government bond spreads gives us
ωˆgt = −
[
1− (1− η)q (1− ϑp)]qˆgt + [1− (1− η)q ]qˆg,rft .
Using the Euler equations again, the above equation can be rewritten as
ωˆgt = (1− η)q Et ωˆgt+1 + χϑp(1− η)q Et qˆgt+1 (4.A.35)
−(1− η)q ϑp qˆt + χ ϑp
1− ϑp F
′
beta
bg
p
Et bˆgt+1
where χ =
[
1 − (1 − η)q (1 − ϑp)]. Finally, with the sovereign risk spillover, the private
sector spreads (average and difference) are functions of the private sector credit spreads:
¯ˆωt = αψ[ θωˆ
g
t + (1− θ)ωˆg∗t ] + s¯t, (4.A.36)
ωˆDt = αψ(ωˆ
g
t − ωˆg∗t ) + sDt , (4.A.37)
4.A.5 Welfare function
This section provides the derivation of the second-order approximated welfare func-
tion. ϑ(||Ξ||2) represents approximation errors of second or higher order, ϑ(||Ξ||3) are
approximation errors of third or higher order. t.i.p. stands for terms independent of policy.
The objective function for the central bank for period t is
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtUt
with Ut = U
(1)
t − U (2)t , U (1)t = θ
[
pisu˜s,t + pibu˜b,t
]
+ (1 − θ)[pisu˜∗s,t + pibu˜∗b,t], U (2)t =
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θ
[
pisv˜s,t + pibv˜b,t
]
+ (1 − θ)[pisv˜∗s,t + pibv˜∗b,t], u˜τ,t = ξτ c1−στ,t1−σ , and v˜τ,t = ψτh1+vτ,t1+v . A second-
order approximation with respect to u˜τ,t yields
u˜τ,t = u˜τ + λτ cτ
(
cˆτ,t +
1− σ
2
cˆ2τ,t
)
+ ϑ(||Ξ||3).
Since at the efficient steady state λτ = λ, we have
U
(1)
t = λ
[
θpiscs
(
cˆs,t +
1− σ
2
cˆ2s,t
)
+ θpibcb
(
cˆb,t +
1− σ
2
cˆ2b,t
)
+(1− θ)piscs
(
cˆ∗s,t +
1− σ
2
(cˆ∗s,t)
2
)
+ (1− θ)pibcb
(
cˆ∗b,t +
1− σ
2
(cˆ∗b,t)
2
)]
+t.i.p.+ ϑ(||Ξ||3)
= λ
{
¯ˆyt +
1
2
(1− σ)¯ˆy2t + σ ¯ˆyt g¯t −
σ
2
[
θ(1− θ)(cˆDt )2
+
piscspibcb
σ2
[
(
¯ˆ
λR,t)
2 + θ(1− θ)(λˆDR,t)2
]]}
+ t.i.p.+ ϑ(||Ξ||3)
= λ
{
¯ˆyt +
1
2
(1− σ)¯ˆy2t + σ ¯ˆyt g¯t −
1
2σ
[
θ(1− θ)pibcb(λˆDR,t)2 + piscspibcb(¯ˆλR,t)2
]}
+t.i.p.+ ϑ(||Ξ||3),
where cˆDt =
(
piscscˆs,t + pibcbcˆb,t
)− (piscscˆ∗s,t + pibcbcˆ∗b,t). The following equations are used in
the above derivation:
¯ˆyt +
1
2
¯ˆy2t − g¯t =
[
θpiscs
(
cˆs,t +
1
2
(cˆs,t)
2
)
+ θpibcb
(
cˆb,t +
1
2
(cˆb,t)
2
)
+(1− θ)piscs
(
cˆ∗s,t +
1
2
(cˆ∗s,t)
2
)
+ (1− θ)pibcb
(
cˆ∗b,t +
1
2
(cˆ∗b,t)
2
)]
+t.i.p.+ ϑ(||Ξ||3),
λˆτ,t = −σcˆτ,t,
λˆs,t = λˆ
∗
s,t + ϑ(||Ξ||2),
cˆDt =
pibcb
σ
λˆDR,t + ϑ(||Ξ||2).
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On the labor side, households’ first-order conditions imply
ψsh
v
s,t
λs,t
=
ψbh
v
b,t
λb,t
= wt.
Together with ht = pishs,t + pibhb,t, we have
hs,t
hs
=
ht
h
(
λs,t
λ
)1/v
λ˜t
,
hb,t
hb
=
ht
h
(
λb,t
λ
)1/v
λ˜t
,
with λ˜t = pis
hs
h
(
λs,t
λ
)1/v
+ pib
hb
h
(
λb,t
λ
)1/v
. The average disutility of labor in Home can be
written as
pisv˜s,t + pibv˜b,t =
1
1 + v
(
ht
λ˜t
)1+v
Λ˜t,
with Λ˜t = pisψs
(
hs
h
)1+v (λs,t
λ
)1+1/v
+ pibψb
(
hb
h
)1+v (λb,t
λ
)1+1/v
. A second-order Taylor
expansion of this equation yields
pisv˜s,t + pibv˜b,t = λ
[
ht − h
h
+
v
2
(
ht − h
h
)2
+
pish˜spibh˜b
2v
λˆ2R,t
]
+ t.i.p.+ ϑ(||Ξ||3),
with h˜τ = hτ/h. To derive an expression for (ht − h)/h in terms of output, I make use of
the production functions and the labor market clearing conditions. For Home, we have
ht − h
h
= 1θh
∫ θ
0 ht(j)dj − 1 = 1θhzt
∫ θ
0 yt(j)dj − 1.
A second-order Taylor expansion of the above equation yields
1
θhzt
θ∫
0
yt(j)dj = Ej
[
yˆt
]
+ 12Varj
[
yˆt
]
+ 12(Ej
[
yˆt
]
)2
−zˆt − zˆtEj
[
yˆt
]
+ t.i.p.+ ϑ(||Ξ||3),
with Ej
[
yˆt
]
= 1θ
∫ θ
0 yˆt(j)dj and Varj
[
yˆt
]
= 1θ
∫ θ
0
(
yˆt(j)− Ej
[
yˆt
])2
dj. Furthermore, from
yt =
[
(1θ )
∫ θ
0 yt(j)
µ−1
µ dj
] µ
µ−1
we have
Ej
[
yˆt
]
= yˆt + ϑ(||Ξ||2),
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Ej
[
yˆt
]
= yˆt − 1
2
µ− 1
µ
Varj
[
yˆt
]
+ ϑ(||Ξ||3).
Using the the above equation to eliminate Ej
[
yˆt
]
, we arrive at
ht − h
h
= yˆt +
1
2
yˆ2t +
1
2µ
Varj
[
yˆt
]− zˆt − zˆtyˆt + t.i.p.+ ϑ(||Ξ||3).
With the corresponding equations for Foreign, on the union-level we have
U
(2)
t = λ
[
¯ˆyt +
1
2
(v + 1) ¯ˆy2t +
1
2
(v + 1) θ(1− θ)τˆ2t
+
1
2µ
(
θVarj
[
yˆH,t
]
+ (1− θ)Varj
[
yˆF,t
])
−θ(v + 1)zˆtyˆt − (1− θ)(v + 1)zˆ∗t yˆ∗t
+
pish˜spibh˜b
2v
[
(
¯ˆ
λR,t)
2 + θ(1− θ)(λˆDR,t)2
] ]
+ t.i.p.+ ϑ(||Ξ||3)
Varj
[
yˆH,t
]
is then substituted for with the following expression
Varj
[
yˆH,t
]
= µ2Varj
[
pˆH,t
]
= µ2
[
αt+1Varj
[
pˆH,−1
]
+
α
1− α
t∑
k=0
αt−k(ΠˆH,k)2
]
.
Finally, we can rewrite the central bank’s objective function as to minimize
−
∞∑
t=0
βtLt + t.i.p.+ ϑ(||Ξ||3),
Lt = (¯ˆyt)
2 +
1
v + σ
[
(v + 1)θ(1− θ)τˆ2t +
µ
K
[
θ(ΠˆH,t)
2 + (1− θ)(ΠˆF,t)2
]
−2θ(v + 1)zˆtyˆt − 2(1− θ)(v + 1)zˆ∗t yˆ∗t − 2σ ¯ˆytg¯t
]
+Ω(
¯ˆ
λR,t)
2 + θ(1− θ)ΩD(λˆDR,t)2
= θ(xt)
2 + (1− θ)(x∗t )2 +
µ
κ
Πˆ2t +
[
1− σ
v + σ
+
µ
κ
]
θ(1− θ)τˆ2
+Ω(
¯ˆ
λR,t)
2 + ΩD(λˆDR,t)
2
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with Ω = 1v+σ
(
pish˜spibh˜b
v +
piscspibcb
σ
)
, ΩD = θ(1−θ)v+σ
(
pish˜spibh˜b
v +
pibcb
σ
)
. xt is the output gap
defined as deviation from the efficient output.
4.A.6 Optimal target criterion in the simplified model
In this section, I characterize optimal monetary policy for the simplified model. Using
the definition of output gap xt and the assumptions outlined in the main text, the Phillips
curve can be rewritten as
Πˆt = βEtΠˆt+1 + κx¯t. (4.A.38)
As discussed in main text, it is furthermore assumed that
ωˆt = −Φ˜piΠˆt − Φ˜y (φT,yyˆt − g˜t) + st
ωˆ∗t = −Φ˜∗piΠˆt − Φ˜∗y (φ∗T,yyˆ∗t − g˜∗t ) + s∗t
¯ˆ
λR,t = −Φ˜λ ¯ˆωt
λˆDR,t = −Φ˜Dλ ωˆDt .
Under these assumptions, the average and regional difference of relative marginal utility
can be expressed as:
¯ˆ
λR,t = Φ˜λ
¯˜Φpi Πˆt + Φ˜λ
¯˜Φy ¯ˆyt (4.A.39)
−Φ˜λ
[
θΦ˜y g˜t + (1− θ)Φ˜∗y g˜∗t + s¯t
]
,
λˆDR,t = Φ˜
D
λ Φ˜
D
pi Πˆt + Φ˜
D
λ Φ˜
D
y
¯ˆyt (4.A.40)
−Φ˜Dλ
[
Φ˜y g˜t − Φ˜∗y g˜∗t + sDt
]
,
with
¯˜Φpi = θΦ˜pi + (1− θ)Φ˜∗pi,
¯˜Φy = θΦ˜yΦT,y + (1− θ)Φ˜∗yΦ∗T,y,
Φ˜Dy = Φ˜yΦT,y − Φ˜∗yΦ∗T,y,
Φ˜Dpi = Φ˜pi − Φ˜∗pi,
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Φ˜Dy = Φ˜yΦT,y − Φ˜∗yΦ∗T,y.
The second-order approximation to the welfare-theoretical loss function (4.12) becomes
Lt = x¯
2
t +
µ
κ
Πˆt + Ω(
¯ˆ
λR,t)
2 + ΩD(λˆDR,t)
2.
Optimal monetary policy is derived by minimizing the expected future discounted value of
Lt subject to the constraints (4.A.38)-(4.A.41). The optimization results in the following
target criterion:
µΠˆt + ∆¯ˆyt + Φ˜yΩ∆
¯ˆ
λR,t + Φ˜
D
y Ω
D∆λˆDR,t
κΦ˜piΩ
ˆ¯λR,t + κΦ˜
D
pi Ω
DλˆDR,t = 0.
The target criterion can also be rewritten in terms of spreads:
µΠˆt + ∆¯ˆxt
−ΩΦ˜λ
[(
Φ˜y + κΦ˜pi
)
¯ˆωt − Φ˜y ¯ˆωt−1
]
−ΩDΦ˜Dλ
[(
Φ˜Dy + κΦ˜
D
pi
)
ωˆDt − Φ˜Dy ωˆDt−1
]
= 0
4.A.7 Coefficients for the adjusted target criterion
This section describes the calibration for the target criterion (4.13) in the main text.
The coefficients are combinations of parameters in the simplified model, whose reduced
forms aim to reflect the microfounded full model.
As shown in Appendix 4.A.6, weights in the welfare-loss function Ω and ΩD are functions
of structural parameters. Under the euro area calibration (see main text), we have
Ω = 0.205, and ΩD = 0.072.
Concerning the parameters Φ˜y and Φ˜
∗
y, the simplifying assumption used in this paper follows
the approach used in Corsetti et al. (2013) in linking the interest rate spread directly with
government deficit. The expression ξ/(pib + sΩ) in their paper corresponds to Φ˜y and Φ˜
∗
y in
this paper.
As the authors have pointed out, when choosing the parameters, one has to take into
account the horizon over which deficits accumulate. In their setup, this means that the
calibration has to reflect the period while the economy is at the zero lower bound. In the
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current setup, deviation from steady state is driven by shocks. Given the persistence of
the disturbances, absent further shocks, it will on average take 16 quarters for the model
variables to return to their steady state after an initial hit. Using the same formula as
suggested in Corsetti et al. (2013), and with steady state debt-to-GDP ratios of 90% in
Home and 130% in Foreign, we have
Φ˜y = 0.042, and Φ˜
∗
y = 0.130.
Turning to Φ˜pi and Φ˜
∗
pi, from equation (4.8) we see that the impact of inflation on the
current government debt - and thus on private sector spreads - are proportional to that of
deficit: Φ˜pi/Φ˜y = χg b
gqg and Φ˜∗pi/Φ˜∗y = χ∗g bg∗qg∗. As a result, we have
Φ˜pi = 0.102, and Φ˜
∗
pi = 0.351.
Finally, solving equation (4.2) forward we have
¯ˆ
λR,t = −
∞∑
j=0
δj ¯ˆωt+j
= −αψ
∞∑
j=0
δj ¯ˆωgt+j
The evolution of the government spreads generally depends on the specific disturbances and
the model calibration. To the extent that the dynamic can be reasonably approximated by
an AR(1) process - as the exogenous disturbances, the above equation can be rewritten as
¯ˆ
λR,t = − α
ψ
1− δρω
¯ˆωgt ,
with ρω ∈ (0, 1) reflecting the persistence of the government spreads. Using equation (4.5)
and following the same arguement, we have
¯ˆ
λDR,t = −
αψ
1− δρω
¯ˆωg,Dt .
Assuming ρω = 0.95, the calculation yields
Φ˜λ = Φ˜
D
λ = 5.641
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Taken all together, we have the following parametization for the target criterion:
7.667 Πˆt + ∆x¯t − 0.045 ¯ˆωt + 0.041 ¯ˆωt−1 + 0.019 ωˆDt − 0.018 ωˆDt−1 = 0.
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4.A.8 Impulse responses under the Taylor rule
Figure 4.8: Impulse responses under the Taylor rule
(a) Impulse response under the Taylor rule and with long-term government bonds, to a technology
shock of 1% (z and z∗)
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(b) Impulse response under the Taylor rule and with long-term government bonds, to a government
spenidng shock of 1% of steady state output (g˜ and g˜∗)
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(c) Impulse response under the Taylor rule and with long-term government bonds, to private sector
financial shocks that increase private sector spreads initially by 1 percentage point (annualized) (s
and s∗)
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(d) Impulse response under the Taylor rule and with long-term government bonds, to a 10
percentage points increase in government debt (g and g∗)
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4.A.9 Impulse responses under alternative monetary policies
Figure 4.9: Impulse responses under alternative monetary policies
(a) Impulse responses (%) to Foreign technology level (z∗), under alternative monetary policies and
with long-term government bonds.
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(b) Impulse responses (%) to Foreign government spending (g∗), under alternative monetary policies
and with long-term government bonds.
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(c) Impulse responses (%) to Foreign private sector spread shock (s∗), under alternative monetary
policies and with long-term government bonds.
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(d) Impulse responses (%) to Foreign government debt shock (g∗), under alternative monetary
policies and with long-term government bonds.
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